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ABSTRACT 
 
SEMRA OZDEMIR: MEASURING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF GOVERNMENT 
PROGRAMS: AN APPLICATION TO EARLY-CHILDHOOD INTERVENTIONS 
(Under the direction of Dale Whittington) 
 
 
Compelling evidence has been found that investing in early-childhood 
development for disadvantaged children has long-term economic benefits to program 
participants and non-participants alike. Public provision of early-childhood intervention 
programs requires allocation of taxpayers’ money to these programs. At a time when the 
opportunity cost of public dollars is very high, it is important to estimate taxpayers’ 
preferences for allocating public funds to early-childhood development programs now for 
benefits that would be accrued years later. The objectives of this dissertation were 1) To 
quantify public’s willingness to pay for reducing childhood poverty in the US; 2) To 
present a budget-allocation framework to measure public demand for specific 
government programs by allowing respondents to express preferences for smaller 
government; and 3) To discuss the presence and implications of asymmetry in stated 
preferences for multiple non-market goods. To achieve these objectives, this study 
utilized stated-preference (SP) survey methods using a contingent valuation survey and 
two discrete-choice experiment surveys. The web-enabled surveys were administered to 
a representative sample of US general population.  
Four findings stand out across the chapters: 1) The population-weighted mean 
WTP for an intensive high-quality early-childhood program was $33 to $52 per year per 
household and was much lower than the annual per household program cost; 2) 
Preferences for supporting early-childhood development programs were correlated with 
iv 
 
ideological perspective, and government involvement seemed to be the main reason for 
the lack of conservatives’ support on the program; 3) The budget-allocation framework 
was used successfully to calculate welfare changes based on changes in disposable 
income and/or reallocation of funding from one government program to another while 
mitigating possible protest responses; and 4) Large asymmetry in preferences was 
observed for taxes and government programs. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Childhood Poverty in the US  
One in every five children lives in poverty in the US (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & 
Smith, 2010). The total economic value of increased production and higher quality of life 
that would accrue if childhood poverty were eliminated in the US was estimated to be 
$500 billion per year in 2008 dollars or 4% of total GDP (Holzer, Schanzenbach, 
Duncan, & Ludwig, 2008). Children who are born into poverty are very likely to have 
lower quality of life when they become adults and pass poverty on to their children as 
well (Francesconi, 2008; Rutter, 2006). 
Poverty has negative effects on the physical, socio-emotional, and cognitive well-
being of children (Evans, 2004). Low-income children experience substantially less 
cognitive stimulation and enrichment in comparison to wealthier children. In addition, 
low-income parents are less involved in their children’s school activities (Nestmann & 
Hurrelmann, 1994) and are less likely to engage with their children in literary activities 
such as reading aloud or visiting a library (Coley, 2002). Furthermore, low-income 
children watch more TV (Larson & Verma, 1999) and have less access to books (G. J. 
Duncan, Brooks‐Gunn, & Klebanov, 1994) and computers (Becker, 2000). It was found 
that less involvement in literacy activities and more time watching television adversely 
affect cognitive development (Coley, 2002; Larson & Verma, 1999).   
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1.2 Early-Childhood Development 
The difference in socio-economic status between the poor and the non-poor 
starts early in childhood and often persists through the rest of someone’s life. Research 
shows that ages 0 through 5 are the sensitive years which affect skill development, 
especially cognitive skill development, more than any other periods of the lifecycle (G. J. 
Duncan et al., 2007; Knudsen, Heckman, Cameron, & Shonkoff, 2006). The skills 
created at an early developmental stage increase the skills acquired at a later stage and 
also increase the productivity of investments in later stages. However, if investments 
start later for children or adolescents in at-risk families, it is harder for these 
children/adolescents to catch up with their counterparts from non-risk families.  
Experimental studies, such as the Perry Preschool (Schweinhart, Montie, Xiang, 
Barnett, Belfield, & Nores, 2005a) and the Abecedarian programs (F. A. Campbell, 
Ramey, Pungello, Sparling, & Miller-Johnson, 2002) show evidence on how enrichment 
of the early environments of children in poor households can make a difference for these 
children in the short and long term. Compared to non-participants, the participants of the 
Perry Program 1) were more likely to have graduated from high school (65% versus 
45%), 2) were more likely to have a full-time job (76% versus 62%), 3) were more likely 
to be home owners (37% versus 28%), 4) were more likely to have a savings account 
(76% versus 50%), and 5) were less likely to have been arrested (36% versus 55%) 
(Schweinhart, Montie, Xiang, Barnett, Belfield, & Nores, 2005b). Compared to non-
participants, the participants of the Abecedarian program 1) scored 1.8 grade years 
higher in reading and 1.3 years higher in math as young adults, 2) were more likely to 
attend a four-year college (36% versus 14%), 3) were more likely to have a skilled job 
(47% versus 27%), 4) were less likely to have had their first child at age 18 or younger 
(26% versus 45%), 5) tended to smoke less (39% versus 55%), and 6) were less likely 
to use marijuana (18% versus 39%) (F. A. Campbell, Pungello, Miller-Johnson, 
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Burchinal, & Ramey, 2001; F. A. Campbell, Ramey, Pungello, Sparling, & Miller-
Johnson, 2002). These findings support a causal link between early-childhood 
development programs and poverty alleviation.   
1.3 The Value of Early-Childhood Development Programs 
A number of studies have conducted economic analyses of experimental early-
childhood development programs by attaching dollar values to realized program 
outcomes (Aos, Lieb, Mayfield, Miller, & Pennucci, 2004; Karoly, 1998; Reynolds, 
Temple, Robertson, & Mann, 2002). These studies, however, differed in terms of what 
economic values they measured based on the outcomes of the experimental programs 
and how these values were measured. Despite their differences, these benefit-cost 
studies have agreed that the cost savings of alleviating the causes of crime, 
unemployment, ill health, and other consequences of social inequities more than offset 
the costs of small-scale, high-quality early-childhood interventions (W. S. Barnett & 
Masse, 2007; Heckman, Moon, Pinto, Savelyev, & Yavitz, 2010). For example, Heckman 
et al. (2010) found an estimated annual social rate of return of 7–10% for the Perry 
project. 
Public provision of early-childhood development services assumes that 
taxpayers’ monies will be allocated to these programs. It is therefore important to 
estimate taxpayers’ preferences for allocating public funds to early-childhood 
development programs. Another important point in understanding public preferences is 
that the social benefits are realized long after the investment cost of early-childhood 
development are born. People might prefer to give priority to more immediate needs in 
the current economic and political climate in the US. The shadow value of public funds 
invested in early-childhood development is therefore greater than the simple cost 
estimates for early-childhood programs would suggest. Policymakers and legislators 
may want to know whether the public is willing to pay for such investments now when 
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they are faced with other social priorities, high unemployment, and a large and growing 
federal deficit. 
1.4 Public Preferences for Government Programs 
The definition of the opportunity cost and the choice of method of payment could 
affect preferences and welfare estimates in stated preference (SP) methods, which have 
been used extensively to measure the value of non-market goods, including publicly 
provided goods and services. Taxes are the most commonly used method of payment 
for eliciting the value of publicly provided goods in SP studies. However, SP studies are 
likely to receive protest responses for new taxes or for any increase in existing taxes in 
the current political climate. This was apparent in focus-group interviews for this study, 
which revealed that some subjects were opposed to any increase in income taxes no 
matter what the purpose of the increase was even if they cared about the social 
problems that government programs targeted. Other subjects suggested that inefficient 
government programs should be reduced to fund good-quality government programs. 
Previous SP studies employed a budget reallocation scenario where they 
measured whether subjects were willing to reallocate existing taxes to a specified public 
program (Bergstrom, Boyle, & Yabe, 2004; Nunes & Travisi, 2009; Swallow & 
McGonagle, 2006), and some also investigated preferences for allocating a fixed amount 
of public dollars among a set of public programs (Blomquist, Newsome, & Stone, 2004; 
Costa-Font & Rovira, 2005). However, these studies did not derive a welfare-theoretic 
estimate of individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP). They also did not specify the exact 
opportunity costs of budget reallocations and the consequences of a funding cut on 
households’ consumption of existing goods and services. Literature shows that the 
framing of the evaluations of a commodity and how the opportunity cost is defined affect 
values (Cummings, Ganderton, & McGuckin, 1994; Hoehn & Loomis, 1993; Neill, 1995). 
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Therefore, a vague definition of the opportunity cost in budget reallocation studies is 
likely to produce invalid welfare estimates.  
1.5 Asymmetry in Stated Preferences 
The gap between WTP and willingness to accept (WTA) has been investigated 
and well documented in previous SP studies (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002), and loss 
aversion and reference dependency has been offered as the primary source for this 
disparity (Bateman, Munro, Rhodes, Starmer, & Sugden, 1997). Loss aversion has been 
measured as a steeper slope of the utility function in the losses domain than in the gains 
domain. Recently, discrete-choice experiment (DCE) studies have found evidence of 
loss aversion in stated preferences and that preferences for an attribute differed 
depending on whether an attribute was defined negatively or positively relative to a 
reference (De Borger & Fosgerau, 2008; Hess, Rose, & Hensher, 2008; Hjorth & 
Fosgerau, 2011; Lanz et al., 2009; Masiero & Hensher, 2010; Masiero & Hensher, 
2011). These studies also suggested that models that did not allow asymmetric 
preferences overestimated WTP and underestimated WTA values. 
These studies, however, were conducted on preferences for private goods; 
specifically all but one were transportation studies, focusing on asymmetry in 
preferences for time and money. It is not obvious whether individuals value gains and 
losses differently for public programs where benefits would accrue mostly to others 
compared to how they value gains and losses for private decisions; and whether the 
degree of preference asymmetry change based on the method of payment. Previous 
studies also have focused on one good at a time and did not provide information on how 
preference asymmetry could affect marginal rate of substitution among goods when 
multiple goods are evaluated jointly.  
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1.6 Objectives  
This dissertation was written in a 3-paper format. The first paper (chapter 2) 
approximated the value of reducing childhood poverty via two different measures: 1) the 
value of a high-quality government program for early-childhood development and 2) the 
value of living in a country with lower childhood poverty rates than the US. The former 
focused on an intervention and aimed to estimate the value of solving the problem 
through an early-childhood program. The latter focused only on the outcome, with no 
reference to the means of reducing childhood poverty. This paper quantifies whether the 
U.S. public would be willing to pay for government programs to reduce childhood poverty 
in the US. 
The second paper (chapter 3) presents a budget-allocation framework to 
measure public demand for specific government programs. This framework offered 
increases as well as reductions in government programs and income taxes which 
allowed respondents to express preferences for smaller government. This type of 
framework aimed to decrease possible scenario rejection for new or higher taxes. The 
opportunity cost of moving public dollars among or spending private dollars on different 
government programs were linked to the changes in the outcomes of these programs to 
allow researchers to estimate the dollar values or changes in other government 
programs that would offset a change in the particular government program of interest. 
This paper also investigated whether the value of an early-childhood development 
program is independent of the other programs competing for the same resources by 
comparing the program with other alternative programs in different versions of the 
survey instrument.  
The third paper (chapter 4) investigated the presence and implications of 
asymmetry in stated preferences for increases and reductions in multiple non-market 
goods. This paper approached the question of valuing gains and losses from two distinct 
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perspectives by investigating whether individuals treat gains and losses differently for 
social versus private decisions. This paper also distinguished the degree and 
implications of asymmetry in preferences for goods and money. By investigating 
asymmetry in preferences for multiple goods in a joint-evaluation setting, this paper 
verified preference asymmetry in the marginal rates of substitution among goods. This 
paper also explored whether the degree of asymmetry differed for income taxes and 
cost-of-living expenses and how this affects different welfare measures. 
1.7 Conceptual Framework 
Reducing childhood poverty provides benefits to taxpayers, such as reduced 
crime rate, increased labor productivity and reduced welfare use, and benefits to 
children in poverty and their families who receive help. The benefits to children can be 
divided into two categories: 1) Benefits they receive during childhood, such as better 
nutrition and better health care, and 2) benefits they receive later in life, such as higher 
earnings, better quality of life, and higher next-generation earnings. 
Altruistic individuals care not only about their own share of social benefits but 
also about benefits to child beneficiaries and other taxpayers. The literature 
distinguishes between paternalistic and non-paternalistic, or pure, altruism. Pure altruism 
refers to the situation where an individual (altruist) values the welfare of another 
individual (beneficiary), whereas paternalistic altruism refers to the situation where the 
altruist values the beneficiary’s consumption of particular merit goods, irrespective of the 
beneficiary’s preferences.  
An individual’s utility for childhood poverty rates thus is a function of benefits to 
taxpayers GN where N represents taxpayers, and benefits to children in the short term 
when they are children (BCM) and benefits in the long term (BLM), where M represents 
the number of children who receive help. Notation can be used to differentiate social 
benefits to oneself (Gn) and to other taxpayers (G-n), where n represents an individual 
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and –n represents all other taxpayers. Altruism usually is represented analytically by the 
entry of the beneficiary’s consumption of the good into the utility function of the altruist if 
paternalistic; by the entry of the beneficiary’s utility function into the altruist’s utility 
function if pure. Hence, individual n’s utility function for childhood-poverty levels would 
be  
    (          (   )           (       )   )  
where  
      ⁄    ,        ⁄    ,        ⁄    ,  
       ⁄    ,        ⁄    ,       ⁄      
and    is individual n’s disposable income. If the utility function is additive it can be 
decomposed into three components:  
1) self-motivated or private utility:   
       (     ),  
2) paternalistic altruism:   
         (           ), and  
3) pure altruism:   
          (   (   )   (       )).  
1.8 Methods 
The research objectives were realized by employing three SP surveys. These 
methods were developed to obtain money-equivalent values for goods and services for 
which there are no market prices, or for which market prices are poor measures of social 
values. Two of the surveys were developed as a DCE while one of them was developed 
as a CV survey. Market researchers as well as environmental and health economists 
have employed such SP methods as CV and DCEs since the 1970s (Green & Rao, 
1971; Green & Wind, 1975; Mitchell & Carson, 1989; Randall et al., 1974). These 
methods have been recommended for use in benefit-cost analysis for resource-
allocation decisions (Boyle, 2003; Hanley, Ryan, & Wright, 2003). CV has been used to 
quantify subjects’ WTP for a particular intervention in a hypothetical market for non-
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market goods (Bishop & Welsh, 1992; Diener, O'Brien, & Gafni, 1998; Mitchell & Carson, 
1990). DCEs were specifically designed to provide information about individuals’ 
willingness to accept trade-offs among alternatives with multiple features (Boxall, 
Adamowicz, Swait, Williams, & Louviere, 1996; F. R. Johnson & Desvousges, 1997; F. 
R. Johnson et al., 2009; Özdemir, Johnson, & Hauber, 2009). DCE quantifies the implicit 
utility parameters of features and feature levels elicited through a series of trade-off 
tasks that require subjects to choose among alternative profiles with different 
combinations of features. Estimated utility parameters then can be used to calculate the 
relative importance of each feature and WTP for changes in alternative features.  
A CV survey measured subjects’ willingness to pay for high-quality, intensive 
early-childhood development programs at federal and state levels. This CV survey was 
designed to focus solely on childhood poverty as well as to address possible public 
concerns related to the relative roles of federal and state governments in investing in 
early-childhood programs. A second survey measured public’s budgetary preferences 
for increasing or reducing taxes, and the early-childhood program was compared to 
other government programs of similar sizes. This DCE survey was developed to account 
for concerns with the growing federal budget deficit and competing social priorities and 
to reduce possible aversion to tax increases by accommodating preferences for both 
smaller and larger government. A third survey assessed the value of living in a country 
with higher or lower childhood-poverty rates than the US. This third survey focused on 
the outcomes alone and avoided any discussion of possible interventions.  
The first paper (chapter 2) uses information from all three surveys, while the 
second paper (chapter 3) only employs the DCE survey on budgetary preferences. The 
third paper (chapter 4) uses information from the two DCE surveys on budget and 
country preferences. All three surveys were web-enabled and administered in June 2012 
by GfK Knowledge Networks (KN) to members of their nationally representative, U.S. 
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general population panel. The CV survey targeted 1,500 observations, while the second 
and third surveys targeted 2,000 and 1,000 observations, respectively.  
1.9 Empirical Approach 
This study approximated the value of reducing childhood poverty using two 
different approaches: 1) the value of a high-quality government program for early-
childhood development in the CV and budget surveys, and 2) the value of living in a 
country with different levels of childhood poverty rates in the country survey. The CV and 
budget surveys facilitated an ex-ante evaluation of these programs such that the benefits 
associated with reducing childhood poverty are a function of a number of factors as 
follows: 
    (    ): Benefits to taxpayers are a function of perceived effectiveness of the 
program (  ) and time (t). Time plays a role in social benefits in this context because 
there is latency between investing in young children and realized social benefits. 
Children participate in the early-childhood program when they are very young but most 
social benefits are observed as they become teenagers and adults. The success of the 
programs depends on their effectiveness, and because these programs are evaluated 
ex-ante, individuals have a perception of how effective the programs are, denoted by   . 
     (  ): Perceived benefits to children from participating in the early-childhood 
program are a function of perceived legitimacy (  ). Individuals could think that early-
childhood is a private matter; it is not a legitimate role of government to intervene.  
     (    ): Long-term benefits to children are a function of perceived effectiveness 
of the program (  ) and time (t). There is latency between participating in the early-
childhood program and children receiving benefits, such as higher earnings. As in the 
case of social benefits, perceived effectiveness affects what an individual thinks the 
long-term benefits would be for children.  
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    (       ) : Perceived effectiveness is a function of the number of children 
beneficiaries (M), the type of institution funding the program (I), ideology (D) and socio-
economic characteristics (Z). The number of children is related to the scalability of the 
program: whether small-scale programs can be implemented successfully for large 
numbers of children or not. The trust and confidence in the funding institution affects 
perceived effectiveness. The perceived effectiveness can also be correlated with 
ideology and other socio-economic characteristics.  
 If individual n thinks that the early-childhood program is not effective in helping 
children break out of poverty, then   (  ) and   (   ) would be zero.  
 If individual n thinks that the early-childhood program is not effective in producing 
social benefits at scale (but might help some children), then only   (  ) would 
be zero. This could be the case when an individual thinks that these programs 
would not reduce childhood poverty overall but could help some children have 
better lives.  
 If individual n thinks that it is not legitimate for government to intervene in early-
childhood development, then   (   )  would be zero. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that   (   ) would be zero although most individuals who 
think “it is not government’s job to intervene in early-childhood development” are 
expected to have low perceived effectiveness for government programs as well. 
 A purely altruistic individual n could have positive   (   (   )   (       )) 
even if the program has low perceived effectiveness. 
In the CV survey, individual n’s utility for an early-childhood program would be    
 (  (    )    (  )    (   )    (  )    (  )   (       )   ) .Social benefits to 
other taxpayers and benefits to children are not a function of time (t) when they enter  
individual n’s utility function because altruistic benefits are received right away when 
 12 
 
helping children even though the consumption of these benefits by others would be in 
the future. That is why an individual’s own share of social benefits is a function of time 
(t), while altruistic benefits are not. This study tested whether WTP was affected by 
whether the program was funded by the federal government (IF) or state government 
(IS). The preference for federal versus state government enters into the utility function 
through perceived effectiveness. Individuals can have more or less trust and confidence 
in federal government over state government. The indirect utility function can be 
specified as      ( 
            )  where X
CHILD is a vector of perceived benefits 
associated with the early-childhood program as described above, and    denotes 
individual n’s socio-economic characteristics. WTP for the early-childhood program is the 
solution to the following equation 
  (  
            )    (  
               ) (1.1) 
where   
      denotes benefits at the status quo and   
      denotes improved benefits. 
The budget survey investigated the value of increasing or decreasing four 
government programs, including the early-childhood program. In the budget survey, 
individual n’s utility function for budget preferences would be 
   
 (  (    )    (  )    (   )    (  )    (  )   (       )  
                 ) 
where XFOOD is a vector of benefits associated with a food-safety program, XJOB and XDIS 
are vectors of benefits associated with job-training and disaster-relief programs, 
respectively. The benefits associated with the early-childhood program are the same as 
in the CV survey. Individual n chooses alternative i over alternative j (i ≠ j) if and only if 
  (  
        
       
      
               )
   (  
        
       
      
              )  (       ) 
(1.2) 
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where     and     are the error terms. This study also tested whether the value of an 
early-childhood program depends on other government programs it is compared to. For 
example, this study tested whether WTP for the early-childhood program at the level 
described in alternative i are the same when calculated based on Equation 1.3a versus 
Equation 1.3b while everything else is held at the status quo: 
  (  
        
       
          )    (  
        
       
              ) (1.3a) 
  (  
        
       
            )    (  
        
       
                ) (1.3b) 
The country survey asked subjects to choose between countries with different 
levels of childhood poverty rates, environmental quality, and access to health care. 
Subjects were asked to make a decision for themselves and their family on where to live 
and faced a higher (lower) cost of living for better (lower) quality of life. Although the 
decision seems to affect only the decision maker, a lower childhood poverty rate also 
means better social benefits to the rest of society and benefits to these children and their 
families. The same benefits described earlier for both the CV and budget surveys apply 
to the country survey as well. However, the main difference between the country survey 
and the other surveys was that benefits already are realized (no latency) and are not a 
function of time or perceived effectiveness. An individual can benefit from lower 
childhood poverty rate whenever the (hypothetical) relocation occurs. Hence, individual 
n’s utility for living in a society with lower childhood poverty rate would be    
 (      (   )           (       )  
               )  where X
ENVR and XHEALTH 
are vectors of benefits associated with environmental quality and access to health care, 
respectively. Individual n chooses country i over country j (i ≠ j) if and only if 
  (  
        
       
                )   
  (  
        
       
               )   (       )  
(1.4) 
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Altruism plays a role in all surveys, but, could be less prominent in the country 
survey than in the other surveys. In the country survey, the individual contribution to 
reducing childhood poverty is less obvious. Subjects pay indirectly for lower childhood 
poverty through a higher cost of living.  It might not be as obvious that the higher cost of 
living contributes to helping children in poverty and reducing childhood poverty as in the 
other surveys. In the CV and budget surveys subjects evaluated mechanisms to help 
children and reduce childhood poverty, and so they might care more about a project that 
they are involved in more actively, especially if they agree with the method of 
intervention. This implies that no or low levels of altruism should generate lower WTP 
when everything else is held constant. Moreover, ideology does not play a role in the 
country survey because the benefits are assumed to be realized immediately when the 
household moves to the selected country, and there is no discussion of the type of 
intervention in this survey.  
 The CV and budget surveys were developed to measure the value of a high-
quality intensive early-childhood program. However, if subjects evaluated the early-
childhood program as a way to expand government services (large versus small 
government) rather than as an intervention to reduce childhood poverty, then these 
subjects did not value the targeted commodity as the survey instruments intended. If that 
was the case, these subjects evaluated “government intervention” or “government role” 
as a commodity rather than the early-childhood program. However, it is hard to 
distinguish whether subjects evaluated a different commodity or whether they did not 
believe that the early-childhood programs could produce successful outcomes in helping 
children break out of poverty. The CV and budget surveys also asked subjects to 
evaluate these programs as taxpayers, not as program participants. Although the 
sample consisted of likely participants of this kind of programs, WTP values do not 
necessarily reflect an individual’s utility as a potential program participant. The country 
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survey, on the other hand, was developed to measure the value of living in a society with 
lower (or higher) childhood poverty rates than the current rate in the US. This survey 
also asked subjects to evaluate better (or worse) quality of life as taxpayers, not as 
someone in poverty who could potentially receive more direct benefits. 
1.10 Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapters 2-4 were written in manuscript format. Chapter 2 (the first paper) 
measures the value to the U.S. citizens of reducing childhood poverty in the US. Chapter 
3 (the second paper) shows how a discrete-choice experiment survey can be used to 
create a budget-allocation framework to elicit public preferences for specific government 
programs. Chapter 4 (the third paper) investigates the implications of asymmetry in 
stated preferences for non-market goods. They are followed in Chapter 5 by the 
conclusions and discussion of the overall results from the three papers. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 2 
PUBLIC’S WILLINGNESS TO PAY FOR REDUCING CHILDHOOD POVERTY 
IN THE US 
2.1 Introduction 
High childhood poverty in the US has been associated with high-school dropout rates 
among native-born children (Heckman & LaFontaine, 2010) and low labor productivity (G. J. 
Duncan, Magnuson, Kalil, & Ziol-Guest, 2012; Heckman, 2008). Much of the difference in 
socio-economic status between poor and non-poor adults can be traced back to early 
childhood (Heckman, 2008). The total economic value of increased production and higher 
quality of life that would accrue if childhood poverty were eliminated in the US was 
estimated to be $500 billion per year in 2008 dollars or 4% of total GDP (Holzer et al., 2008). 
This estimate included reductions in the annual aggregate US production of goods and 
services associated with childhood poverty, as well as reduced safety and well-being 
because of crime and poor health associated with adults who have grown up poor. 
Compelling evidence has been found that investing in early-childhood education for 
disadvantaged children has long-term economic benefits to program participants and non-
participants alike (W. S. Barnett & Masse, 2007; Heckman et al., 2010). 
In his State of the Union speech in February 2013, President Obama called upon 
Congress to expand access to high-quality preschool for every child in the US, in 
acknowledgment that the beginning years of a child’s life are critical for building the 
necessary foundation for success in school and in life. The president proposed federal-state 
initiatives to improve quality and expand preschool to low- and middle-income 4-year olds, 
maintain and expand current Early Head Start and Head Start programs, and expand 
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professional, evidence-based home visits to at-risk families. As he proposed to accomplish 
these initiatives without contributing to the federal budget deficit, the president assured the 
public that every tax dollar spent on such investments returns seven dollars. However, it is 
not clear whether the American public is willing to pay for or allocate government funding to 
such interventions now, in order to obtain benefits that may accrue largely to others in the 
future. The opportunity cost of public funds is very high in the current fiscal climate, when 
government is trying to find ways to cut spending. 
The objective of this study was to quantify willingness to pay for reducing childhood 
poverty in the US. Reducing childhood poverty is a heterogeneous good, meaning that both 
the outcome (i.e., whether and how much childhood poverty is reduced) and the process 
(i.e., how childhood poverty is reduced) come into play. Measuring the value of reducing 
childhood poverty involves tackling both of these components. This study approximated the 
value of reducing childhood poverty via two different measures: 1) the value of a high-quality 
government program for early-childhood development and 2) the value of living in a country 
with lower childhood poverty rates than the US. The former focused on an intervention and 
aimed to estimate the value of solving the problem through an early-childhood program. The 
latter focused only on the outcome, with no reference to the means of reducing childhood 
poverty. This study utilized stated-preference (SP) survey methods to measure ex ante 
willingness to pay (WTP) for reducing childhood poverty. 
An ex-ante valuation poses several challenges to valuing an early-childhood 
program. First, a government program on early-childhood development is susceptible to 
polarized ideological views about the appropriate role and size of government; in addition, 
some individuals consider early-childhood development to be a private domain and oppose 
outside intervention. Second, some individuals could be skeptical about the ability of 
government programs to produce successful outcomes and could therefore question the 
effectiveness of early-childhood development programs when they are evaluated ex ante. 
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Third, some individuals could be skeptical about the likely success of early-childhood 
programs when they are implemented at scale. Fourth, government programs are financed 
through taxes or public borrowing: not only does investing in young children compete with 
other publicly provided goods and services for allocations from the public budget, some 
taxpayers could object to increases in their taxes for any purpose. Fifth, the investment cost 
of early-childhood development has to be borne long before the benefits to society are 
realized; people might prefer to invest tax revenues in social priorities that they think require 
more immediate attention. 
Three SP survey instruments were developed to achieve the objectives of this 
research. The first two focused on the value of a particular intervention (i.e., early-childhood 
programs) and the third focused on poverty reduction without reference to a particular 
process. In a contingent-valuation survey (hereafter, CV survey) this study measured 
subjects’ willingness to pay for high-quality, intensive early-childhood development 
programs at federal and state levels. This CV survey was designed to focus solely on 
childhood poverty as well as to address possible public concerns related to the relative roles 
of federal and state governments in investing in early-childhood development. To reduce 
possible aversion to tax increases, and to account for concerns with the growing federal 
budget deficit and competing social priorities, this study developed a discrete-choice 
experiment (DCE) survey that accommodated preferences for both smaller government and 
larger government. This survey (hereafter, budget survey) measured public preferences for 
increasing or reducing taxes and early-childhood programs compared to other government 
programs of similar sizes. A third survey focused on the outcomes alone and avoided any 
discussion of possible interventions. This DCE survey (hereafter, country survey) assessed 
the value of living in a country with higher or lower childhood-poverty rates than the US. All 
three surveys were web-enabled and administered in June 2012 by GfK Knowledge 
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Networks (KN) to about 4,800 members of their nationally representative, U.S. general 
population panel.  
The next section provides background on the previous literature. The third section 
presents the research methods. The fourth section discusses the study design, which was 
developed based on information from focus-group and pretest interviews. The fifth and sixth 
sections provide details on the survey design and survey development.  The seventh and 
eight sections present information on survey administration protocol and statistical analysis. 
The ninth and tenth sections of the paper present the results and the discussion. 
2.2 Background 
The difference in socio-economic status between the poor and the non-poor starts in 
early childhood, often persists through the rest of their lives, and is often passed on to their 
children. Poverty has been found to have negative effects on the physical, socio-emotional, 
and cognitive well-being of children (Evans, 2004). Cunha et al. (Cunha, Heckman, & 
Schennach, 2010) showed that children’s experiences from ages 0 through 5 affect skill 
development, especially cognitive skill development, more than during any other periods of 
the lifecycle. Skills acquired at one stage affect the skills acquired in later stages and 
increase the productivity of later investments (Cunha & Heckman, 2007). Enhancements of 
family environments improve child outcomes and affect both cognitive and non-cognitive 
skills. If investments in children or adolescents from at-risk families begin later, it is harder 
for these children/adolescents to catch up with their counterparts from non-risk families. 
Heckman (Heckman, 2008) has shown that investments in the early years provide the 
highest returns among alternative investments in different life stages and that the rate of 
return from investments at different stages indicates the highest returns are achieved 
between 0 and 5 years, especially between 0 and 3. Thus, the timing of the investments in 
children matters and investing on childhood development in the early years of life seems to 
be crucial. 
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A number of early-childhood programs have been investigated closely (Aos et al., 
2004; Karoly, 1998; Reynolds et al., 2002). (For a survey of the early-childhood programs, 
please refer to (Karoly, Kilburn, & Cannon, 2005).) The Perry Preschool Project 
(Schweinhart, Montie, Xiang, Barnett, Belfield, & Nores, 2005a) and the Abecedarian project 
(F. A. Campbell, Ramey, Pungello, Sparling, & Miller-Johnson, 2002) are two of the best 
known experimental early-childhood programs. These were rigorous empirical studies that 
compared a treatment group to a control group, with long-term follow-up data. The Perry 
Preschool Project was administered to 58 disadvantaged African American children in 
Ypsilanti, Michigan between 1962 and 1967. The treatment consisted of five weekday-
mornings, 2.5-hour classroom sessions and one 90-minute home visit by the teacher on a 
weekday afternoon. The length of each preschool year was 30 weeks. To date, the 
Abecedarian project was the most intensive early-childhood program offered to young 
children at risk for development delays and school failure (F. A. Campbell et al., 2001; F. A. 
Campbell, Ramey, Pungello, Sparling, & Miller-Johnson, 2002). The program ran full-day, 
year-round, and continued until kindergarten entry in Chapel Hill, NC. Between 1972 and 
1977, 57 infants were randomly assigned to receive early educational intervention and 54 
infants were assigned to a control group. The curriculum involved educational “games” that 
emphasized development skills in cognition and language. Children also received 
healthcare on site from a staff pediatrician. The latest measurements of participant 
outcomes from these programs were conducted when the Perry participants were 40 years 
old and the Abecedarian participants were 21 years old. These measurements found 
achievements in education, earnings, social behavior, and health (Abecedarian only) for the 
children in the treatment group that persisted long after the programs had ended.  
Previous studies have conducted economic analyses of experimental early-childhood 
development programs by attaching dollar values to realized program outcomes. A direct 
comparison of the benefit-cost findings of different programs could be misleading, however, 
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because there were variations in outcomes of the programs’ targets and measures as well 
as in the economic values the benefit-cost studies attached to these outcomes (Karoly, 
2010)(Karoly, 2010). Early-childhood programs have varied in terms of their goals, duration, 
timing, intensity, targeting criteria, and control-group definitions (Karoly et al., 2005). For 
example, the status quo for the Perry project, which lasted about 1.5 years for each child, 
was no formal early-childhood program, whereas the Abecedarian project lasted 5 years 
and provided some health, developmental, and family services to the control group. 
The economic evaluation of these studies also varied in terms of what outcomes 
were measured and how they were measured. Previous literature has included educational 
achievements (e.g., reduced grade repetition and special education) and increased earnings 
as benefits to the participants in the Perry Preschool Project, as well as tax savings 
associated with educational achievements,1 reduced crime (e.g., reduced victim costs and 
criminal justice system costs including police, court, and correctional costs), and reduced 
welfare use 2  as benefits to the taxpayers. Researchers have also calculated future-
generation earnings, maternal earnings, and savings from improved health (as reduced 
smoking) as benefits to the participants in the Abecedarian Project. Monetization of 
outcomes such as a reduced crime rate is challenging, however, and requires several 
assumptions that have varied across economic studies (W. S. Barnett, 1993; Heckman et 
al., 2010). Karoly (2010) has offered a set of guidelines for the standardization of benefit-
cost analysis on early-childhood programs. 
The main conclusion of previous benefit-cost studies is that they provide evidence of 
high economic returns to society. The benefit-cost analysis conducted by Barnett and Masse 
(W. S. Barnett & Masse, 2007) found a benefit-cost ratio of 2.5 for the Abecedarian Project, 
                                                 
1
 Educational achievements also led to longer time in school, which created further costs for taxpayers. 
2
 Because welfare payments are a transfer from taxpayers to the program participants, the administrative welfare 
costs are the only net costs associated with welfare.  
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and a corresponding figure of 9 for the Perry project. In a recent study, Heckman et al. 
(2010) found an estimated annual social rate of return of 7–10% for the Perry project. The 
internal rate of return was around 6.3 for the participants and ranged between 8.1 and 9.2 
for society overall, including non-participants. The net benefits to the non-participants 
constituted between 55% and 72% of the total net benefits, depending on the assumptions 
on the costs associated with crime and the deadweight cost of taxation.  
Previous benefit-cost analysis studies have calculated the cost savings from 
investing in children in poverty or the return on investing in young children in poverty. These 
types of valuations are different than the WTP measure that was the focus of this study. 
WTP in this study theoretically includes the perceived value of individual share of the social 
benefits and altruism. Possible social benefits can be listed as reduced crime rate, 
increased labor productivity and reduced welfare use. Altruism (i.e., caring about the welfare 
of others) is one of the reasons people make donations to publicly provided goods or 
contribute to a common pool, according to empirical (Viscusi, Magat, & Forrest, 1988; 
Vázquez Rodríguez & León, 2004) and experimental (Andreoni, 1995; Andreoni & Miller, 
2003; Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001) literature. Coate (Coate, 1995) showed that 
altruism provides an efficiency rationale for public provision of insurance to the poor. 
Similarly, individuals might care that society in general benefit from reducing childhood 
poverty and might want to help disadvantaged children, who are in poverty through no fault 
of their own, to get out of poverty and have a better future if they are altruists. They also 
might support the program for the short-term benefits children receive during their 
participation. An ex-ante evaluation of benefits perceived by a subject, however, could be 
quite different than monetary values attached to ex-post (realized) outcomes. For example, 
one of the largest benefits associated with these programs calculated in the literature was 
savings from reduced crime, yet it was not obvious how much each subject in this study 
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considered reduced crime as one of the benefits she or the rest of society would receive 
from reduced childhood poverty.  
Previous benefit-cost studies have shown that the cost savings of alleviating the 
causes of crime, unemployment, ill health, and other consequences of social inequities more 
than offset the costs of small-scale, high-quality early-childhood interventions (W. S. Barnett 
& Masse, 2007; Heckman et al., 2010). Public provision of these services requires allocation 
of taxpayers’ money to these programs, however, and the opportunity cost of public dollars 
is very high in the current economic climate. The investment cost of early-childhood 
development has to be borne long before the social benefits are realized. People might 
prefer to give priority to more immediate needs, in addition to government efforts to find 
ways to cut spending while continuing to provide current services. Thus, the shadow value 
of investing on early-childhood development is greater than the simple cost estimates for 
early-childhood programs would suggest. It is therefore important to estimate taxpayers’ 
preferences for allocating public funds to early-childhood development programs now, 
keeping in mind that the benefits would be accrued years later. Policymakers and legislators 
may want to know not only that returns on investments in early-childhood development are 
economically attractive from an overall societal perspective, but also the strength of support 
of non-participants for such programs and their willingness to pay for such investments. The 
public might or might not be willing to pay for these interventions now when they are faced 
with other social priorities, high unemployment, and a large and growing federal deficit.  
2.3 Methods 
SP survey methods were used for an ex-ante evaluation of the U.S. public’s 
willingness to pay for reducing childhood poverty. These methods were developed to obtain 
money-equivalent values for goods and services for which there are no market prices, or for 
which market prices are poor measures of social values. Market researchers as well as 
environmental and health economists have employed such SP methods as CV and DCEs 
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since the 1970s (Green & Rao, 1971; Green & Wind, 1975; Mitchell & Carson, 1989; 
Randall et al., 1974). These methods have been recommended for use in benefit-cost 
analysis for resource-allocation decisions (Boyle, 2003; Hanley, Ryan, & Wright, 2003). CV 
has been used to quantify subjects’ WTP for a particular intervention in a hypothetical 
market in environmental and health applications (Bishop & Welsh, 1992; Diener et al., 1998; 
Mitchell & Carson, 1990). DCEs were specifically designed to provide information about 
individuals’ willingness to accept trade-offs among alternatives with multiple features (Boxall 
et al., 1996; F. R. Johnson & Desvousges, 1997; F. R. Johnson et al., 2009; Özdemir et al., 
2009). DCE quantifies the implicit utility parameters of features and feature levels elicited 
through a series of trade-off tasks that require subjects to choose among alternative profiles 
with different combinations of features. Estimated utility parameters then can be used to 
calculate the relative importance of each feature and WTP for changes in alternative 
features.  
2.4 Focus Groups and Study Design  
SP survey development heavily relies on focus-group interviews and pretesting of 
the survey instrument, especially for research topics in areas where these methods have not 
been much utilized. To the best of our knowledge, SP methods have not been used to 
estimate willingness to pay for childhood-poverty programs; moreover, there is a general 
lack of data on people’s opinions about and attitudes toward the problem of childhood 
poverty in the US. Therefore, focus-group interviews were conducted to understand people’s 
opinions about childhood poverty and what factors might influence their preferences for 
reducing it. This information was used to develop the survey instruments. Forty-nine adult 
U.S. residents were interviewed in 2008 in Raleigh, NC, Chicago, IL, and Dallas, TX.  
These interviews revealed that the majority of the subjects had experienced poverty 
directly or indirectly. Some subjects stated that they had been poor in the past, some were 
poor in the present, and others had family members who had experienced poverty. A 
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significant portion of the subjects indicated that they were currently living paycheck to 
paycheck. Breaking the cycle of poverty seemed to be the main motivation for these 
people’s desire to reduce childhood poverty in the US. Also, several subjects observed that 
reducing childhood poverty would increase labor productivity and decrease crime rates, in 
acknowledgment that poverty has been a real burden to society. Some subjects suggested 
that poverty is not widely publicized or acknowledged in the US. The following sections 
discuss the main topics from the focus-group interviews that shaped the study design. 
2.4.1 Intervention versus Outcome 
Some of the first questions raised during the focus-group interviews were how 
childhood poverty would be reduced and whether it is actually possible to achieve this 
outcome. To create a realistic and credible scenario, this study focused on early-childhood 
programs that have produced successful child outcomes and Heckman et al.’s research on 
this topic. Because these successful programs were implemented at smaller scales, this 
study used government interventions into early-childhood development that provide high-
quality services (e.g., Perry and Abecedarian) to illustrate nationwide impact. Although 
evidence of program success was provided, focus-group participants were skeptical that a 
possible large-scale government program on early-childhood development would work 
effectively and produce successful outcomes. About half of the interviewees stated that 
current government programs were not effective in reducing childhood poverty. There 
seemed to be two reasons for this skepticism. First, people doubted whether the success of 
small-scale experimental programs could be replicated at larger scales. Second, people 
doubted whether government programs could produce successful outcomes as other 
programs had done. In the former, skepticism was related to scalability; in the latter, it was 
related to the involvement of government.  
The focus-group discussions also revealed that many subjects had strong ideological 
beliefs about the role of government. Many stated that government should spend more 
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money on programs to reduce poverty and associated problems, while others opined that it 
was not government’s responsibility to fund such programs and that extended family, 
churches, and local communities should be involved in early-childhood development. These 
opinions tended to be highly associated with political ideology. Previous research has shown 
that, in U.S. policy debates, political ideology, party affiliation, and political trust are highly 
associated with beliefs about government spending. In general, Democrats and liberals are 
more likely to support spending than Republicans and conservatives are (Jacoby, 1994; 
Jacoby, 2006). People who lack political trust (Rudolph & Evans, 2005) and confidence in 
institutions (Eismeier, 1982) are more likely to favor reductions in government spending. 
This study found in the focus-group interviews that valuing programs to reduce 
childhood poverty was largely inseparable from views on the appropriate size and role of 
government, perceptions about the effectiveness of U.S. government programs, and other 
real-world complications. This inseparability was a consequence of the type of good being 
evaluated, which would have been part of real-life decision making on this topic. Valuing 
poverty levels apart from process considerations could mitigate such confounding factors. 
The third survey attempted to mitigate these effects by taking people out of the U.S. political 
context and avoiding discussions about the specific type of interventions that might be 
needed to reduce childhood poverty. 
2.4.2 Federal versus State Programs 
Some subjects in the focus-group interviews expressed mistrust of federal 
government in general and were reluctant to support federal poverty-alleviation programs. 
Some subjects also cared about whether programs were funded by federal, state, or local 
governments. These findings are consistent with previous studies that have shown trust in 
government is low (Chanley, Rudolph, & Rahn, 2000; Citrin, 1974; Dalton, 2005). In a 2012 
opinion survey, the Pew Research Center found that the favorable rating was only 33% for 
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the federal government but 52% for state government3. State governments received slightly 
higher ratings than the federal government for being mostly honest (49% versus 31%), 
addressing people’s needs (42% versus 30%) and being generally efficient (38% versus 
24%).  
2.4.3 Aversion to Tax Increases 
The focus-group discussions also revealed that some subjects were against any 
increase in taxes, no matter what the purpose for the increase was, even if they cared about 
childhood poverty. Some of these subjects also stated that they were unwilling to accept a 
bigger burden as taxpayers while almost half of U.S. citizens do not pay federal income 
taxes. In a pilot study conducted in 2008, about 35% of subjects who said “no” to a tax 
increase reported that other government programs should be reduced to fund early-
childhood programs. Childhood poverty is one of a number of competing social concerns, 
and early-childhood programs are only some of the many competing government programs 
that require allocations from public dollars. This perception of competition and aversion to 
tax increases bring up questions about how important childhood poverty is, compared to 
other programs, and whether subjects would be willing to cut funding from other government 
programs in favor of early-childhood programs. Several studies have shown that subjects 
and policy makers care about the mechanism by which funds have been raised (Johnston, 
Swallow, & Weaver, 1999; Stevens, DeCoteau, & Willis, 1997) and the method of payment 
affects individuals’ preferences (Champ & Bishop, 2001; Ivehammar, 2009; Mazur & 
Bennett, 2010; Wiser, 2007). 
2.5 Survey Design 
Three survey instruments were developed to measure the value of reducing 
childhood poverty while addressing the issues revealed during the focus-group interviews: 
                                                 
3
 Accessed at the website of the Pew Research Center at http://www.people-press.org/2012/04/26/growing-gap-
in-favorable-views-of-federal-state-governments/ on October 11, 2012.  
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 CV survey. This instrument focused solely on poverty and asked subjects 
whether they would be willing to pay higher taxes for a high-quality early-
childhood development program. This survey was designed to test in a between-
sample experiment whether preferences would be different for federal-level and 
state-level programs.  
 Budget survey. This DCE survey presented hypothetical budget alternatives in 
which the early-childhood program was evaluated with three other government 
programs and individual tax burdens that go to pay for them. It presented the 
issue as a part of a budget-allocation problem in which a group of programs was 
competing for the same resources, in order to highlight the opportunity cost of 
public dollars. The survey was developed to address possible aversion to tax 
increases by offering reductions in taxes and in early-childhood programs, 
allowing for preferences for a smaller government. 
 Country survey. This DCE survey asked subjects to imagine moving to a 
different, hypothetical country that was defined in terms of childhood poverty, 
environmental quality, access to health care, and cost of living. This survey 
instrument was developed to focus on outcome (as changes in the childhood-
poverty rate) without discussing a specific intervention. The survey took people 
out of the U.S. political context to avoid preformed opinions about government 
programs and taxes. 
Different factors played roles in stated preferences for programs or features described in 
each survey instrument. Mean WTP could vary across the surveys based on which factor 
was dominant. The following sections discuss possible findings on differences among the 
survey instruments. 
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2.5.1 Federal-level versus state-level programs 
WTPSTATE > WTPFEDERAL: Opinion surveys and the focus-group discussions indicated 
a higher mistrust for a federal-level program than for state-level programs, which could lead 
to a lower mean WTP for a federal-level program than for state-level programs. 
WTPFEDERAL > WTPSTATE: Mean WTP could be higher for a federal-level program than 
for a state-level program because an individual state program would target a lower number 
of children than a federal program would. Subjects in the “state” version were informed only 
about a state-level program in their own state, whereas subjects in the “federal” version 
were informed about a nationwide program. 
2.5.2 Intervention versus outcome 
WTPCOUNTRY > WTPBUDGET or WTPCOUNTRY > WTPCV: Although the values from the 
country survey were not directly comparable to the budget and CV surveys, the mean WTP 
values for the country survey could be higher because of the nature of the benefits 
described in this survey. The country survey offered realized outcomes, whereas the other 
surveys offered a program to reduce childhood poverty, but how much reduction either 
alternative would lead to was not defined. In addition, the benefits could (hypothetically) be 
utilized immediately in the country survey, whereas benefits (hypothetically) accrued in the 
future in the other surveys.  
WTPBUDGET > WTPCOUNTRY or WTPCV > WTPCOUNTRY: Altruism theoretically plays a role 
in all surveys, but, could be less prominent in the country survey than in the other surveys. 
In the country survey, the individual contribution to reducing childhood poverty is less 
obvious. Although subjects pay for lower childhood poverty through higher cost of living, it 
might not be as obvious that the higher cost of living contributes to helping children in 
poverty and reducing childhood poverty. In the CV and budget survey, on the other hand, 
subjects evaluated mechanisms to help children and reduce childhood poverty, and so they 
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might care more about a project that they are involved in more actively, especially if they 
agree with the method of intervention.  
2.6 Survey Development 
The CV questionnaire first introduced Heckman’s findings on investing in early 
childhood and highlighted the main results from the Perry and Abecedarian early-childhood 
programs. This web-enabled survey also presented a 1-minute video of Heckman describing 
his findings.4 The CV question was motivated by asking subjects to suppose that their 
(congressional or state) representative sent them a letter asking how they wanted him or her 
to vote on funding a program. Subjects were asked to assume that if the majority of the 
congressional or state-house members voted “yes,” the legislation would pass, and that as a 
result they would have to pay higher taxes to fund this program. Subjects were then asked 
whether they would vote “for” or “against” funding this program. If they voted “for,” they were 
also asked how certain they were of their answer (Champ, Bishop, Brown, & McCollum, 
1997; Champ & Bishop, 2001; Vossler, Kerkvliet, Polasky, & Gainutdinova, 2003). These 
questions were followed by debriefing questions to understand the motivation behind how 
subjects voted.  
A scope test (Carson & Mitchell, 1993) was included in the CV survey. According to 
standard economic theory, utility should increase as the amount of a given desired good 
increases; therefore, WTP for a program that targets a larger number of children should be 
higher than WTP for a program with a smaller number of children. Generally, the scope test 
has been used to test the validity of data from CV surveys, but findings have been mixed 
(Heberlein, Wilson, Bishop, & Schaeffer, 2005). A study could fail a scope test for several 
reasons. In this case, to begin with, the early-childhood program may not be considered as 
a desired good by everyone. For example, some individuals during the focus-group and 
                                                 
4
 A short version of Heckman’s “The Urgency of Now” video was used. The original video, which is provided for 
public use, can be found at http://www.heckmanequation.org/ 
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pretest interviews stated that early-childhood care was a private domain and a family 
responsibility, and that involvement from government would be intrusive. In addition, some 
subjects were against any government involvement in early-childhood development because 
they did not think it is government’s responsibility to fund such involvement. Similar opinions 
might also have led some individuals to support a smaller-scale program that would target 
only the most impoverished children, rather than a larger-scale program. Second, subjects 
who were skeptical of government’s ability to successfully implement a large national 
program might be willing to support a smaller program, but would be much less likely to 
support a larger program.  
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four hypothetical CV scenarios: 1) A 
federal, small-scale program; 2) a federal, large-scale program; 3) a state-level, small-scale 
program; and 4) a state-level, large-scale program. These scenarios are presented in Table 
2.1. The small-scale and large-scale programs were developed to conduct a between-
sample scope test that targeted only the beneficiaries of current programs and about 90% of 
children in poverty (under the age of 6), respectively. The method of payment was identified 
as federal and state taxes for the federal and state programs, respectively. 
The budget survey also focused on an intervention but employed a DCE method to 
allow a joint comparison of the early-childhood program with other programs of similar size 
(Table 2.1). Subjects were told that the U.S. Congress had been debating government 
budget issues, trying to decide which government programs to cut, which ones to increase, 
and whether to cut or increase taxes to pay for these programs. They were also told that the 
U.S. Congress was going to vote on how federal spending should be divided among 
government programs, and asked to suppose that their congressman had sent them a letter 
asking how he or she should vote on this matter. Subjects were presented with a series of 
choice tasks that included two hypothetical budget alternatives with changes in government-
program outcomes and household tax amounts, and were asked which of the two budget 
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alternatives they would want their representative to vote for. The early-childhood program 
was compared to three other programs: 1) a job-training program, 2) a disaster-relief 
program, and 3) a food-safety monitoring program. These programs were selected because 
they were of similar size in terms of budget impact and they constituted a relatively small 
share of the federal budget; controversial programs (e.g., climate-change-related 
expenditures) were avoided. The early-childhood program was treated as one of the 
government programs; no information was given to suggest that the survey was related to 
childhood poverty.  
Program benefits were defined in terms of the number of beneficiaries; this number 
was presented both in relative (e.g., 50% improvement) and absolute (e.g., 640,000 children 
can participate) terms. The cost attribute was defined as the additional annual household 
taxes that would be required to pay for these government programs. Because a substantial 
portion of American citizens do not pay federal income taxes5, an income-tax credit was 
used for those who receive earned-income tax credits. The tax-attribute levels were also 
defined in terms of increases and reductions in tax levels (or tax-credit levels) from the 
amounts that households currently pay (or receive). The analysis of the budget survey in 
this paper was based on the “tax” version because the sample size for the “tax-credit” 
version was very small.6 Table 2.2 presents the attributes and levels used in the budget 
survey and Figure 2.1 presents a sample budget trade-off question. 
                                                 
5
 The information was accessed at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/1001547-Why-No-Income-
Tax.pdf on March 2012. 
6
 This study used Knowledge Networks’ general population panel, which is a representative sample of the U.S. 
population. Based on this panel, 40–50% of the subjects should have received income tax credits. The 
reason for a small sample size for this group appears to be a result of screening questions used to identify 
tax-credit receivers. The screening questions to identify the “income-tax credit” version were only asked to 
those who were considered to be living in poverty according to the definition of the U.S. Census Bureau, 
based on their annual household incomes and household sizes as archived by KN. It is possible that some 
Americans who receive income-tax credits do not live in poverty according to this definition; these subjects 
were assigned to the “tax” version. Another contributing factor might be the fact that 761 subjects were 
ineligible to take the survey because they were not able to watch a video on their computers. It is possible 
that these were low-income subjects who received earned-income credits. 
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The country survey, the only survey that focused on outcomes, employed a DCE 
method to compare childhood poverty with other quality-of-life features. Subjects were 
asked to suppose that they and their families had to move to another country. They were 
then presented with a series of choice tasks that included two hypothetical country 
alternatives with changes in quality of life and cost of living, and were asked which country 
they would choose to live in. Childhood poverty was compared to two other country features: 
1) environmental quality and 2) access to affordable health care. Environmental quality and 
access to health care were chosen because they are plausible social indicators that 
compete with childhood poverty without being highly correlated.7 The percentage of children 
living in poverty, the high-school graduation rate of teenagers in poverty, and the pregnancy 
rate among poor teenage girls were presented as some of the measures of childhood 
poverty. The country features were presented relative to the U.S. levels. Subjects were 
presented with a description of each country feature and the statistics on each feature 
before the country trade-off questions. As in the budget survey, childhood poverty was 
treated as just one of the country features; no information was given to suggest that the 
survey was related to childhood poverty. The cost attribute was defined as the annual cost 
of living because this attribute has been successfully used in other SP studies (Viscusi, 
Huber, & Bell, 2008). The cost-attribute levels were also defined in terms of increases and 
reductions in subjects’ current cost of living. Table 2.3 presents the attributes and levels 
used in the country survey and Figure 2.2 presents a sample country trade-off question. The 
survey instruments were presented in Appendices A, B and C.  
Earlier versions of the CV and country surveys were administered to about 300 
subjects8 via a web-enabled survey in January 2009. The budget survey and the state-level 
                                                 
7
 Some of the other important social priorities (e.g. unemployment and education) were not selected because 
they are likely to be correlated with childhood poverty. 
8
 The results from this pilot study were presented at the Benefit-Cost Analysis Conference in Washington, D.C., 
in October 2009. 
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program in the CV survey were developed after assessments were made of the findings 
from the focus-group interviews and the pilot study. Reductions in both monetary and non-
monetary attributes were added as levels of attributes in the budget and country survey 
instruments. One-on-one, face-to-face interviews were used to evaluate the draft survey 
instruments. The CV survey instrument was tested with 15 subjects in July and December 
2011. These interviews were used to frame the CV scenario and the question format. The 
budget survey instrument was pretested with 17 subjects in July–August 2011 and with 18 
subjects in October 2011. These interviews helped to refine the context descriptions of 
budget priorities for government programs, to identify a reasonable method of payment, and 
to select government programs to be evaluated with the early-childhood program. The 
country survey instrument was pretested with 18 subjects in July and November 2011. 
These interviews helped to refine the context description for the scenario and to identify a 
reasonable method of payment. The pretest interviews were also used to test the language 
of the text and to confirm that subjects were capable of answering the trade-off questions. 
The web-enabled survey instruments were pilot-tested again in March–April 2012. The CV 
and the budget survey were administered to about 200 subjects each and the country 
survey was administered to 100 subjects. The findings from the pilot data were used to 
finalize the budget and country features and the levels of cost attributes and also to test the 
web-survey administration.  
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of seven annual tax increases in the CV 
survey: $10, $25, $50, $100, $300, $1,000 and $2,000. The tax-attribute levels in the budget 
survey were $2,000 more/less, $300 more/less, $50 more/less, and no change, which 
overlapped with the three tax levels used in the CV survey. Because cost of living was 
highly associated with annual household income, the cost of living in the country survey was 
indexed to subjects’ own annual household income. The attribute levels were the dollar 
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amounts that corresponded to 20%, 5% and 1% of annual household income.9 A variation of 
a commonly used algorithm was used to construct a near-optimal experimental design for 
the DCE surveys (F. R. Johnson et al., 2013). 
To reduce subject burden, the trade-off questions were divided into 14 blocks of 8 
questions within the DCE surveys, and each subject was randomly assigned to one of the 
blocks. To minimize possible order effects, the sequence of the trade-off questions was 
randomized. The internal validity of the DCE data was tested using a transitivity test in which 
subjects who chose Alternative A over Alternative B in one choice set and Alternative B over 
Alternative C in another choice set had to pick Alternative A over Alternative C in a third 
choice set. Transitivity is a fundamental axiom of utility theory and is required for valid 
welfare estimation (Just, Hueth, & Andrew. Schmitz, 2004). A second test identified subjects 
who had no variation in their answers to the trade-off questions; that is, they always picked 
either Alternative A or Alternative B in all trade-off questions. 
This paper investigated whether subjects dominated on or were insensitive to the 
cost attribute. Dominance on the cost attribute was used as an indicator of protest 
responses, especially for the tax attribute in the budget survey. Protest responses in DCE 
studies could manifest as decisions based only on the cost attribute, without regard to the 
other attributes. Someone was considered as dominating on the cost attribute if he or she 
chose the alternative with the lower level of cost increase or the higher level of cost 
reduction in all of the trade-off questions. Finally, subjects in all three surveys were tested 
for whether they were insensitive to the cost attribute. In the DCE data, subjects who were 
insensitive to the cost attribute were identified as those who had zero utility for the cost 
                                                 
9
 For example, the levels for a subject with an annual household income of $52,000 were $10,400 less per year, 
$2,600 less per year, $520 less per year, same as now, $520 more per year, $2,600 more per year, and 
$10,400 more per year. 
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attribute (Scarpa, Gilbride, Campbell, & Hensher, 2009). 10 In the CV survey, subjects who 
were willing to pay taxes higher than 5% of their annual household income were identified 
as insensitive to the cost. Appendix D provides detailed information on the internal-validity 
tests. 
SP surveys have been criticized for being hypothetical and for not accurately 
predicting actual behavior (Cummings & Harrison, 1995; Diamond & Hausman, 1994). To 
mitigate the hypothetical nature of our surveys, a cheap-talk script was used (Ajzen, Brown, 
& Carvajal, 2004; Cummings & Taylor, 1999). The term “cheap talk” has been used in game 
theory to describe nonbinding communication between players that is intended to influence 
the outcome of a game (Lusk, 2003). In this context, cheap talk can be thought of as 
communication that breaches the usual anonymity between survey researchers and 
respondents. In a survey situation, the researcher attempts to engage subjects in the 
research problem and to motivate them to devote more effort, attention, and imagination to 
the preference-elicitation task than they would otherwise do (Özdemir et al., 2009). A very 
similar cheap-talk script was used for the three surveys, although some differences in text 
could not be avoided because of the different context in each survey. The cheap-talk text in 
this study asked subjects to consider the consequences of paying higher or lower taxes on 
their incomes or having a higher or lower cost of living, and to answer the questions as if the 
study findings would affect the policy decisions in the US. 
2.7 Survey Administration and Time-to-think Protocol 
When people make actual decisions, they often take some time to think about their 
choices and may discuss the decision with family and friends. If budget constraints are 
relevant, they may give more careful thought than usual to this factor. The general practice 
in SP studies, however, is to ask subjects to give an answer during a survey that typically 
                                                 
10
 I used the method developed by Scarpa et al. (2009) to identify likely non-attendance to the cost attribute by 
using an equality-constrained latent-class model where a class of subjects with likely zero utility weights for 
the cost attribute was identified. Appendix D provides detailed information on this method and its findings. 
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lasts for less than half an hour. The “time-to-think” (TTT) protocol mimics a more realistic 
decision-making process and helps mitigate the hypothetical nature of a survey by giving 
subjects extra time (Whittington et al., 1992). A review of studies with a TTT protocol 
showed evidence of improved preference data (Cook, Maskery, Jeuland, & Whittington, 
2011). Cook et al. (2011) found that the certainty of answers to CV questions increased and 
the number of internal-validity test failures decreased in DCE surveys for subjects who had 
time to think compared to those who did not have time to think. 
A similar survey structure and design was followed in all three questionnaires. In the 
CV survey, subjects were presented with the CV scenario but the survey did not ask them to 
provide answers right away. Subjects were asked to think about the survey, discuss the 
survey with others if they would like, and return to the second part of the survey within one 
to 10 days. The second part of the survey began with a reminder of the task and provided a 
link to a summary of the first part of the survey if subjects would like to check. After the 
cheap-talk text, subjects were asked to answer the same CV question they saw in the first 
part of the survey. In the DCE surveys, subjects were presented with the trade-off questions 
before the first part of the survey ended. The second part of the surveys followed the same 
procedure as the CV survey. After the cheap talk text, subjects were asked to answer the 
trade-off questions. All three surveys ended with attitudinal questions on beliefs about the 
causes of wealth and poverty, social mobility, and ideological perspectives.  
The web-enabled survey instruments were hosted on a secure site and were 
administered in June 2012 by GfK KN. Survey subjects were recruited from KN’s nationally 
representative general population panel and asked to participate in a social survey via e-
mail. Subjects received KN incentive points for their participation and extra points if they 
returned the second part of the survey. All subjects were required to be U.S. residents, to be 
at least 18 years of age, and to have indicated their willingness to proceed with the survey 
after reading the informed-consent materials. Because this study was interested in citizen 
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preferences, the e-mail invitation was sent to KN members who currently resided in the US 
and who were currently or formerly registered to vote. Subjects who did not have computer 
capabilities to see a video (n = 761) were identified at the beginning of the CV survey and 
dropped from the sample. This study received IRB approval from the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Office of Human Research Ethics. 
2.8 Model Estimation 
Statistical analysis of the SP data is based on random-utility theory. Appendix E 
provides details on model estimation and econometrics used in this study. A binomial-probit 
model was used to estimate the binary response data from the CV question. The dependent 
variable was a dummy variable equal to 1 if a subject voted for paying higher taxes to fund 
the early-childhood program and 0 otherwise. In the CV question, the support for funding 
was considered positive only if a subject reported that she was certain or very certain of her 
answer.  
Mixed-logit (also known as random-parameters logit) models were employed to 
analyze the budget and country trade-off questions. Two linear variables were created for 
each attribute: one for increases and the other for reductions. 11 The empirical models of the 
budget and country data are defined as: 
         
        
            ̌        (2.1) 
where k indicates a government program in the budget survey and a quality-of-life attribute 
in the country survey. Marginal WTP was calculated by dividing a non-monetary attribute by 
the estimate of the cost-increase parameter. For example, WTP for a 50% increase in the 
early-childhood program was calculated as: 
 
     
         
  
 
(2.2) 
where        indicates the parameter for increases in the early-childhood program.  
                                                 
11
 A discussion on functional form can be found in the third paper. 
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2.9 Results 
2.9.1 Survey Sample 
The CV survey consisted of 1,712 observations and the budget and country surveys 
consisted of 2,037 and 1,010 observations, respectively. Table 2.4 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the three surveys. A list of descriptive statistics on the common questions in all 
three surveys is listed in Appendix F, and a full list of descriptive statistics from the three 
survey instruments is provided in Appendices G, H and I. The distribution of the 
demographic characteristics and the mean values were very similar among the surveys. 
Based on the U.S. Census Bureau statistics,12 the main differences of the sample from the 
general population is in lower representation of females (47% versus 51%), African 
Americans (9% versus 13%) and Hispanics (8% versus 17%), and slightly higher 
representation of college graduates (34% versus 30%). The median income of the sample 
($55k) was about the same as the median household income ($53k) in the US.  
Poverty was reported to be one of the two most important priorities in the US by 
about 13% of the subjects, while about 15% reported that it was one of the two least 
important priorities. About 14% and 16% of the subjects had an experience with current 
government programs (e.g., Head Start) in the CV and budget surveys, respectively; they 
indicated that one of their children or a family member’s children had participated in a 
current government program on early-childhood development.13  
About 25% of the subjects identified themselves as liberal, about 33% as moderate, 
and about 40% as conservative (Table 2.5). About 40% of the subjects reported that 
government policy should be harder on gun control, while another 40% said it should be 
about the same. About 50% of the subjects reported that by law, a woman should always be 
                                                 
12
 The U.S. Census Bureau statistics was accessed at http://www.census.gov/ on March 13, 2013.  
13
 This question was not asked in the country survey because this survey instrument did not discuss the early-
childhood program. 
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able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice, while 33% reported that the law 
should permit abortion only in cases of rape or incest, or when the woman’s life is in danger. 
To reduce the number of explanatory variables, a factor analysis was conducted on the 
ideological questions (i.e., gun control, abortion, and self-identified political ideology) and on 
attitudinal questions about the reasons for wealth and success, and chances of social 
mobility. The factor analysis grouped these explanatory variables into 5 factors labeled as 
“wealth because of luck,” “wealth because of bias,” “wealth because of hard work and 
intelligence,” “chance of social mobility,” and “social ideology.” Appendix J provides more 
information about the factor analysis. Questions about gun control, abortion, and self-
identified political ideology were grouped into the “social ideology” factor. The social-
ideology factor score was used to assign each subject to a specific ideological group for 
some of the analyses. Subjects within the highest 30% of the social-ideology factor scope 
were classified as liberals and subjects within the lowest 30% were classified as 
conservatives. The rest were considered to be moderates.  
Table 2.6 presents the descriptive statistics on experience with poverty by ideology. 
Liberals formed a higher percentage of subjects who had never lived in poverty (p value = 
0.006), while conservatives formed a higher percentage of subjects who had lived in poverty 
in the past but not anymore (p value = 0.001). Moderates formed a higher percentage of 
subjects who lived paycheck-to-paycheck and felt as if they could easily fall into poverty (p 
value = 0.000). Although a significant portion of subjects across all political groups indicated 
that the poor should have the greatest responsibility for helping themselves, this option was 
the most popular with conservatives and moderates (Figure 2.3). Liberals were more likely 
to indicate that the federal government should have the greatest responsibility for helping 
the poor. 
Subjects in the CV survey were asked about their opinions about current government 
programs on early-childhood development, such as Head Start (Figure 2.4). The negative 
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opinions about current government programs were selected on average by 20% of 
conservatives, 10% of moderates, and only 6% of liberals. In addition, about 20% of 
conservatives indicated positive opinions about Head Start programs. Positive opinions 
were selected by about one third of moderates and by half of liberals, while one third of all 
subjects indicated no knowledge about these programs. In the CV survey, subjects were 
also asked about the likelihood of success of an intensive early-childhood program to help 
children break out of poverty when funded by the 1) federal government, 2) state 
governments, and 3) local governments or private institutions (Figure 2.5). Conservatives 
had the most confidence in local government or private institutions, and the least confidence 
in federal government. Moderates and liberals supported all three types of institutions about 
equally, although a larger percentage of liberals had more confidence in these institutions. In 
the budget survey, 23% of subjects indicated a low likelihood of success for the early-
childhood program to help children break out of poverty. The low chances of success were 
indicated by 54% of conservatives, 25% of moderates and 14% of liberals in the budget-
survey sample. 
2.9.2 Internal Validity Results 
Just over 1% of the subjects had no variation in their answers to the SP questions in 
the budget and country surveys. These subjects also failed the transitivity test and were very 
likely to go through the survey without paying close attention to the questions. For these 
reasons, these subjects were dropped from the subsequent analysis. About 9% of the 
subjects failed the transitivity test in the budget and country surveys. This rate is much less 
than the failure rates for internal-validity test results in similar studies (Ryan & San Miguel, 
2000; Ryan & Bate, 2001; Özdemir, Mohamed, Johnson, & Hauber, 2010). The preferences 
of subjects who failed the transitivity test were found not to be significantly different than 
others after the subjects who had no variation were dropped in the preliminary analysis. 
 42 
 
Therefore, these subjects were kept in the final analysis. Appendix D provides detailed 
information on the internal-validity test results. 
Only 1% of subjects in the budget survey dominated on the tax attribute while 10% of 
subjects in the country survey dominated on the cost-of-living attribute. The low level of 
dominance on the tax attribute in the budget survey indicates that possible protest votes 
over taxes were reduced. The higher level of dominance on the cost-of-living attribute is not 
so surprising, because this attribute was indexed to household income in the country survey. 
Around 1% of the subjects in the CV survey supported funding the early-childhood 
program when the tax level was more than 5% of their annual household income. These 
subjects were eliminated from the subsequent analysis as it is commonly practiced. About 
35% and 33% of the subjects in the budget and country surveys, respectively, were 
identified as insensitive to the cost attribute. In the budget survey, liberals, subjects who 
indicated that “federal government” should be the group most responsible for helping the 
poor, and subjects who failed the transitivity test were more likely to be insensitive to the tax 
attribute; subjects who indicated that “poor themselves” should be the group most 
responsible for helping the poor were less likely to be insensitive to the tax attribute. In the 
country survey, income was positively associated with insensitivity to the cost; subjects who 
indicated that “poor themselves” should be the group most responsible for helping the poor 
were less likely to be insensitive to the cost attribute. The insensitivity to the cost attribute is 
within the range of the statistics reported by the studies that have investigated this issue 
(Gilbride, Allenby, & Brazell, 2006; Hensher, 2008; Lagarde, 2012) and lower than the 
statistics reported by these studies that used taxes as method of payment (D. Campbell, 
Hutchinson, & Scarpa, 2008; Scarpa et al., 2009; Scarpa, Notaro, & Raffelli, 2009). 
However, because about one-third of the subjects were insensitive to the cost attribute in 
DCE surveys, the model estimation was controlled for these preferences by including 
interaction terms between the cost variables and the dummy variable that indicated the 
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insensitivity to the cost attribute. The marginal utility of income, however, was calculated 
based on the main-effects cost coefficient assuming that the marginal utility of income is not 
different between the subjects who were insensitive to the cost attribute and the rest of the 
sample.  
2.9.3 Estimation Results 
2.9.3.1 CV Survey Estimates  
The questions on the chances of success of the early-childhood program to help 
children break out of poverty, other attitudinal questions, ideology and socio-economic 
characteristics were used to understand individuals’ willingness to pay for the early-
childhood program. Table 2.7 presents three sets of binomial-probit estimates for the CV 
question. The first model consists only of the tax level and annual household income. The 
second one consists of the tax level, socio-economic characteristics and dummy variables 
indicating whether a subject indicated low chances of success for an early-childhood 
program if funded by the federal and state governments. This second model was used to 
check the validity of survey responses as subjects who perceived the effectiveness of early-
childhood programs to be low should not support the early-childhood program. The third one 
is the most comprehensive model which includes the tax level, socio-economic 
characteristics and variables indicating subjects’ attitudes towards government spending 
and public programs. The tax level and annual household income were significant at the 1% 
level.14 Subjects who indicated low chances of success for an early-childhood program if 
funded by the federal or state governments were significantly negatively associated with 
supporting the early-childhood program as expected. College degree, believing that “federal 
government” should be responsible for the poor, being liberal, “wealth because of bias,” and 
“wealth because of hard work and intelligence” factors were positively associated with 
supporting the early-childhood program. The dummy variable for state-level programs was 
                                                 
14
 From this point forward, significance is considered to be at the 1% level if not otherwise specified. 
 44 
 
not significant. However, people who believed that “federal government” should be 
responsible for the poor were more likely to support the federal-level program than the state-
level program at the 5% level. It is reasonable for subjects who indicated that federal 
government should have the main responsibility were more supportive of a federal-level 
program. The dummy variable for the small-scale program was not significant. These 
findings show that neither the level of trust for the type of government nor the number of 
targeted children had a significant effect on people’s responses to the valuation question. In 
the case of federal versus state programs, it is possible that these two forces 
counterbalanced each other’s effects such that although the trust for state-run programs 
was higher than the trust for federal-run programs, an individual state program would target 
a smaller number of children than a federal-level program would do. The finding on the scale 
of the program, however, confirms that the number of targeted children was not the primary 
influence upon subjects’ responses.   
 Subjects were asked why they were in support of (Figure 2.4) or against (Figure 2.5) 
funding the early-childhood program in the CV survey. As their reason for being supportive, 
almost half of the subjects indicated that they wanted to stop the cycle of poverty. This was 
the most frequently selected reason by all ideological groups. The second-most-selected 
reason was “Lower taxes for me in the future” for conservatives and “the future of the 
economy depends on a well-trained labor force” for liberals. The majority of subjects 
seemed to think about the overall benefits (both to the society and participants) from 
reducing childhood poverty by wishing to stop the cycle of poverty. However, the second-
most-selected reasons shade light on how each ideological group approached to childhood 
poverty. Conservatives seem to think about the individual share of the social benefits by 
choosing “lower taxes”, and liberals seem to think about the benefits to the society by 
choosing “well-trained labor force”. The most-selected reason for being against funding was 
“Government should not be involved in the care of young children, this is family’s 
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responsibility” for conservatives, followed by being against any new taxes and affordability. 
A significant portion (10%) of conservatives also indicated that it is not government’s 
responsibility to fund early- childhood development programs. Affordability was the most-
selected reason for liberals and moderates, followed by “Other programs should be reduced 
to pay for it” for being against funding. Fifteen percent of moderates also indicated being 
against any new tax increases. These findings show that although affordability was the main 
issue for liberals, ideology motivated conservatives’ opposition to funding early-childhood 
programs. Moderates’ opinions were somewhere in between. 
2.9.3.2 Budget Survey Estimates 
 Table 2.8 presents the mixed-logit parameter estimates for the early-childhood 
program and taxes in the budget survey. The full model estimates were provided in 
Appendix K. Table 2.8 present parameters from three different models: 1) the parameters 
were interacted with perceived effectiveness; for example, the early-childhood parameters 
were interacted with a dummy variable indicating low likelihood of success for the early-
childhood program to help children break out of poverty15, 2) the parameters were interacted 
with ideology, and 3) the parameters were interacted with ideology and the early-childhood 
parameters were interacted with experience with the early-childhood program (that is, if their 
own or a family member’s children had participated a current early-childhood program). The 
parameter estimate for reductions in the early-childhood program was significantly negative 
for all groups in all three models. In the first model, the parameter estimate for increases in 
the early-childhood program was not significant for subjects who perceived the effectiveness 
of early-childhood programs to be low but significantly positive for others. As in the case of 
the CV survey, subjects who perceived the effectiveness of early-childhood programs to be 
low were not willing to pay for increases in the early-childhood program. In the second and 
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 I also tried interactions with perceived effectiveness and ideology in the same model, but the model did not 
converge. 
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third models, the parameter estimate for increases in the early-childhood program was 
significantly positive for liberals, and was not significant for conservatives. It was significantly 
positive for moderates when it was interacted only with ideology (second model), but it 
became insignificant when interactions with experience were included (third model). The 
mean-parameter for increases in the early-childhood program was significantly larger for 
subjects with experience than for subjects without experience. The slope of the utility 
function for program reductions was much steeper than the slope of the utility function for 
program increases in the same program––a display of preference asymmetry 16 . The 
parameter estimates for reductions in other programs were significantly negative for all 
groups. The estimates for increases were significant for all programs for liberals; for job-
training and disaster-relief programs for moderates and for only job-training program for 
conservatives. The parameter estimate for tax increases was significantly negative for all 
groups in all three models. The parameter estimate for tax reductions in the first model was 
significantly positive for subjects no matter what their opinion was on the effectiveness of 
early-childhood programs. It was also significantly positive for conservatives and moderates, 
but was not significant for liberals in the second and third models. As in the case of 
government programs, the slope of the utility function for tax increases was much steeper 
than the slope of the utility function for tax reductions. The conditional-logit estimates were 
parallel to the findings from the mixed-logit estimates, and can be found in Appendix L.  
2.9.3.3 Country Survey Estimates 
 Table 2.9 present the mixed-logit parameter estimates for childhood poverty and cost 
of living in the country survey. Appendix K presents the full model estimates. The 
interactions with ideology show that conservatives had significantly different preferences 
than moderates and liberals. The parameter estimate for living in a country with higher 
childhood-poverty rates than the US was significantly negative for all ideological groups; it 
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 More information on preference asymmetry can be found in chapter 4. 
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was significantly larger for liberals and moderates than for conservatives. The parameter 
estimate for living in a country with lower childhood poverty was not significant for any of the 
groups. Preferences for environmental quality followed the same pattern. Preferences for 
access to health care were the same across ideological groups; the parameter estimate for 
deterioration in access to health care was significantly negative and the one for 
improvements in health care was significantly positive. However, the utility for deterioration 
in access to health care was much larger than the utility for improvements in health care. 
The parameter estimates for cost of living had the expected signs and did not differ by 
ideology. The conditional-logit estimates were parallel to the findings from the mixed-logit 
estimates and were presented in Appendix L.  
2.9.3.4 WTP Estimates 
Table 2.10 presents the mean annual WTP (standard errors in parentheses) per 
household from each survey analysis. 17  The WTP values from the CV survey were 
estimated based both on parametric estimates and non-parametric estimates. The 
parametric estimates were based on the third model presented in Table 2.7. The non-
parametric estimates were based on the Turnbull estimator, and more information on non-
parametric estimates was provided in Appendix L. In the CV survey, liberals were willing to 
pay $742 (116) annually for a large-scale federal program that aimed to enroll 90% of 
children in poverty under the age of 6 based on the Turnbull estimator. The corresponding 
WTP value was $739 (102) based on the parametric estimates. Moderates were willing to 
pay $422 (102) annually based on the Turnbull estimator, and $224 (91) based on the 
parametric estimates for the same program. Conservatives, in contrast, were willing to pay 
$149 (59) based on the non-parametric analysis, while they did not have positive WTP 
values based on the parametric analysis.  
                                                 
17
 This paper presents WTP for improvements and WTP to avoid worsening conditions. For more information on 
gains and losses, please refer to the fourth chapter. 
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There is a big difference between the non-parametric and parametric analyses, 
especially for moderates and conservatives. While the non-parametric analysis is 
informative to see the split-sample mean Turnbull estimators, and is free of distributional 
assumptions, the parametric analysis control for all other factors, such as socio-economic 
characteristics. The parametric analysis suggests that conservatives had negative WTP 
values and would have to be compensated if the early-childhood program was implemented. 
However, negative WTP is not a relevant condition in circumstances as this, where there are 
no property rights to be compensated, and it should be interpreted as zero or no willingness 
to pay. The negative WTP could be due to the distributional assumptions and/or the fact that 
the bid range was selected very high for conservatives. Overall, these results indicate that 
conservatives would not be willing to pay for the early-childhood program while liberals 
would be willing to pay $500 to $700 per year for this program. The population-weighted 
mean WTP values were calculated by weighing the mean WTP value for each group by its 
representation in the sample. The population-weighted mean WTP based on the 
characteristics included in the parametric analysis shown in Table 2.7 would be $188 and 
$195 per year for federal and state programs, respectively.18  
Table 2.10 presents the mean annual WTP for the early-childhood program in the 
budget survey based on the second and third models presented in Table 2.8. Liberals on 
average were willing to pay $95 (14) to $70 (16) per year for a 50% increase in the early-
childhood program (enrolling 640,000 children) while conservatives had zero willingness to 
pay for this outcome. Moderates were willing to pay $49 (12) per year based on the second 
model; they were not willing to pay for increasing the early-childhood program based on the 
third model. Subjects with direct experience with similar current government programs had 
significantly higher WTP values than subjects without experience. If these subjects were 
                                                 
18
 The population-weighted mean WTP was calculated by weighting the mean WTP for each group with its 
representation in the sample. 
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liberals, the mean WTP increased to $139 (24). Moderates and conservatives with 
experience had a mean WTP of $87 (20) and $57 (22) per year, respectively. The 
population-weighted mean WTP in the second model was $52 annually, and it was $34 in 
the third model for a 50% increase in the early-childhood program in the budget survey. The 
population-weighted mean WTP was $50 annually based on the conditional-logit estimates 
with ideology interactions (Table L.6 in Appendix L). Subjects from all three ideological 
groups were willing to pay to avoid reductions in the early-childhood program. Liberals were 
willing to pay $227 (18) to $225 (21) to avoid a 50% reduction in the early-childhood 
program (enrolling 210,000 children), while moderates and conservatives were willing to pay 
$153 (15) to $143 and $80 to $74 (16), respectively based on the model. The population-
weighted mean WTP to avoid a 50% reduction in the program was $153 annually in the 
second model, and it was $147 in the third model in the budget survey. 
Subjects who perceived the effectiveness of early-childhood programs to be low 
were not willing to pay for increases in the early-childhood program but they were willing to 
pay $39 annually to avoid a 50% reduction in this program. The perceived effectiveness 
denotes the likelihood of success of the program in helping children break out of poverty 
when they become adults. It does not necessarily indicate the effectiveness of the program 
of providing children with short-term benefits, such as better nutrition and health-care 
services. Subjects with low perceived effectiveness could be willing to pay to avoid cutting 
the program so that current participants can continue benefiting from short-term benefits. 
This also could be true for conservatives who did not want to reduce the program although 
they did not want to pay for program increases.  
The mean WTP values for a federal-level early-childhood program from the CV 
survey were higher than the mean WTP values from the budget survey. However, a direct 
comparison between the two survey instruments is difficult because they targeted different 
numbers of children, and their contexts and framing differed. The federal program in the CV 
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survey targeted a larger number of children than the budget survey did, but this difference 
was probably not highly influential because preferences were not sensitive to the number of 
children in the CV survey. It is possible that CV values, especially the magnitude of the 
association with ideology, could have been overestimated. It is also possible that 
conservatives did not support the early-childhood program because they were reacting 
negatively to the prospect of tax increases and that liberals were supporting the early-
childhood program without seriously considering the opportunity cost of public dollars. The 
budget-allocation framework could have mitigated these problems by 1) eliminating possible 
tax aversions by offering reductions in taxes, and 2) reminding subjects about the 
opportunity cost of public dollars (for example, by presenting other programs that were 
competing for same resources and by mentioning the budget problem in general).  
In the country survey, regardless of their political ideology, subjects did not perceive 
more value for living in a country with lower childhood poverty than living in the US at 
current childhood-poverty rates. However, moderates and liberals were willing to pay $2,992 
(216) per year and conservatives were willing to pay $2,057 (259) per year to avoid living in 
a country with 50% higher childhood-poverty rate than the US. The only quality-of-life 
feature subjects cared about was improvements in access to health care; and preferences 
for health care had no significant association with ideology. Subjects would be willing to pay 
$486 (142) per year for a 50% improvement in access to health care and perceived an 
annual loss of $3,678 (244) for a 50% deterioration (compared to the current U.S. situation).  
Comparison of WTP values from the country survey to the values in the other 
surveys indicated that subjects valued being involved in the process for reducing childhood 
poverty in the CV and budget surveys. WTP should have been higher in the country survey 
because the benefits offered in this survey were larger and could be utilized with no latency 
compared to the benefits in the other two surveys. However, as the results show, this was 
not the case. Subjects did not value benefits of living in a society with lower childhood-
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poverty rates than the US, but, on the other hand, liberals and sometimes moderates valued 
helping children in poverty through the early-childhood program in the CV and budget 
surveys. This shows that although the early-childhood program could be rejected by some 
groups because of the involvement of the government, others, such as liberals valued being 
directly involved in decisions on how to reduce childhood poverty, especially if they think 
these interventions would be successful.  
2.9.4 Sensitivity Analysis 
The ideological groups were identified based on the “social ideology” factor by 
categorizing subjects with the highest 30% factor score as liberals and the lowest 30% 
factor score as conservatives, and all others as moderates (base-case scenario). This 
categorization of the ideological groups could affect the findings because ideology seemed 
to play a significant role on preferences for reducing childhood poverty. Table 2.11 presents 
the mean annual WTP values when liberals and conservatives were identified based on the 
highest and lowest 20% factor scores, and then based on the highest and lowest 40% factor 
scores. The mean annual WTP from the CV survey ranged from $170 to $192, which was 
actually within the range of the mean annual WTP values for the base-case scenario. In the 
budget survey, when attributes were interacted with ideology, the population-weighted mean 
WTP for a 50% increase in the early-childhood program increased from $52 (base-case 
scenario) per year to $58-$59 for the 20% and 40% scenarios; when attributes were 
interacted with ideology and the early-childhood program was interacted with experience, 
the population-weighted mean WTP increased from $34 (base case scenario) per year to 
$37 and $40 for the 20% and 40% scenarios, respectively. The sensitivity analysis on the 
definition of the ideological groups did not affect the findings for the country survey; the 
mean parameter estimates for increases in the early-childhood program were not statistically 
significant for any of the groups.  
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2.10 Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper presents WTP estimates for reducing childhood poverty in the US. SP 
survey methods were used to measure the value of implementing intensive early-childhood 
development programs at scale and to measure the value of living in a country with lower 
childhood-poverty rates than the US. First, to account for attitudes about government 
centralization, a CV survey was used to assess subjects’ willingness to pay for high-quality, 
intensive early-childhood development programs at federal and state levels. Second, a DCE 
survey investigated subjects’ budgetary preferences for increasing and reducing the high-
quality, intensive early-childhood program with associated impacts on individual tax 
burdens. This survey was developed to avoid possible aversions to tax increases by offering 
subjects options that included smaller government and lower levels of public spending. The 
early-childhood program was compared to other government programs with similar budget 
sizes to help subjects consider the opportunity cost of public dollars. Third, another DCE 
survey investigated subjects’ preferences for living in a country with lower or higher 
childhood-poverty rates than the US. This survey was developed to mitigate the effect of 
subjects’ preformed opinions and attitudes associated with taxes, government programs, 
and the role of government while avoiding any discussion of a possible intervention. 
Individual share of social benefits and altruism theoretically played role in all three surveys, 
but benefits were a function of perceived effectiveness and ideology in the CV and budget 
surveys because the early-childhood program was evaluated ex-ante, and a function of time 
because most benefits would be realized as participants become teenagers and adults. 
One of the important findings of this study is that the involvement of government in 
early-childhood development was unacceptable for conservatives, who seemed to have 
several objections to governmental involvement. First, the environment of children in early 
childhood was seen as a private matter and governmental involvement was considered 
intrusive. Twenty percent of conservatives indicated government intrusion as the primary 
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reason for voting against the early-childhood program in the CV survey. In addition, 26% of 
conservatives indicated that extended family should be responsible for early-childhood care. 
Second, conservatives did not think it is government’s responsibility to fund these programs. 
About 10% of conservatives indicated inappropriate assignment of responsibility as the 
primary reason for voting against the program and 21% of conservatives indicated this item 
when asked about current government programs related to early childhood. Third, being 
against any new tax increases contributed to being against government programs related to 
early childhood. Aversion to tax increases was selected as the primary reason for voting 
against the program by 18% of conservatives. Finally, conservatives indicated very low 
perceived effectiveness for the early-childhood program for helping children to break out of 
poverty. Programs funded by federal and state governments were indicated to be likely to 
produce successful outcomes only by 26% and 35% of conservatives, respectively, but this 
approval rate increased to 66% for programs funded by local governments, churches, and 
private charities in the CV survey. More than half of conservatives also indicated very low 
likelihood of success for the early-childhood program in the budget survey. These issues 
were all related to ideology and provide evidence of conservatives’ disapproval of 
governmental involvement in this matter.  
These findings reveal another very important finding, namely that subjects cared 
greatly about the process (i.e., how childhood poverty is reduced). One of the main 
differences between the results of this study and the benefits calculated in previous benefit-
cost analysis studies is that this study assessed the perceived value placed by people on 
reducing childhood poverty by incorporating preferences for the process as well as the 
outcome. Subjects who indicated low perceived effectiveness for the early-childhood 
program and conservatives in general did not want to pay for increasing the program. 
Others, especially liberals, valued making decisions on how to help children in the CV and 
budget surveys instead of just receiving outcomes as it was offered in the country survey. 
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When an intervention is evaluated in benefit-cost analysis, values associated with the 
intervention itself were usually excluded from the analysis. However, this study shows that 
individuals care about the process and could perceive benefits differently based on the 
intervention type. 
Subjects across all groups, including conservatives and subjects who perceived the 
effectiveness of early-childhood programs to be low were not in favor of reducing the early-
childhood program. The population-weighted mean annual WTP to avoid a 50% reduction in 
the early-childhood program was $147 to $153 per household. This shows that even if 
subjects were against government involvement or they did not think the programs were 
effective in achieving the long-term goals of reducing childhood poverty, they might support 
keeping the programs for their short-term benefits to the children while attending the 
program. It also indicates that even if subjects were not willing to pay for increasing the 
early-childhood program and enrolling higher number of children into the program, they were 
willing to pay to avoid a reduction in the program.  
The CV survey did not pass a scope test. It is possible that an early-childhood 
program was not seen as a desired good by everyone, especially by conservatives. Carson 
et al. (2012) noted that the likelihood of government delivering on very large projects can be 
perceived to be much lower than the likelihood for smaller projects, which may indicate that 
values placed on two goods may be entangled with beliefs about how well government 
functions. Subjects in this study might have considered a program that targeted 90% of 
children in poverty to be structurally impossible, or might not have believed that a very large-
scale program could produce successful outcomes. Instead, they might have believed that a 
small-scale program was more likely to be successful, or might have preferred helping the 
most impoverished children (via a small-scale program) to reaching out to a larger 
population.   
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The early-childhood program in the CV and budget surveys provides benefits to the 
program participants and taxpayers. Most of these benefits, such as reduced crime rate or 
increased earnings as adults for program participants would be realized in the long term. 
This paper assumed that survey subjects took the effect of latency between the timing of the 
investment and receiving the benefits into consideration when they answered the questions. 
Thus, WTP values estimated for the CV and budget surveys were assumed to inherently 
account for latency. 
There is evidence that estimates from the budget survey are more reliable than the 
estimates from the other two surveys. First, the CV survey did not pass the scope test, and 
the WTP values were not sensitive to the number of children enrolled in the early-childhood 
program Second, the budget-allocation framework helped to mitigate possible protest 
responses (due to tax aversion) by offering smaller government: only 1% of the subjects 
dominated on the tax attribute by always picking either a lower tax increase or a higher tax 
reduction. Third, the budget survey revealed that conservatives and others did not want to 
cut the early-childhood programs. A more traditional method of investigating program 
improvements or increases would not have revealed this information, which implied that 
conservatives did care about children in poverty. Fourth, the budget-allocation framework 
helped subjects understand the opportunity costs of public dollars because WTP values 
were generally lower than the values in the CV survey. One problem with the budget survey 
was that 33% of the subjects were likely to be insensitive to the tax attribute, and that 
liberals were positively associated with this reaction. However, the parameter estimates 
associated with both the tax increase and reduction showed that liberals were insensitive to 
tax reductions even as they indicated disapproval of tax increases. This result shows that 
their insensitivity to the cost attribute likely was a result of their insensitivity to tax reductions. 
Controlling for the preferences of these subjects produced much lower mean WTP values.  
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These results can be interpreted in a referendum context to predict whether a 
majority of Americans would vote to support these programs and pay higher taxes as a 
result. The total cost of enrolling one child for 5 years in the Abecedarian project  was 
$80,969, and the total cost of enrolling one child in the Perry project, which lasted about 1.5 
years per child, was $19,626 in 2012 dollars (W. S. Barnett & Masse, 2007; G. J. Duncan & 
Magnuson, 2013). The annualized cost for enrolling one child in the Abecedarian project 
would be $17,749, while the cost per child would be $13,629 for the Perry project using a 
3% discount rate. The annual cost of enrolling 640,000 children would be $11.3 billion and 
$8.7 billion for the Abecedarian and Perry style projects, respectively. When the annualized 
costs are divided by the number of households in the US (approximately 117 million in 
2010), the annual cost of enrolling one child to a household would be $96.95 and $74.44 
based on the Abecedarian and Perry projects, respectively. If 5% is used as a discount rate, 
then the annual cost of one child to a household would be $102.55 and $76.25 for the 
Abecedarian and Perry projects, respectively. Would a nationwide referendum pass if the 
proposed annual tax increase was $97 or $74? This question can be answered by 
investigating whether at least 50% of the subjects would say “yes” to this tax increase in 
support of funding the early-childhood program. Based on the second model for the budget 
survey in Table 2.10, only liberals were willing to pay more than $74, which constitutes 40% 
of the sample. Based on the third model for the budget survey, only 11% of the subjects who 
were moderates and liberals with experience were willing to pay higher than $74. Even if we 
consider that the WTP values for conservatives (and possibly for moderates) were 
underestimated, the mean WTP for these groups could not be higher than $70, which was 
the mean WTP for liberals (who had no experience with these programs). Even under these 
circumstances, a hypothetical referendum would not pass. This is also the case based on 
the findings from the sensitivity analysis on the definition of the ideological groups. Although 
the differences are smaller when the Perry program costs were used, the cost estimates 
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from the Abecedarian project would be more relevant to this study for comparison because 
the high-quality intensive early-childhood programs in the survey instruments were 
described based on the Abecedarian program. 
The mean WTP values could be even lower than the ones estimated in this study for 
two reasons. First, the WTP values estimated in the budget survey were very likely to 
include pure altruism which should be excluded from benefit-cost analysis to avoid double 
counting of the benefits received by the altruists and beneficiaries. The mean WTP values 
would be lower if the WTP associated with pure altruism is excluded from total WTP. 
Second, the WTP values could be overestimated because of the social desirability bias. 
Social desirability bias is known as over-reporting socially approved behaviors or attitudes, 
and under-reporting socially disapproved behaviors or attitudes since people like to appear 
favorably or respectable in the eyes of others as well as in their own (Lindhjem & Navrud, 
2011). Social desirability bias, however, might not be a major problem in this study since 
research shows that internet surveys reduced this bias compared to phone interviews 
(Chang & Krosnick, 2010; Holbrook & Krosnick, 2010; Kreuter, Presser, & Tourangeau, 
2008) and face-to-face interviews (Heerwegh, 2009). Also, it is less obvious what the 
socially desirable choice is in DCE surveys (compared to CV surveys). 
When he proposed his initiative on investing in early childhood, President Obama 
referred to the high rates of return on investing in young children. Previous studies show that 
benefits of alleviating the causes of crime, unemployment, and other consequences of social 
inequities more than offset the costs of small-scale, high-quality early-childhood 
interventions. However, the results from this study show the lack of public support for 
allocating public dollars to early-childhood development: subjects’ perceived value of 
investing in early-childhood development was found to be low. A plausible interpretation of 
this reluctance is that individuals considered the opportunity cost of public funds to be very 
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high in the current economic climate. In any case, at this time childhood poverty does not 
seem to be high priority for the majority of Americans.   
This study focused on government programs on early-childhood development as a 
means of reducing childhood poverty; subject preferences were strongly associated with 
political ideology. Future research can investigate whether an early-childhood program 
managed by churches, charities, or private institutions would receive support from all parts 
of the political spectrum. Another area that is important to investigate is benefits to the 
participants. Future research can estimate the economic value to a household of 
participating in an effective early-childhood program (for example, how much a potential 
participant, such as a parent of a disadvantaged child might be willing to pay to have her 
child participate in an intensive early-childhood program or how much she would accept in 
monetary compensation rather than being a participant household). Intangible benefits 
should also be considered in future studies, because child participants receive benefits such 
as better and more productive quality of life in the long run, and their current and future 
families would also benefit from these advantages. The current study did not include these 
intangible benefits. Although the sample included participants in current government 
programs, the current study focused on overall benefits to society rather than on participant 
benefits. Therefore, the subjects whose children or relatives were current program 
participants could have underestimated the potential benefits they would receive from an 
effective early-childhood program.  
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2.11 Tables  
Table 2.1 Description of the Survey Instruments 
Survey Commodity 
Administrative 
Level 
Number of Children 
Method of 
Payment 
CV 
(federal, 
small-
scale) 
Early-
childhood 
program  
Federal 
Only the children who 
are currently enrolled in 
existing government 
programs (18% of 
children living in 
poverty) under the age 
of 6  
Federal 
income tax 
CV 
(federal, 
large-
scale) 
Early-
childhood 
program 
Federal 
90% of children living in 
poverty under the age 
of 6, including the 
current beneficiaries 
Federal 
income tax 
CV  
(state, 
small-
scale) 
Early-
childhood 
program 
State 
Only the children who 
are currently enrolled in 
existing programs in a 
state 
State 
taxes 
CV (state, 
large-
scale) 
Early-
childhood 
program 
State 
90% of children living in 
poverty under the age 
of 6 in a state, including 
the current beneficiaries 
State 
taxes 
Budget 
Early-
childhood 
program 
Federal 
210,000 / 320,000 / 
430,000 / 530,000 / 
640,000 children can 
participate 
Federal 
income tax  
Country 
Childhood 
poverty rate 
Country 
50% or 25% higher 
than the US, same as 
the US, 25% or 50% 
lower than the US  
Cost of 
living 
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Table 2.2 Budget Survey Attributes and Levels, "Tax" Version 
Attribute Level 
Intensive early-
childhood 
development 
program  
 50% worse: 210,000 children can participate 
 25% worse: 320,000 children can participate 
 No change: 430,000 children can participate 
 25% improvement: 530,000 children can participate 
 50% improvement: 640,000 children can participate 
Job-training 
program 
 50% worse: 3 million people can participate 
 25% worse: 4.5 million people can participate 
 No change: 6 million people can participate 
 25% improvement: 7.5 million people can participate 
 50% improvement: 9 million people can participate 
Food-safety 
monitoring 
program 
 50% worse: 200,000 severe food poisoning cases 
 25% worse: 165,000 severe food poisoning cases 
 No change: 130,000 severe food poisoning cases 
 25% improvement: 100,000 severe food poisoning cases 
 50% improvement: 65,000 severe food poisoning cases 
Disaster-relief 
program 
 50% worse: 90,000 households can be assisted 
 25% worse: 140,000 households can be assisted 
 No change: 180,000 households can be assisted  
 25% improvement: 230,000 households can be assisted 
 50% improvement: 270,000 households can be assisted 
Effects on 
household taxes 
 You pay $2,000 more per year ($170 more per month) in taxes than 
now 
 You pay $300 more per year ($25 more per month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $50 more per year ($4 more per month) in taxes than now 
 No change: Same amount of taxes as now 
 You pay $50 less per year ($4 less per month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $300 less per year ($25 less per month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $2,000 less per year ($170 less per month) in taxes than now 
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Table 2.3 Country Survey Attributes and Levels  
Attribute Description Level 
Environmental 
quality 
 Percentage of deaths due to 
air pollution  
 Percentage of rivers that do 
not meet water-quality 
standards for fishing and 
swimming 
 Percentage of total land that 
are protected 
  50% worse than the US 
  25% worse than the US 
  Same as the US 
  25% better than the US 
  50% better than the US 
Childhood 
Poverty 
 Percentage of children living in 
poverty 
 High school graduation rate of 
teenagers living in poverty 
 Pregnancy rate among poor 
teenage girls 
  50% worse than the US 
  25% worse than the US 
  Same as the US 
  25% better than the US 
  50% better than the US 
Health care 
 Percentage of people who 
have high-quality health 
insurance with affordable co-
payments 
 The average waiting time to 
see a specialist 
 The average number of 
hospital beds 
  50% worse than the US 
  25% worse than the US 
  Same as the US 
  25% better than the US 
  50% better than the US 
Cost of livingϮ 
 You would have $11,000 less per year to spend ($917 per month) 
 You would have $2,750 less per year to spend ($229 per month) 
 You would have $550 less per year to spend ($46 per month) 
 Same as now 
 You would have $550 more per year to spend ($46 per month) 
 You would have $2,750 more per year to spend ($229 per month) 
 You would have $11,000 more per year to spend ($917 per month) 
Ϯ The cost of living levels were indexed to a subject’s annual household income. The levels shown 
here are for an annual household income of $55,000. 
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Table 2.4 Demographic Information 
 CV 
Survey 
N=1712 
Budget 
Survey 
N=2037 
Country 
Survey 
N=1010 
Gender, %    
Male 54 52 52 
Female 46 48 48 
Age, mean (SD), years 53 (16) 52 (16) 52 (16) 
Marital status, %    
Married 60 60 58 
Widowed 5 5 5 
Divorced/separated 12 13 13 
Single 16 16 17 
Living with partner 7 6 7 
Race/ethnicity, %    
White 78 76 77 
Hispanic 7 8 8 
African-American 9 9 9 
2 or more races 3 3 3 
Other 3 3 3 
Highest education, %    
Less than high school graduate 8 8 8 
High school or equivalent (e.g., GED) 27 27 27 
Some college  31 30 32 
Bachelor’s or graduate degree (e.g., BA, 
BS) 34 35 33 
Employment, %    
Paid employee 46 48 48 
Self-employed 7 8 7 
Temporary layoff from a job 1 1 1 
Looking for work 8 6 7 
Retired 25 23 24 
Disabled 7 7 7 
Other 6 7 6 
Household Income, mean (SD), $ 69K (49K) 72K (49K) 71K (48K) 
Household size, mean (SD) 2.6 (1.4) 2.6 (1.5) 2.6 (1.3) 
1 child between 0 and 5 11 11 12 
2 or more children between 0 and 5 2 2 2 
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Table 2.5 Political and Ideological Perspectives 
 
CV 
Survey 
Budget 
Survey 
Country 
Survey 
Government policy on buying a handgun, %    
Make it more difficult 42 42 44 
Make it easier 10 9 9 
Keep these rules about the same 41 42 40 
Don’t know/not sure 7 6 6 
Missing <1 <1 <1 
Abortion, %    
By law, abortion should never be permitted 12 11 12 
The law should permit abortion only in case of 
rape, incest or when the woman’s life is in 
danger 31 33 33 
By law, a woman should always be able to 
obtain an abortion as a matter of personal 
choice 50 50 48 
Don’t know/not sure 6 6 7 
Missing <1 <1 <1 
Political perspective, %    
Extremely liberal 3 3 2 
Liberal 13 12 11 
Slightly liberal 9 11 11 
Moderate, middle-of-the-road 30 30 33 
Slightly conservative 13 13 12 
Conservative 24 24 24 
Extremely conservative 5 4 5 
Libertarian 3 2 2 
Missing 1 1 1 
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Table 2.6 Subjects' Experience with Poverty, % (check all that apply) 
 
Conservatives 
N=1242 
Moderates 
N=1687 
Liberals 
N=1163 
All 
N=4318
Ϯ
 
I am not poor now and have never 
lived in poverty. 
30 27 33 30 
I grew up in a family in poverty and 
my family is still poor. 
5 10 6 7 
I have been poor in the past, but I 
am not poor now. 
27 22 24 24 
I was not poor in the past, but am 
poor now. 
4 6 5 5 
Members of my family have 
experienced poverty, but I have 
not. 
11 9 10 10 
Families in my neighborhood have 
experienced poverty. 
11 12 15 12 
I am not poor now, but I feel like I 
could easily fall into poverty. I live 
paycheck to paycheck. 
24 31 26 27 
None of the above 10 9 11 10 
Ϯ 
This question was not asked in version FJD in the budget survey because this version excluded the 
early-childhood program. 
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Table 2.7 CV Survey Binomial-Probit Estimates  
 
Model 1 
Coefficient 
(St. Err.) 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
(St. Err.) 
Model 3 
Coefficient 
(St. Err.) 
Tax level -7.08E-04*** 
(5.54E-05) 
-7.47E-04*** 
(5.75E-05) 
-8.66E-04*** 
(6.73E-05) 
Household income 3.58E-06*** 
(6.66E-07) 
3.71E-06*** 
(7.57E-07) 
3.49E-06*** 
(8.95E-07) 
BS degree  
0.169** 
(0.075) 
0.180** 
(0.088) 
White  
-0.104 
(0.080) 
0.053 
(0.098) 
Male  
-0.038 
(0.066) 
0.073 
(0.078) 
Age  
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Program success low under federal 
government  
-0.529*** 
(0.102) 
 
Program success low under state 
governments  
-0.365*** 
(0.111) 
 
Living in a high-poverty area   
0.303* 
(0.171) 
Has a child in Head Start   
0.081 
(0.114) 
“Federal government”Ϯ   
0.681*** 
(0.152) 
“State governments”
 Ϯ   
0.059 
(0.182) 
“Poor themselves”
 Ϯ   
0.003 
(0.127) 
Liberal   
0.446*** 
(0.093) 
Conservative   
-0.532*** 
(0.094) 
Wealth because of luck   
-0.038 
(0.037) 
Wealth because of bias   
0.152 
(0.039) 
Wealth because of hard work   
0.101*** 
(0.038) 
Chance of social mobility   
-0.016 
(0.039) 
State-level program   
0.064 
(0.131) 
Small-scope program   
0.013 
(0.075) 
“Federal government” * State-level 
program
ұ
 
  
-0.487 
(0.212) 
“State government” * State-level 
program
ұ
 
  
0.085 
(0.182) 
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Model 1 
Coefficient 
(St. Err.) 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
(St. Err.) 
Model 3 
Coefficient 
(St. Err.) 
“Poor themselves” * State-level 
program
ұ
 
  
0.136 
(0.258) 
Constant -0.170*** 
(0.058) 
-0.033 
(0.137) 
-0.338 
(0.204) 
    
N of observations 1698 1698 1376 
Log likelihood -1046 -987 -751 
AIC 1.24 1.17 1.13 
Ϯ These are the categories for the question about which group should be the most responsible for 
helping the poor.  
ұ 
Interaction variables between the categories for the question about which group should be the most 
responsible for helping the poor and a dummy variable indicating a state-level program. 
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Table 2.8 Budget Survey Mixed-Logit Parameter Estimates  
 
Others 
(Neutral or 
Effective) 
IneffectiveϮ Moderate Liberal 
Conservati
ve 
Main-
Effects 
 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
St. 
Deviation 
(St. Error) 
Model 1: Budget Survey, Interactions with Perceived Effectiveness 
Decrease in 
early-child 
program 
-0.042*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
   
0.038*** 
(0.003) 
Increase in 
early-child 
program 
0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
   
0.027*** 
(0.003) 
Increase in 
taxes 
-10.591*** 
(0.440) 
-10.360*** 
(0.452) 
   NA 
Decrease in 
taxes 
0.146*** 
(0.044) 
0.796*** 
(0.048) 
   NA 
Model 2: Budget Survey, Interactions with Ideology 
Decrease in 
early-child 
program 
  
-0.032*** 
(0.003) 
-0.048 
(0.004)*** 
-0.017*** 
(0.003) 
0.040*** 
(0.003) 
Increase in 
early-child 
program 
  
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.020*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
Increase in 
taxes 
  -10.552*** (0.442) NA 
Decrease in 
taxes 
  
0.210*** 
(0.053) 
0.015 
(0.066) 
0.583*** 
(0.059) 
NA 
Model 3: Budget Survey, Interactions with Ideology and Experienceұ 
Decrease in 
early-child 
program 
  
-0.031*** 
(0.003) 
-0.049*** 
(0.004) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.038*** 
(0.003) 
Increase in 
early-child 
program 
  
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Increase in 
program (for 
subjects with 
experience) 
  
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.030*** 
(0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
NA 
Increase in 
taxes 
  -10.799*** (0.446) NA 
Decrease in 
taxes 
  
0.205*** 
(0.047) 
NA 
0.569*** 
(0.053) 
NA 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level, and *** indicates at the 
1% level 
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Ϯ
 Subjects who indicated a low likelihood of success for a government program on early-childhood 
development in helping children to break out of poverty. 
ұ 
Subjects with children or family member’s children participating in one of the current government 
programs on early-childhood development (e.g., Head Start). 
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Table 2.9 Country Survey Mixed-Logit Parameter Estimates  
 Moderates Liberals Conservatives Main-Effects 
 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
St. Deviation 
(St. Error) 
Childhood poverty     
Higher 
-0.035 
(0.002)*** 
-0.035 
(0.002)*** 
-0.024 
(0.003)*** 
0.022*** 
(0.003) 
Lower -0.001 (0.002) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
Cost of living     
Increase -0.583 (0.032)*** NA 
Decrease 0.072 (0.008)*** NA 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level, and *** indicates at the 
1% level 
Ϯ
 Subjects with children or family member’s children participating in one of the current government 
programs on early childhood (e.g., Head Start). 
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Table 2.10 Mean Annual WTP per Household 
 Moderates Liberals Conservatives 
Weighted 
Mean* 
CV survey nonparametric estimates, Early-childhood program  
Federal-level large-
scale program 
$422  
(102) 
$742  
(116) 
$149  
(59) 
$436 
State-level large-scale 
program 
$92 
(15) 
$510  
(105) 
$156 
(76) 
$237 
CV survey parametric estimates, Early-childhood program 
Federal-level large-
scale program 
$224 (91) $739 (102) -$390 (113)  $188 
State-level large-scale 
program 
$246 (115) $761 (122) -$369 (132) $195 
Budget survey, Early-childhood program (Model 2)
 ұ
  
50% decrease/Enrolling 
210,000 children 
$153 (15) $227 (18) $80 (16) $153 
50% increase/Enrolling 
640,000 children 
$49 (12)
ұ
 $95 (14)
 ұ
 $0 $52 
Budget survey, Early-childhood program (Model 3) 
50% decrease/Enrolling 
210,000 children 
$143 (15) $225 (21) $74 (16) $147 
50% increase/Enrolling 
640,000 children 
$0 $70 (16) $0 
$34 
50% increase/Enrolling 
640,000 children for 
Subjects with 
Experience
 Ϯ 
$87 (20) $139 (24) $57 (22) 
Country survey, Childhood poverty  
50% higher rate $2,992 (216) $2,057 (259) $2,711 
50% lower rate $0  
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Ϯ The mean WTP per year for subjects with children or family member’s children participating in one 
of the current government programs on early childhood (e.g., Head Start) 
ұ 
The WTP values were based on the second model presented in Table 2.8. The next set of WTP 
values for the early-childhood program in the budget survey were based on the third model in 
Table 2.8.  
*This was calculated by weighting the mean WTP for each group with its representation in the 
sample. For example, moderates constituted 40% of the sample, while liberals and conservatives 
constituted 30% each. Subjects with experience constituted 16% of the sample in the budget 
survey, so, for example, liberals with experience would be 4.8% of the sample.  
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Table 2.11 Sensitivity Analysis on the Categorization of Ideological Groups, Mean 
Annual Population-Weighted WTP per Household
Ϯ
 
 
Base-case 
(Top & 
bottom 30%) 
Top & bottom 
20% 
Top & bottom 
40% 
CV survey parametric estimates, Early-childhood program 
Federal-level large-
scale program 
$188 $170 $175 
State-level large-scale 
program 
$195 $192 $188 
Budget survey, 50% increase in the early-childhood program 
Interactions with 
ideology 
$51.81 $58.46 $59.14 
Interactions with 
ideology and 
experience 
$33.11 $37.05 $50.66 
Ϯ 
In the base-case scenario, subjects with the highest 30% factor score were identified as liberals, the 
lowest 30% identified as conservatives, and the others were identified as moderates. In the “top & 
bottom 20%” scenario, subjects with the highest 20% factor score were identified as liberals, the 
lowest 20% identified as conservatives, and the others were identified as moderates. In the “top & 
bottom 40%” scenario, subjects with the highest 40% factor score were identified as liberals, the 
lowest 40% identified as conservatives, and the others were identified as moderates. 
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2.12 Figures 
If these were the only two alternatives, which one would you want your Congressman 
to vote for? 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Disaster-relief program 
 50% improvement:          
270,000 households can 
be assisted 
 No change:           
180,000 households can 
be assisted 
Intensive early-childhood 
development program  
 
50% worse:       210,000 
children can participate 
 25% worse:              
320,000 children can 
participate 
Food-safety monitoring 
program 
 25% worse:               
165,000 severe food 
poisoning cases  
 25% improvement:               
100,000 severe food 
poisoning cases 
Effects on household 
taxes  
 You pay $2,000 less per 
year ($170 less per 
month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $50 more per 
year ($4 more per month) 
in taxes than now 
Which alternative would 
you like your 
Congressman to vote for? 
 
 
  
Figure 2.1 A Sample Budget Trade-off Question 
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If these were the only two alternatives, which country would you choose to live in? 
Country 
Feature 
Current US Levels  Country A  Country B 
Environmental 
Quality 
 3% of all deaths due to 
air pollution 
 40% of rivers fail 
standards 
 8% of total land is 
protected 
 
25% better than 
the US 
 
25% worse than 
the US 
Childhood 
Poverty  
 20% of children live in 
poverty 
 65% graduate high 
school 
 13% teenage 
pregnancy rate 
 
50% worse than 
the US 
 
50% better than 
the US 
Health Care 
 60% have high-quality 
health insurance 
 20 days of waiting time  
to see a specialist 
 1 hospital bed per 350 
people 
 
Same as the US  Same as the US 
Cost of Living 
 You would have 
$5,000 more per 
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($420 more per 
month)  
 
You would have 
$5,000 less per 
year to spend 
($420 less per 
month)  
Which country would you choose? 
 
   
Figure 2.2 A Sample Country Trade-off Question 
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Figure 2.3 Opinions on the Group Who Should Have the Greatest Responsibility to Health 
the Poor, by Ideology 
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Figure 2.4 Opinions on Current Government Programs on Early-Childhood Development, by 
Ideology 
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Figure 2.5 Opinions on Likely Success of Early-Childhood Programs Funded by Federal, 
State and Local Governments, and Private Charities, by Ideology 
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Figure 2.6 The Main Reason for Voting in Support of Funding the Early-Childhood Program 
in the CV Survey, by Ideology (N = 847) 
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Figure 2.7 The Main Reason for Voting Against Funding the Early-Childhood Program in the 
CV Survey, by Ideology (N = 835) 
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CHAPTER 3 
USING A BUDGET-ALLOCATION FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS PREFERENCES FOR 
PUBLICLY PROVIDED GOODS IN A DISCRETE-CHOICE EXPERIMENT SURVEY 
3.1 Introduction 
Stated preference (SP) methods have been used extensively in the fields of 
environmental and health economics to measure the value of non-market goods, including 
publicly provided goods and services. Within this type of research, a payment vehicle is 
specified to facilitate the method of payment for hypothetical changes in the good of interest, 
under the premise that the choice of payment vehicle and definition of the opportunity cost 
could affect preferences and welfare estimates. Taxes are the most commonly used 
payment vehicle for publicly provided goods in SP studies. However, in the current political 
climate in the US and other developed countries, SP studies are likely to garner high 
numbers of protest votes for any type of increase in taxes or for new taxes. The focus-group 
interviews for this study revealed this type of payment-vehicle problem. 
The main focus of the larger research question for this study was to measure the 
perceived value placed by the public upon government investments in early-childhood 
development programs. Focus-group interviews were conducted in Raleigh, NC; Chicago, 
IL; and Dallas, TX in 2008 with 49 adult U.S. residents to test various SP scenarios. These 
discussions showed that some subjects were against any income-tax increase no matter 
what the purpose for the increase was, even if they cared about the social problems that the 
government programs were targeted to alleviate. Some of these subjects also stated that 
they were unwilling to accept a heavier burden as taxpayers while almost half of U.S. 
citizens do not pay federal income taxes. Other subjects suggested that inefficient 
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government programs should be reduced in order to fund high-quality government 
programs. These observations from the focus-group interviews led to the question of 
whether subjects would prioritize one government program over another and would be 
willing to cut one government program to expand another. 
Researchers have used budget reallocations of existing government funding or tax 
revenues as payment vehicles (Bergstrom et al., 2004; Nunes & Travisi, 2009; Swallow & 
McGonagle, 2006) and have quantified subjects’ willingness to trade existing taxations for a 
specified public program. However, these studies were vague about the opportunity costs of 
budget reallocations and the possible consequences of funding cuts on households’ 
consumption of existing goods and services. Literature has shown that values are affected 
by both the framing of the evaluations of a commodity and how the opportunity cost is 
defined (Cummings et al., 1994; Hoehn & Loomis, 1993; Neill, 1995). Therefore, vague 
definitions of opportunity costs in budget reallocation studies are likely to produce invalid 
welfare estimates. A handful of SP studies have also investigated preferences for allocating 
a fix amount of public dollars among a set of public programs (Blomquist et al., 2004; Costa-
Font & Rovira, 2005); however, these studies did not use the budget-allocation surveys to 
derive welfare-theoretic estimates of individuals’ willingness to pay (WTP). 
This study shows how a discrete-choice experiment (DCE) survey can be used to 
create a budget-allocation framework to elicit public preferences for specific government 
programs. This framework contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, offering 
reductions as well as increases in government programs and income taxes allows 
respondents to express preferences for smaller government, which may also decrease 
scenario rejection. Second, the opportunity cost of either moving public dollars among 
different programs or spending private dollars on these programs were linked to changes in 
the outcomes of these programs. This framework allows researchers to estimate the dollar 
values or changes in other government programs that would offset a change in the particular 
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government program of interest. Third, this study tested whether the value of an early-
childhood development program would be considered independently of other programs 
competing for the same resources by comparing a given government program with various 
alternative programs in different versions of the survey instrument.  
The next section provides background from previous literature. The third section 
introduces the budget-allocation framework. The fourth and fifth sections present the case 
study, and the model specification. The sixth and seventh sections present the results and 
the discussion. 
3.2 Background 
The most commonly used payment vehicles in SP studies are income, property and 
sales taxes, utility bills, park entrance fees, and trust-fund payments (M. D. Morrison, 
Blamey, & Bennett, 2000). Researchers have proposed numerous criteria for choosing a 
payment vehicle in an SP study. Cummings et al. (1986) recommended using a payment 
vehicle that is reasonable for the specific case (Cummings, Brookshire, Schulze, Bishop, & 
Arrow, 1986). Boyle (2003) suggested identifying a payment vehicle that has a relatively 
small impact on welfare estimates (Boyle, 2003)(Boyle, 2003)(Boyle, 2003). Carson and 
Groves (2007) stated that a payment vehicle should be incentive-compatible. Several 
studies (Champ & Bishop, 2001; Ivehammar, 2009; Mazur & Bennett, 2010; Wiser, 2007) 
have shown that the payment vehicle affects the parameter estimates. Payment vehicle 
effects are reasonable because subjects and policy makers may care about the mechanism 
by which the funds are raised (Johnston et al., 1999; Stevens et al., 1997).  
The value of the provision of publicly provided goods and services is usually 
assessed in terms of tax increases or the introduction of new taxes. Two conditions have 
been proposed under which tax use might not be credible: 1) if respondents focus on the 
exclusion of non-taxpayers from the vehicle; and 2) if subjects do not trust that the funds 
raised will go to the program of interest (Kontoleon, Yabe, & Darby, 2005). In the current 
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economic environments of most developed countries, utilizing any form of new taxes as a 
payment vehicle in an SP study may lead to a high number of protest responses or to 
scenario rejection. During pretest interviews, Morrison et al. (2000) found that 32% of their 
sample proposed that the Australian government should pay for an environmentally friendly 
drainage-pipe system out of existing taxation funds. I observed similar attitudes during the 
focus-group interviews and in a pilot study conducted for this study in 2008 in the US. Of the 
subjects who said “no” to a tax increase in the pilot study, 15% reported that they were 
against any new tax increases and 37% reported that other government programs should be 
reduced to fund the good of interest. Morrison and MacDonald (2011) have observed that 
increases in taxes may not always be relevant in developing countries because nontax 
revenues (e.g., foreign aid) could be the source of provision of public services. 
The literature contains two lines of studies on budget (re)allocation (Table 3.1). To 
understand the demand for public goods, the first line has used budget reallocation as a 
possible alternative to tax increases (Bergstrom et al., 2004; Kontoleon et al., 2005; M. 
Morrison & Hatton MacDonald, 2011; Nunes & Travisi, 2009; Swallow & McGonagle, 2006). 
These studies measured subjects’ willingness to allocate public dollars from existing publicly 
provided goods and services to a particular publicly provided good, and compared these 
values to willingness to pay new taxes for the public provision of the same good. They 
emphasized that subjects would not need to pay extra taxes under a tax-reallocation 
payment scenario. Under the assumptions that    
 denotes the publicly provided good   of 
interest and     denotes the existing publicly provided goods and services at the status quo 
level, these studies estimated the amount of public dollars (existing taxes) subjects were 
willing to allocate from existing publicly provided goods     for an improvement of   . Using 
a contingent valuation (CV) survey method, Bergstrom et al. (2004) found that, in the U.S. 
states of Maine and Georgia, willingness to reallocate funds from other publicly provided 
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goods to groundwater quality protection was significantly higher than willingness to pay a 
new tax. However, Kontoleon et al. (2005) found in the UK that willingness to pay a higher 
tax was not significantly different than willingness to reallocate funds from other 
government-funded goods for the labeling of genetically modified food. 
Other studies (M. Morrison & Hatton MacDonald, 2011; Nunes & Travisi, 2009; 
Swallow & McGonagle, 2006) utilized both tax reallocation and new taxes as a payment 
vehicle in a DCE survey. Swallow and McGonagle (2006) and Nunes and Travisi (2009) 
asked subjects to choose between hypothetical alternatives in which the cost of the program 
was described either by new taxes or tax reallocation in a within-sample experiment. 
Morrison and MacDonald (2011) conducted a between-sample experiment in which one 
questionnaire employed new taxes and the other employed tax reallocation as a payment 
vehicle.  
These studies have all shared a common problem: the opportunity cost of public 
dollars was vaguely defined. For example, Swallow and McGonagle (2006) defined WTP of 
individual n for alternative i over status quo as:   
  (                 )   (            ) (3.1) 
for (i ≠ SQ) where    and     denotes the attributes associated with alternative i and status 
quo, respectively,    represents individual n’s disposable income,    denotes the current 
level of taxes individual n pays, and    is a vector of socio-economic characteristics of 
individual n.  The authors defined the willingness to reallocate (WTT) existing taxes using 
the WTP analogy as  
  (                 )   (            ) (3.2) 
This approach implicitly assumes that reallocating some of the existing taxes from 
other publicly provided goods   to   leads to a change of   . For example, Bergstrom et al. 
(2004) stated that the funds would be allocated from the bundle of all other public goods, 
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and Swallow and McGonagle (2006) stated that the funds would be drawn from publicly 
provided goods in proportion to their existing share of the public budget. The problem, 
however, as acknowledged by Morrison and MacDonald (2011), is that the change in   was 
not clearly identified in the previous studies. Even when people might know the existing 
goods at the status quo level (   ), it was not reasonable to expect that they would know 
  . It could be hard for people to understand the exact opportunity cost of reallocating public 
dollars without knowing the consequences of a funding cut on households’ consumption of 
existing goods and services. An individual’s utility and her decision about reallocation may 
change based on what she assumes about   . It is possible that subjects assume taxes 
would be reallocated from goods and services that they do not care about or care about the 
least. For example, a family without children could assume that taxes would be reallocated 
from funding for public schools, which arguably would have no effect on their budget or 
quality of life.  
After highlighting the shortcomings of previous studies, Morrison and MacDonald 
(2011) described the opportunity cost of public dollars in terms of possible reduced services 
(   ) without indicating a specific program or identifying an explicit change for each 
reallocation. They concluded that “the question remains about how definitions of alternative 
reallocations influences value estimates, including the effect of using single budget areas 
(e.g. roads, education) versus broadly defined reallocations” (p. 11). Nunes and Travisi 
(2009) investigated whether preferences change when the reallocated budget comes from 
program    versus program    within the same sector, and found that it did not matter. 
However, they did not explain what the specific consequences (    and    ) would be for 
the services for which spending was reduced. Thus the problem with previous studies has 
been compounded: not only was    not clearly defined, but a subject’s decision on 
reallocation could also change when the opportunity cost was associated with the existing 
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good    , good    , or a bundle of goods  . McCaffery and Baron (2005) found that their 
subjects were willing to cut both taxes and spending to appreciably low levels when a single 
large category was provided. However, when subjects evaluated specific programs, they 
were unwilling to cut spending.19 
These studies also lacked the essential welfare-theoretic connection between 
preferences and personal budget constraints. Subjects were basically asked to spend 
existing taxes as if they were spending someone else’s money in exchange for a personally 
ambiguous share of publicly provided goods and services. For these reasons, WTP or 
willingness to accept (WTA) which are the essential concepts for benefit-cost analysis 
cannot be calculated. The WTT approach also directly assumes that the marginal utility of 
public dollars (
  
  
) is different than the marginal utility of income/private dollars (
  
  
). The 
authors have hypothesized that if the marginal utility of income exceeds the marginal utility 
of a public dollar, then WTT would indicate a greater willingness than WTP to allocate funds 
to the good of interest. Previous studies cited in this paper (except Kontoleon et al., 2005) 
found that this was the case: in other words, the estimates of willingness to reallocate taxes 
were greater than the WTP estimates for a new tax. 
Vague definitions of the opportunity cost of a good or the source of reallocation could 
have led to invalid estimates of demand for trade-offs among goods and services in the 
previous studies. Indeed, those researchers suggested that further research was needed to 
understand how the opportunity costs should be specified and how the definitions of 
alternative reallocation scenarios influence value estimates. Publicly provided goods and 
services could have substitution and complementary effects in terms of outcomes and 
targeted beneficiaries; in addition, a publicly provided service can affect multiple outcomes 
                                                 
1
 The authors defined this effect analogously to the “identified victim” effect (Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Small & 
Loewenstein, 2003; Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007) in which people were more willing to help a specific 
victim than a general cause. 
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and may also affect outcomes generated by another service. SP studies have found 
substitution and complementary effects in the valuation of environmental goods and 
services (Hailu, Adamowicz, & Boxall, 2000; Hoehn, 1991; Hoehn & Loomis, 1993), non-
environmental goods (Cummings et al., 1994), and health- care services (Donaldson, 
Luchini, Protière, & Moatti, 2008).  
The second line of SP studies (Blomquist et al., 2004; Costa-Font & Rovira, 2005) 
measured the relative preference strength of alternative public programs (i.e., the rate of 
preference for one program over another) using a fixed amount of public dollars. Although 
these studies could be helpful in understanding public preferences about allocating a certain 
budgetary amount, they did not link public dollars to WTP or translate budgeted dollars into 
program outcomes; nor did individuals know how changes in public spending would change 
the quantity or quality of public services targeted. Koford (2010) linked preferences for state 
spending on state-provided services with private WTP values. The first stage of his study 
was similar to the earlier studies in that it asked subjects to allocate a certain amount of 
public dollars across a set of public sectors. He used this information to calculate marginal 
willingness to trade between two sectors. In the second stage, he elicited WTP for 
expanding one of the sectors in this set using a CV question. He then calculated WTP for 
other sectors by multiplying the WTP for the specific sector elicited in the second stage with 
the marginal willingness to trade between two budget categories elicited in the first stage.20 
The problem with this method is that subjects could be considering the specified tax 
increase as the only tax increase when answering the WTP question; moreover, they might 
not be able to afford the sum of the taxes calculated for all budget categories. If they were 
aware of all possible tax increases for the full set of publicly provided services, their WTP for 
                                                 
20
 For example, assume that in the first stage, the sample allocated $20, $40, $10, and $30 million (out of $100 
million) to A, B, C, and D sectors, respectively. The marginal willingness to trade off between two budget 
categories would be 1, 2, 0.5, and 1.5 if A is used as the numeraire. Assuming that the mean WTP for A is 
estimated to be $60 as a one-time payment in the second stage, the WTP for B, C, and D are calculated as 
$120, $30, and $90, respectively.  
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one or more of the sectors could have been smaller. It is also possible that they might be 
willing to reallocate existing public funding to a program without wanting to pay new taxes 
for that program.  
The existing budget-allocation studies have focused only on increases in funding for 
publicly provided goods and services; they have not investigated how preferences for 
funding cuts differ from expansions. The reallocation scenarios used in previous studies 
have assumed cuts in existing services but did not explicitly describe reductions in the 
existing public goods from which the taxes would be reallocated. Literature has shown that 
people are more averse to experiencing losses than to obtaining gains; for example, the 
disutility from losing $100 is greater than the utility of earning $100 (Kahneman, Knetsch, & 
Thaler, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). These findings on loss aversion in different 
settings and for a variety of goods led us to expect that preferences for reducing publicly 
provided services could be quite different than preferences for increases or improvements in 
these services.  
3.3 Budget Allocation Framework 
3.3.1 Welfare Measure 
The budget-allocation framework used in this study made the standard assumption 
that an individual n’s utility for alternative i is divided into a deterministic     and a random 
part    : 
      (        )      (3.3) 
where    denotes the public program   associated with alternative i,    represents 
individual n’s disposable income, and    is a vector of socio-economic characteristics of 
individual n. Individual n chooses alternative i over alternative j (i ≠ j) if and only if 
  (           )   (           ) (3.4) 
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where    denotes the taxes associated with alternative i. Similarly, individual n chooses 
alternative i over alternative j if and only if 
  (              )   (              ) (3.5) 
where    denotes other public programs associated with alternative i, such that individuals 
are informed about changes in these programs. In this case,    denotes the taxes 
associated with alternative i, which goes to pay for    and   . 
3.3.2 Budget-Allocation Survey Design 
The survey design for a budget-allocation framework follows similar steps that are 
used in developing a typical DCE study. DCE studies present hypothetical commodity 
alternatives, each of which is defined by several attributes including––in most applications––
a payment vehicle. A budget-allocation study defines hypothetical budget alternatives in 
which each budget is described by a set of public programs and the household share of 
taxes that are used to pay for these goods. Instead of identifying the key attributes 
associated with a commodity, the first step in this case is to specify a set of public programs.  
There might be two apparent cases for selecting a set of public programs. First, a 
study might already be interested in understanding preferences for a group of public 
programs. If this is the case, then this group of public programs would naturally constitute 
the budget. Second, it is possible that a study might be interested in identifying preferences 
for only a particular public program. In this case, the next step is to select public programs 
that are institutionally relevant and are plausibly representative of programs that would 
compete with the good of interest for the same resources. Determining these possibilities, 
which is perhaps one of the most challenging parts of the budget-allocation framework, 
requires pretesting of the selected public programs. Not only is it important to choose 
programs among which subjects are willing to accept trade-offs, it is also reasonable to 
choose programs that are of similar size in terms of budget spending.  
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The second step is to decide how each public program is defined. An important 
difference between the budget-allocation framework proposed in this study and the other 
budget-allocation studies is that here each program is defined in terms of outcomes, not in 
terms of dollars. Communicating outcomes helps subjects understand what they are trading. 
There could be several ways of defining program outcomes, depending on the type of public 
programs in question. This study used the number of beneficiaries as program outcomes; 
other possibilities are quantity or quality of services. 
The third step is to choose a payment vehicle with respect to the interest of the 
study. Taxes are the common way of paying for public programs and so are a natural choice 
for use as a cost attribute in a DCE study. However, taxes are not considered credible if 
respondents focus on the exclusion of non-taxpayers from the vehicle (Kontoleon et al., 
2005). It is important to choose a credible cost attribute (e.g., the right type of tax) that is 
inclusive of the majority of subjects who are paying for the program and is relevant to the 
study. 
The next step is identification of attribute levels. The main difference between this 
study and a typical DCE study at this step is that it offered both increases in and reductions 
from status quo program budgets (i.e., the budget alternatives offered increases and 
reductions in program outcomes and also in taxes). A budget-allocation framework does not 
have to offer reductions; it may focus only on increases, or only on reductions. Offering 
changes in both directions from the status quo, as this study did, helps to capture 
preferences and mitigate possible protest responses by those who believe in smaller 
government. The other steps in the development of a budget-allocation framework, such as 
the question format and experimental design, are similar to those of a typical DCE study. 
Subjects should be provided with similar amounts and kinds of information on each 
program, and if the study is about a particular program they should not be told so that the 
evaluation they receive for each program can be neutral.   
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3.4 Case Study 
This study was motivated by informing subjects that the U.S. Congress has been 
debating government budget issues (i.e., trying to decide which programs to cut, which ones 
to increase, and whether to cut or increase taxes to pay for these programs). They were 
also told that the U.S. Congress was going to vote on how federal spending should be 
divided among three government programs, and that their congressional representative had 
sent them a letter asking how he or she should vote on this matter. Subjects were then 
presented with a series of choice tasks that included two hypothetical budget alternatives 
and asked which of the two they would want their representative to vote for.  
As the main focus of this study was to measure WTP for a government program on 
early-childhood development, three other programs were selected for comparison: (1) a job-
training program, (2) a disaster-relief program, (3) a food-safety monitoring program. These 
programs were selected because they are of similar size in terms of budget impact. 
Controversial programs such as climate-change-related expenditures were avoided. Pretest 
interviews confirmed that subjects were willing to make trade-offs among these programs. A 
brief description of each program was provided in the survey instrument. 
Program outcomes were defined in terms of the number of beneficiaries. The status 
quo was the number of beneficiaries based on the 2010 federal budget; the other levels 
were assigned as reductions or increases from the status quo. These levels were presented 
both in relative (e.g., 50% improvement) and absolute terms (e.g., 640,000 children can 
participate) because providing this information only in relative terms might have led subjects 
to overestimate the changes. The attributes and levels used in this study are shown in Table 
3.2, and a sample trade-off question is shown in Figure 3.1. The full survey instrument is 
presented in Appendix B. To test whether the competing programs in a choice set affected 
preferences, each hypothetical budget contained three out of four of the government 
programs. Four different versions of the survey instrument were constructed so that each 
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program appeared with the other two programs twice (Table 3.3). Each version was named 
after the initials of the three programs included in a survey version; for example, Version 
CFJ included early-childhood (C), food-safety (F) and job-training (J) programs. The order of 
the programs was randomized in the survey instrument to minimize possible order effects.  
The cost attribute was the change in annual household federal income taxes or 
income-tax credits. This paper is focused only on the results from the taxes because the 
sample size for the tax-credit version was very small. However, the survey informed subjects 
that the budget alternatives offered changes not only in taxes but also in tax credits some 
individuals would receive, to highlight that individuals who do not pay federal income taxes 
would be paying their share. The tax-attribute levels were defined in terms of increases and 
reductions in tax (credit) levels from what households currently pay (receive). These levels 
were $2000 more/less, $300 more/less, $50 more/less, and no change.  
I employed a variation of a commonly used algorithm to construct a statistically 
efficient experimental design (F. R. Johnson, Kanninen, Bingham, & Ozdemir, 2007; Rose & 
Bliemer, 2010). A statistically efficient design minimizes the asymptotic variance covariance 
matrix. I chose a D-efficient design created in SAS (SAS Institute, Cary, NC) that minimizes 
the D-error (F. R. Johnson et al., 2013; Kuhfeld, 2005). To reduce subject burden, the trade-
off tasks were divided into 14 blocks. Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the 
block versions. To minimize possible order effects, the sequence of the trade-off questions 
was randomized.  
This study investigated several possible manifestations of scenario rejection. First, if 
subjects rejected the hypothetical scenario, they might have refused to answer or have 
skipped the entire set of trade-off questions in the survey. Second, scenario rejection might 
have manifested as making decisions based on only the tax attribute. A participant was 
considered to be dominating on the tax attribute if he or she chose the alternative with the 
lower level of tax increase or the higher level of tax reduction in all of the trade-off questions. 
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Third, the use of an opposite heuristic to dominance on making decisions was also 
considered to be scenario rejection. Because subjects might not have paid attention to the 
amount of taxes they would need to pay, they were tested for whether they were likely to be 
non-attendant or insensitive to the tax attribute, following the method developed by Scarpa 
et al. (Scarpa et al., 2009). Based on this method, a class of subjects whose utility weights 
for the tax attribute were likely zero was identified using an equality-constrained latent-class 
model.  
Two other tests were conducted to test the internal validity of the DCE data. A 
transitivity test in which subjects who chose Alternative A over Alternative B in one choice 
set and Alternative B over Alternative C in another choice set had to pick Alternative A over 
Alternative C in a third choice set. Transitivity is a fundamental axiom of utility theory and is 
required for valid welfare estimation (Just et al., 2004). A second test identified subjects who 
had no variation in their answers to the trade-off questions; that is, they always picked either 
Alternative A or Alternative B in all of the trade-off questions. Appendix D provides detailed 
information on these tests. 
The survey was implemented online as a web survey. Earlier versions of the paper 
questionnaire were pretested by one-on-one, face-to-face interviews with 17 subjects in July 
and August 2011 and with 18 subjects in October 2011. These interviews helped select the 
government programs to be evaluated and to refine our descriptions of these programs. The 
pretest interviews were also used to test the language of the text and to confirm that 
subjects were capable of answering the trade-off questions. The web survey was pilot-
tested with 200 subjects to evaluate the attribute-level ranges, especially the tax-attribute 
levels.  
A cheap-talk script (Ajzen et al., 2004; Cummings & Taylor, 1999) was used to 
mitigate the effects of possible hypothetical bias. The cheap-talk text in this study asked 
subjects to consider the consequences of paying taxes on their income and to answer the 
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questions as if the study findings would affect policy decisions in the US. The study also 
followed a “time to think” (TTT) protocol (Whittington et al., 1992). A review of studies with a 
TTT protocol (Cook et al., 2011) has shown that the certainty of answers to CV questions 
increased and the number of internal-validity test failures decreased in DCE surveys for 
subjects who had time to think compared to those who did not have time to think. After a 
brief introduction of government programs and review of the trade-off questions, subjects 
were given time to think about the survey and were asked to return to the survey within 1 to 
10 days. The second part of the survey began with a reminder of the task and provided a 
link that summarized the first part if participants wanted to check. After they read the cheap-
talk text, subjects were asked to answer the budget trade-off questions.  
The web-based survey instrument targeted 2,000 subjects, was hosted on a secure 
site, and was administered in June 2012 by GfK Knowledge Networks (KN) to their general- 
population panel members. All participants were required to be U.S. residents at least 18 
years of age and to have indicated their willingness to proceed with the survey after they 
had read the informed-consent materials. This study received IRB approval from the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s Office of Human Research Ethics. 
3.5 Model Estimation 
 Statistical analysis of the DCE data was based on random-utility theory. Mixed-logit 
(also known as random-parameters logit) models were employed to analyze the budget 
trade-off questions. Appendix E provides details on model estimation and econometrics 
used in this study, and Appendix L presents the conditional-logit estimates. Two linear 
variables were created for each attribute: one for increases from the status quo and the 
other for reductions. NLOGIT 4.0 was used for all the econometric analysis. Five hundred 
Halton draws were used for the mixed-logit estimates. All attribute parameters except the 
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cost parameters were specified as normally distributed;21 cost parameters were assumed to 
be nonrandom. The empirical model was defined as the following: 
         
        
            ̌        (3.6) 
where k indicates a government program. The attributes were also interacted with individual-
specific characteristics, and these parameters were assumed to be non-random. The 
marginal WTP was calculated by dividing a non-monetary attribute by the cost-increase 
parameter. For example, marginal WTP for an increase in the job-training program was 
calculated as the following: 
 
     
    
  
 
(3.7) 
where      indicates the parameter for increases in the job-training program. An interested 
researcher can also calculate welfare changes based on subjects’ willingness to accept tax 
reductions by using the cost-reduction parameter.22 The marginal WTP values as shown in 
Equation 3.7 were used to compare different model estimates or estimates from the different 
versions presented in the next sections to address differences in scale across the different 
models. 
3.6 Results 
3.6.1 Sample 
The descriptive statistics of the sample (Table 3.4) were compared to statistics on 
the general population demographics from the U.S. Census Bureau. 23  A full list of 
descriptive statistics on the survey questions are presented in Appendix H. The sample had 
a slightly lower representation of females than the general population (48% versus 51%). 
                                                 
21
 Assuming triangular distribution for all parameters produced very similar results. When parameters were 
assumed to be log-normally distributed, the models did not converge. 
22
 Willingness to accept values are presented in the fourth chapter. 
23
 This information on the general population is based on U.S. Census Bureau statistics accessed at 
http://www.census.gov/ on March 13, 2013.  
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Although the white population was well represented (78% versus 78%), the percentage of 
African Americans (9% versus 13%) and Hispanics (8% versus 17%) were lower in the 
sample than in the general population. The household size of the sample (2.6) matched the 
mean U.S. household size. The sample had a higher representation of college graduates 
than the general population (37% versus 30%). The median income of the sample ($67k) 
was higher than the U.S. median household income ($53k). The full descriptive statistics on 
the survey questions are presented in Appendix H. 
To reduce the number of explanatory variables, a factor analysis was conducted on 
the ideological questions (i.e., gun control, abortion, and self-identified political ideology) and 
on attitudinal questions about the reasons for wealth and success and the chances of social 
mobility. Appendix J provides more information about the factor analysis. These explanatory 
variables were grouped into five factors that were labeled as “wealth because of luck,” 
“wealth because of bias,” “wealth because of hard work and intelligence,” “chance of social 
mobility,” and “social ideology.” The factor analysis grouped the questions about gun control, 
abortion, and self-identified political ideology into the “social ideology” factor. The social-
ideology factor score was then used to assign each subject to a specific ideological group. 
Subjects within the highest 30% of the social-ideology factor score were classified as 
liberals and subjects within the lowest 30% were classified as conservatives. The rest were 
considered to be moderates. For some of the analyses, these dummy variables were used 
instead of the social-ideology factor to identify subjects’ ideology (i.e., liberal, moderate, or 
conservative). 
3.6.2 Results on Internal-Validity and Scenario Rejection 
In total 31 (1.5%) subjects had no variation in their answers to the budget trade-off 
questions. These subjects also failed the transitivity test and were very likely to go through 
the survey without paying close attention to the questions. For these reasons, these 
subjects were dropped from the subsequent analysis. One hundred ninety-five (9.6%) 
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subjects failed the transitivity test. This percentage is much lower than the failure rates for 
internal validity test results in similar studies (Ryan & San Miguel, 2000; Ryan & Bate, 2001; 
Özdemir et al., 2010) and may have been because the respondents in this study were given 
time to think about their answers (Cook et al., 2011).  
Two of the three tests on scenario rejection were satisfactory: only 1 subject skipped 
all the trade-off questions, and only 22 subjects (about 1% of the sample) dominated on the 
cost attribute. However, 709 subjects (35%) were classified as likely to be non-attendant to 
the cost attribute. Although this statistic was relatively high, it fell within the range of the 
statistics reported by the studies that investigated attribute non-attendance (Gilbride et al., 
2006; Hensher, 2008; Lagarde, 2012) and was lower than the statistics reported by these 
studies that used taxes as a payment vehicle (D. Campbell et al., 2008; Scarpa et al., 2009; 
Scarpa, Notaro et al., 2009).  
Table 3.5 presents the binomial-probit estimates of who was likely to fail the 
transitivity test and who was likely to be non-attendant to the cost attribute.24 Subjects with a 
college degree were less likely and subjects who were non-attendant to the cost attribute 
were more likely to fail the transitivity test. Subjects who failed the transitivity test were found 
to have no significantly different preferences for the tax attribute than others in the 
preliminary analysis. Therefore these subjects were kept in the final analysis, which 
consisted of 1,896 subjects. Liberals, subjects who indicated that “federal government” 
should be the group most responsible for helping the poor, and subjects who failed the 
transitivity test were more likely to be non-attendant to the tax attribute, and subjects who 
indicated that the “poor themselves” should be the group most responsible for helping the 
poor were less likely to be non-attendant. Interaction terms between the cost variables (     
                                                 
24
 Models based on no variation and dominating on the cost attribute are not discussed here because they 
constituted a very small portion of the sample. More information on internal validity test can be found in 
Appendix A. 
 98 
 
and     ) and a dummy variable indicating likely non-attendance to the cost (       ) were 
included such that the empirical model in Equation 6 can be rewritten as: 
         
        
         ̌                      ̌             (3.8) 
The cost-increase (µ+ µ1) and cost-reduction ( ̌   ̌ ) parameters for subjects who 
were non-attendant to the cost equal zero. The main-effects cost-increase parameter (µ) 
was used to calculate the marginal utility of income. This method of calculating WTP used 
the mean parameter β for all subjects for non-monetary attributes and the mean parameter µ 
for the subjects, excluding the ones who were likely non-attendant to the cost attribute for 
cost increase. This approach assumed that the marginal utility of income for those who were 
non-attendant to the cost attribute was not different than the marginal utility of income for 
others.  
3.6.3 Alternative Programs Matter in a Choice Set 
The mixed-logit model estimates show the evidence of cross-effects between the 
programs. 25  The interaction between increases in the early-childhood program and 
increases in the food-safety program was significantly positive at the 1% level in Version 
CFJ.26 The interaction between increases in the job-training program and increases in the 
disaster-relief program was significantly positive in Version CJD. The pairwise comparison of 
different versions was conducted using marginal WTP values (Table 3.6). Of the 30 pairwise 
comparisons across versions, nine marginal WTP values were significantly different at the 
1% or 5% levels. For example, the value of a 1% increase in the early-childhood program 
was not significantly different among the versions. However, a 1% reduction in the early-
childhood program led to an annual loss of $2.76 per household in Version CFJ, $3.74 in 
Version CFD, and $2.05 in Version CJD. These values for the early-childhood development 
                                                 
25
 The final models were run only with the significant interaction variables.  
26
 From this point forward, if the significance level is not mentioned specifically it was considered significant at 
the 1% level. 
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program were significantly different between Version CFJ and Version CFD (p = 0.050) and 
between Version CFD and CJD (p = 0.001). The full mixed-logit estimates for each survey 
version are presented in Table M.1 in Appendix M. 
The greatest loss was associated with the early-childhood program for all the 
versions that included it. In Version FJD, which did not include the early-childhood program, 
the greatest loss was associated with the job-training program. Preferences for program 
increases were more heterogeneous. An increase in the early-childhood program had the 
greatest value among programs in Version CFJ; an increase in the disaster-relief program 
had the greatest value in Version CFD; the job-training program had the greatest value in 
Version CJD; and the food-safety program had the greatest value in Version FJD. These 
results indicate that valuation of a given government program was not independent of the 
programs to which it was compared, and that marginal WTP values for a specific program 
changed based on what other programs were being considered.  
Different survey versions can be pooled after adjusting for possible scale differences 
across the versions using an error-components (EC) model (Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 
2008). The EC model relaxes the assumption of independence across individuals in mixed-
logit models by including an alternative-specific constant (ASC) for each version. In an 
unlabeled design such as this, ASCs provide the average utility distances between the 
mean effects in each version and the alternatives in a version. The random parameters 
associated with each version approximate the distribution of the scale for a version relative 
to the scale of the version without an intercept, which this study designated as Version CFJ. 
The only significant scale parameter for the scale-controlled model was the one associated 
with Version CFD, which indicated that the mean effect of Version CFD was significantly 
different than Version CFJ (Table M.2 in Appendix M). The associated standard deviations 
were not significant for any of the versions, which signaled that these versions did not have 
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significantly different scales than Version CFJ. The pooled model estimates were used for 
the subsequent analysis. 
3.6.4 The Effect of Likely Non-Attendance to the Cost Attribute 
Table 3.7 presents the marginal WTP estimates with and without adjustments for 
likely non-attendance to the cost attribute; the full mixed-logit estimates are presented in 
Table M.2 in Appendix M. The controlled (adjusted) model is used in Equation 3.6, followed 
by the uncontrolled model (without adjustment) in Equation 3.8. Pairwise comparisons of 
these estimates indicated that only two out of nine comparisons (increases in the early-
childhood and job-training programs) were not significantly different between the controlled 
and uncontrolled estimates. The mean marginal WTP values for program reductions were 
significantly larger in the uncontrolled model than in the controlled model. While the 
uncontrolled model provided significantly negative or insignificant mean values for program 
increases, the mean marginal WTP estimates had the expected sign for three program 
increases in the controlled model. This result shows that not controlling for likely non-
attendance to the cost attribute would have led to implausible mean WTP values. These 
models were also compared based on log likelihood and on Akaike’s information criterion 
(AIC), which balances the reduction in the log-likelihood function with the increase in the 
number of parameters. The controlled model performed better than the uncontrolled model, 
with a smaller log likelihood (in magnitude) and a smaller AIC measure. 
Standard deviations provide information on unobserved taste heterogeneity: a high 
standard deviation signals more heterogeneous preferences and a small standard deviation 
signals more homogeneous preferences. The taste heterogeneity was in general larger for 
reductions in a program than increases in a program (see Table M.2 in Appendix M). 
Preferences with the largest heterogeneity were for reductions in the early-childhood 
program and the job-training program. The significant standard deviations associated with 
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all attribute parameters indicated significant unobserved taste heterogeneity in the attributes 
and confirmed the importance of estimating a mixed-logit model. 
3.6.5 The Effect of Ideology 
An important consideration when measuring preferences for government programs 
and budget allocation is the possibility of correlations with political ideology. Dummy 
variables associated with being a liberal and a conservative were interacted with the 
attribute parameters; being moderate was left out as the omitted category. The tax-increase 
parameter, which was used to calculate the marginal WTP values, was negative and was 
not significantly different across the ideological groups. Table 3.8 presents the mean 
marginal WTP values (i.e., the mean WTP for a 1% increase or reduction) per household 
per year and the standard errors for moderates, liberals, and conservatives. The full mixed-
logit model estimates are presented in Table M.3 in Appendix M. 
Subjects across all ideological groups perceived losses from reductions in all four 
government programs. The largest losses for all groups were associated with reductions in 
the early-childhood program. The mean WTP to avoid a 1% reduction in the early-childhood 
program was $4.50, $2.90 and $1.50 per household per year for liberals, moderates, and 
conservatives, respectively. Liberals valued increases in all programs except the food-safety 
program. Liberals had a mean annual WTP of $1.40 for a 1% increase in the early-childhood 
program and about $0.6 for a 1% increase in the job-training and disaster-relief programs.27 
Conservatives valued increases only in the job-training program with a mean annual 
marginal WTP of $0.6, but perceived losses from increases in the food-safety program with 
a mean annual marginal loss of $1.4. Moderates valued increases in the job-training and 
disaster-relief programs; their WTP values lay somewhere in between liberals and 
conservatives. In general, compared to other groups, liberals valued increases more and 
                                                 
27
 A 1% increase corresponds to around 4,200 children in the early-childhood program, 60,000 food-poisoning 
cases in the food-safety program, 1,400 beneficiaries in the job-training program, and 1,800 households in 
the disaster-relief program. 
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perceived larger losses from reductions. Conservatives and moderates (conservatives more 
than moderates) valued reductions in their taxes; while this was not significant for liberals.  
Some of these findings were consistent with the expectations; for example, liberals 
liked program increases but did not like program reductions. The findings on conservatives, 
however, were somewhat surprising: they did not want to give up any of the four programs, 
although they significantly supported expanding only the job-training program, and seemed 
to support the status quo for the other three programs. These findings show that some 
subjects were reluctant to accept program reductions when the opportunity cost and the 
consequences of changes were laid out very explicitly.  
3.6.6 Budget Allocation and Welfare Changes  
 The value of a 50% increase in a program can be evaluated in two ways: 1) by 
calculating how much subjects are willing to pay in taxes for this increase; and 2) by 
comparing it to a value of reductions in other programs. The values for the early-childhood 
program are presented in this section as an example. The mean WTP per household (based 
on the main-effects model) for a 50% increase in the early-childhood development program 
was $32 per year. Liberals were willing to pay $70 and moderates were willing to pay $18, 
while conservatives did not value increases in the early-childhood program based on the 
interactions model. If subjects had children or family members’ children participating in one 
of the current government programs on early-childhood development, WTP increased to 
$139 and $87 for liberals and moderates, respectively. Conservatives in this group were 
willing to pay $57 per year.  
The second approach estimates the value of reductions in other government 
programs that would offset the value of a 50% increase in the early-childhood program. 
Using the main-effects estimates, the value associated with a 50% increase in the early-
childhood program was offset by a 19% reduction in the food-safety program, a 17% 
reduction in the job-training program, or a 22% reduction in the disaster-relief program. 
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Another option is to partly cut two or more programs. For example, the food-safety program 
could be decreased by 10% and the job-training program by about 9%. For a 50% increase 
in the early-childhood program, moderates would be willing to decrease the food-safety 
program by 11%, the job-training program by 7%, or the disaster-relief program by 10%. 
Liberals would be willing to decrease the food-safety program by 49%, the job-training 
program by 29%, or the disaster-relief program by 41%. Possible budget reallocation 
scenarios for increasing the early-childhood program could not be calculated for 
conservatives because they did not value increases in this program. For conservatives, 
budget reallocation scenarios could only be calculated for increasing the job-training 
program, in which the only program they valued the expansions. 
  A 10% increase in all four government programs would lead to an average 
perceived gain of $15 per year per household based on the main-effects model. The gain 
would be $17 for moderates and $26 for liberals, but would only be $6 for conservatives. A 
perhaps more interesting and policy-relevant scenario, a 10% cut across all four programs, 
led to an average perceived loss of $77 per year per household based on the main-effects 
model. Liberals would suffer the most ($111), followed by moderates ($84) and last by 
conservatives ($47) based on the interactions model. 
3.7 Conclusion and Discussion 
 This study used a DCE method in a budget-allocation framework to elicit public 
preferences for specific government programs. Hypothetical budget alternatives were 
described by changes in the number of beneficiaries together with individual shares of the 
taxes that would be used to pay for these programs. Each program and household tax 
shares were defined both in terms of increases and reductions from the status quo, which 
allowed preferences for smaller as well as larger government roles to mitigate scenario 
rejection. 
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This study presents four important findings. First, consistent with predictions of 
economic theory, this study showed that the valuation of one program was not independent 
of valuation of the alternative programs: the perceived value of a program changed 
according to which other programs it was compared to. This finding has major 
consequences for budget reallocation studies that did not clearly define the opportunity cost. 
A vague definition of the opportunity costs of allocating budget among publicly provided 
goods could produce invalid estimates. The value of a particular program changes based on 
subjects’ assumption about the (existing) goods from which budgetary amounts are 
reallocated. It is possible that subjects assumed different status-quo levels for the existing 
goods, or might even have focused on the different existing goods in the previous studies. In 
any case, the findings of this study imply that individuals care about where the funding for a 
government program comes from. If value estimates are to be used in a benefit-cost 
analysis, it is important to choose institutionally relevant alternatives for comparison. 
Second, preferences exhibited strong asymmetry in which the disutility associated 
with program reductions was much higher than the utility associated with corresponding 
increases. Subjects in the sample were reluctant to approve of cuts when they were faced 
with the exact definition of what they needed to give up or how a reduction would affect the 
provision of services. Several subjects stated during the pretest interviews that they did not 
want to take rights away from a program’s current beneficiaries even though they weren’t 
particularly supportive of that program. This result could be consistent with previous findings 
that indicate people change their preferences when a specific program or a specific victim is 
identified instead of a single large category (McCaffery & Baron, 2005).  
Third, this study showed how to calculate welfare changes based on changes in 
disposable income and/or reallocation of funding from one government program to another. 
An allocation of public dollars from one program to another without changing taxes led to 
changes in welfare within society. Decreasing programs led to a welfare loss for all groups 
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while increasing programs generally led to perceived welfare gains for liberals and 
sometimes for moderates, but not for conservatives: in our sample, conservatives preferred 
status quo and the perceived losses from decreasing or increasing funding for three out of 
four programs. These findings seem consistent with expectations; however, this is the first 
study to quantify the effect of ideology on the value of changes, especially reductions, in 
experimentally controlled budget alternatives. 
Fourth, the budget-allocation framework mitigated the problems with scenario 
rejection. Possible manifestations of scenario rejection in this study were identified as not 
answering the trade-off questions, not trading away from the lower level of tax increase or 
higher level of tax reduction, and paying no attention to the tax levels. The statistics on the 
first two tests were relatively low, although 35% of the subjects were likely to be non-
attendant to the cost attribute. This result indicates that the use of increases as well as 
reductions in individual tax shares might have helped to reduce possible aversion to tax 
increases but instead created a problem of insensitivity to tax reductions for some 
individuals. However, it was not possible to distinguish the effect of budget-allocation from 
the effects of the cheap-talk text and the TTT protocol on the internal validity of the survey 
data. 
One advantage of using a DCE method in this context was that likely non-attendance 
to the cost attribute could be identified and controlled for. Being a liberal was positively 
correlated with likely non-attendance to the tax attribute. As to whether liberals supported 
government programs, regardless of the tax level, findings imply that this was not 
necessarily the case. Liberals significantly perceived losses from tax increases, which 
indicates that this group paid attention to the tax increases. The difference between this 
group and others was its preference for tax reductions; unlike other groups, liberals were 
indifferent to tax reductions. This seeming contradiction has been addressed in the literature 
on tax psychology. Studies have shown that some groups of individuals would like 
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government to provide services such that they support paying taxes even for an inefficient 
use of government funds (McCaffery & Baron, 2005). This stance might help explain why 
liberals in our sample did not particularly value tax reductions. In fact, during the pretest 
interviews several subjects stated that if they got $100 back on their taxes they would just 
waste it on shopping, and also that they might be able to help others by paying taxes.  
Results from this study suggest that tax reductions should be used together with tax 
increases to reduce scenario rejection in future DCE studies. The use of lower taxes as a 
payment vehicle (without tax increases) might not work as effectively, however, because 
subjects in general were much less sensitive to tax reductions than tax increases—a result 
that has been shown elsewhere as well (Hess et al., 2008; Lanz et al., 2009; Masiero & 
Hensher, 2010). It is possible that mental accounting played a role (Thaler, 1985); if so, it 
might explain the large difference between tax increases and tax reductions. Individuals 
might have categorized the taxes they had been already paying as forgone income and thus 
would not have considered a reduction in taxes as an increase in their disposable income.  
This paper shows how a DCE survey can be used to assess preferences for publicly 
provided goods and services. This framework is especially relevant in the current economic 
climate where governments are trying to make decisions on where to cut spending while 
also providing existing and new services. It is hard to distinguish the effect of the budget-
allocation framework on preferences from the effects of the cheap-talk scenarios and the 
TTT protocol used in this study. It is likely that combined use of these methods avoided high 
numbers of scenario rejections or unrealistically high WTP values. Future studies would do 
well to further investigate this likelihood, as well as whether this framework works for other 
programs or programs in a specific area (e.g., public-health programs or programs in other 
countries). The use of tax reductions and tax credits as payment vehicles is another area 
future SP studies could investigate. 
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3.8 Tables 
Table 3.1 Summary of Previous Literature 
Study Details Problems SP Question 
Budget reallocation studies  
Bergstrom 
and 
colleagues 
(2004) 
CV; G was 
defined as all 
other publicly 
provided 
goods 
ΔG was not 
identified 
Split Sample: 1) Subjects were asked whether they 
would vote for a program if the special tax costs their 
household $100 per year for 10 years. 2) Subjects 
were asked whether they would vote for a program if 
the amount of their households’ tax money spent on 
other public services is reduced by $100 per year for 
10 years. 
Kontoleon, 
Yabe, & 
Darby (2005) 
CV; G was 
defined as all 
other publicly 
provided 
goods 
ΔG was not 
identified 
Split Sample: 1) Subjects were asked whether they 
would vote for a program to ensure all foods clearly 
state their GM content if the program would cost their 
household an extra £X for every £100 they spend on 
food. 2) Subjects were asked whether they would 
vote for a program to ensure that all foods clearly 
state their GM content if the program would cost the 
government £X of their family’s taxes for every £100 
they spend on food.  
Swallow & 
McGonagle 
(2006) 
DCE; G was 
defined as all 
other publicly 
provided 
goods 
ΔG was not 
identified 
Subjects were asked to consider two land parcels 
described by 11 physical and management attributes 
and cost. Subjects chose among parcels A and B 
and the cost-free option of neither parcel. Costs 
involved either an amount of "additional taxes next 
year" or an amount of "taxes that have already been 
paid." 
Nunes & 
Travisi (2009) 
DCE; G was 
defined as 1) 
reallocation 
from spending 
on public 
transport 2) 
reallocation 
from spending 
on 
administration/ 
entertainment 
ΔGA and ΔGB 
were not 
identified. 
Subjects were asked to consider two noise-
abatement options described by five attributes, 
including annual cost per household and the type of 
financing. The type of financing involved 1) a new 
provincial one-time tax, and 2) a reduction of the 
2006 provincial budget on public transport, or 3) 
reduction of the 2006 provincial budget on 
administrative expenses. 
Morrison & 
Hatton 
MacDonald 
(2011) 
DCE; G was 
defined as all 
other publicly 
provided 
goods; 
possible ΔG 
were 
presented 
ΔG was 
identified 
without 
referring to a 
specific 
program 
Split Sample: Subjects were asked to consider two 
land protection options described by four attributes 
and a status-quo option. Half of the sample saw a 
levy on income tax (new tax) and the other half saw 
that government expenditure would be reallocated 
from other government programs (tax reallocation). 
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Study Details Problems SP Question 
Allocation of fixed budget 
Blomquist, 
Newsome, & 
Stone (2004) 
DCE 
No link to 
WTP 
Subjects were asked how they would allocate an 
extra $100 million to a list of programs if they were 
making choices for the state of Kentucky. 
Costa-Font & 
Rovira (2005) 
DCE 
No link to 
WTP 
 
Koford (2010) 
DCE (first 
stage) and CV 
(second 
stage) 
Link to WTP 
for one of the 
programs in 
the second 
stage 
Stage 1: Subjects were asked how they would 
allocate an extra $100 million to a list of programs if 
they were making choices for the state of Kentucky. 
Stage 2: Subjects were asked how they would vote 
for an additional one-time increase in their taxes of 
$X for [one of the budget categories] Kentucky 
Community and Technical College System. 
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Table 3.2 Attributes and Levels 
Attribute Level 
Intensive early-
childhood 
development 
program  
 50% worse:210,000 children can participate 
 25% worse:320,000 children can participate 
 No change:430,000 children can participate 
 25% improvement:530,000 children can participate 
 50% improvement:640,000 children can participate 
Job-training 
program 
 50% worse:3 million people can participate 
 25% worse:4.5 million people can participate 
 No change:6 million people can participate 
 25% improvement:7.5 million people can participate 
 50% improvement: 9 million people can participate 
Food-safety 
monitoring 
program 
 50% worse:200,000 severe food poisoning cases 
 25% worse:165,000 severe food poisoning cases 
 No change: 130,000 severe food poisoning cases 
 25% improvement:100,000 severe food poisoning cases 
 50% improvement:65,000 severe food poisoning cases 
Disaster-relief 
program 
 50% worse:90,000 households can be assisted 
 25% worse:140,000 households can be assisted 
 No change:180,000 households can be assisted  
 25% improvement:230,000 households can be assisted 
 50% improvement:270,000 households can be assisted 
Effects on 
household taxes 
 You pay $2,000 more per year ($170 more per month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $300 more per year ($25 more per month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $50 more per year ($4 more per month) in taxes than now 
 No change: Same amount of tax credits as now 
 You pay $50 less per year ($4 less per month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $300 less per year ($25 less per month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $2,000 less per year ($170 less per month) in taxes than now 
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Table 3.3 Government Programs Included in Each Survey Version 
Version Government Programs Included 
Version CFJ Early childhood, food safety and job training 
programs 
Version CFD Early childhood, food safety and disaster relief 
programs 
Version CJD Early childhood, job training and disaster relief 
programs 
Version FJD Food safety, job training and disaster relief 
programs 
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Table 3.4 Demographic Information 
Gender, %  
Male 52 
Female 48 
Age, mean (SD), years 52(16) 
Marital status, %  
Married 61 
Widowed 5 
Divorced/separated 13 
Single 15 
Living with partner 6 
Race/ethnicity, %  
White 78 
Hispanic 8 
African-American 9 
2 or more races 3 
Other 2 
Highest education, %  
Less than high school graduate 7 
High school or equivalent (e.g., GED) 26 
Some college  30 
Bachelor’s or graduate degree (e.g., BA, BS) 37 
Employment, %  
Paid employee 49 
Self employed 8 
Temporary layoff from a job 1 
Looking for work 6 
Retired 24 
Disabled 6 
Other 6 
Household Income, mean (SD), $ 76K (48K) 
Household size, mean (SD) 2.6 (1.4) 
1 child between 0-5 9 
2 or more children between 0-5 2 
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Table 3.5 Binomial-Probit Model Estimates for the Internal Validity Tests 
 Failing Transitivity 
Non-attendant to the 
Tax Attribute 
 Coef St. Error Coef St. Error 
Income -3.57E-07 1.03E-06 8.00E-07 7.24E-07 
BS degree -0.220** 0.103 0.010 0.073 
White -0.064 0.103 -0.081 0.079 
Male 0.024 0.089 0.011 0.065 
Age -0.003 0.003 0.000 0.002 
Social ideology -0.018 0.047 0.312*** 0.036 
Federal government
 Ϯ 
0.205* 0.114 0.188** 0.085 
Poor themselves
 Ϯ 0.089 0.102 -0.228*** 0.075 
Non-attendant to cost 0.213** 0.092 NA  
Failed transitivity test NA
ұ
  0.237* 0.121 
No variation NA  0.274 0.298 
Tax-Credit version -0.023 0.213 0.020 0.167 
Version CFD -0.055 0.123 0.007 0.090 
Version CJD -0.189 0.133 -0.141 0.094 
Version FJD 0.046 0.123 0.090 0.093 
Constant -1.216*** 0.200 -0.392** 0.152 
     
N of observations 1708  1708  
Log Likelihood -490  14  
Degrees of freedom 13  -1030  
Ϯ These are the categories for the question on who should be the most responsible group for helping 
the poor.  
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level and *** indicates at the 
1% level. 
ұ 
NA denotes “not applicable”. 
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Table 3.6 Marginal WTP Values (per Household per Year) and Standard Errors for 
Each Version 
 Version CFJ Version CFD Version CJD Version FJD 
 Mean 
St. 
Err 
Mean 
St. 
Err 
Mean 
St. 
Err 
Mean 
St. 
Err 
Early 
childhood  
        
decrease -2.759*** 0.343 -3.737*** 0.362 -2.052*** 0.342 NA  
increase 0.831*** 0.250 0.787*** 0.274 0.452 0.312 NA  
Food safety          
decrease -1.484*** 0.255 -1.936*** 0.305 NA  -1.872*** 0.285 
increase -0.116 0.305 -0.116 0.265 NA  0.641*** 0.201 
Job training          
decrease -1.705*** 0.286 NA  -1.487*** 0.351 -2.522*** 0.313 
increase -1.000** 0.416 NA  0.482 0.292 0.592** 0.252 
Disaster 
relief          
decrease NA
ұ
  -1.705*** 0.283 -1.372*** 0.308 -1.348*** 0.293 
increase NA  1.029*** 0.223 -0.157 0.332 0.523** 0.232 
Tax         
decreaseϮ 0.015** 0.007 0.033*** 0.008 0.027*** 0.007 0.040*** 0.008 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level and *** indicates at the 
1% level. 
ұ 
NA denotes “not applicable”. 
Ϯ This is the ratio of the marginal utility of tax-reductions to the marginal utility of tax-increases.  
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Table 3.7 Marginal WTP Values (per Household per Year) and Standard Errors for the 
Pooled Sample 
 Controlled Uncontrolled 
 Mean St. Err Mean St. Err 
Early childhood  
  
  
decrease -2.791*** 0.193 -18.134*** 1.277 
increase 0.634*** 0.161 -0.505 1.110 
Food safety      
decrease -1.651*** 0.156 -11.409*** 1.039 
increase -0.004 0.153 -5.144*** 1.049 
Job training      
decrease -1.867*** 0.171 -12.364*** 1.150 
increase 0.546*** 0.157 -1.172 1.078 
Disaster relief      
decrease -1.411*** 0.154 -8.891*** 1.017 
increase 0.328** 0.155 -3.093*** 1.039 
Tax     
decreaseϮ 0.029*** 0.004 0.086*** 0.020 
     
Log likelihood -6052  -7139  
AIC criterion 0.92  1.08  
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level and *** indicates at the 
1% level. 
Ϯ This is the ratio of the marginal utility of tax-reductions to the marginal utility of tax-increases. 
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Table 3.8 Marginal WTP Values (per Household per Year) and Standard Errors by 
Ideology for the Pooled Sample 
 Moderates Liberals Conservatives 
 Mean St. Err Mean St. Err Mean St. Err 
Early 
childhood  
      
decrease -2.851*** 0.291 -4.508*** 0.426 -1.473*** 0.310 
increase 0.352 0.255 1.403*** 0.325 -0.256 0.291 
Food safety        
decrease -1.424*** 0.182 -2.457*** 0.288 -1.424*** 0.182 
increase 0.194 0.186 0.194 0.186 -0.440* 0.264 
Job training        
decrease -2.413*** 0.216 -2.413*** 0.216 -0.904*** 0.269 
increase 0.609*** 0.157 0.609*** 0.157 0.609*** 0.157 
Disaster 
relief        
decrease -1.720*** 0.188 -1.720*** 0.188 -0.940*** 0.287 
increase 0.590*** 0.193 0.590*** 0.193 -0.239 0.278 
Tax       
decreaseϮ 0.019*** 0.004 -2.4E-04 0.006 0.053*** 0.005 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level and *** indicates at the 
1% level. 
Ϯ This is the ratio of the marginal utility of tax-reductions to the marginal utility of tax-increases. 
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3.9 Figures 
If these were the only two alternatives, which one would you want your Congressman 
to vote for? 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Disaster-relief program 
 50% improvement:          
270,000 households can 
be assisted 
 No change:           
180,000 households can 
be assisted 
Intensive early-childhood 
development program  
 
50% worse:       210,000 
children can participate 
 25% worse:              
320,000 children can 
participate 
Food-safety monitoring 
program 
 25% worse:               
165,000 severe food 
poisoning cases  
 25% improvement:               
100,000 severe food 
poisoning cases 
Effects on household 
taxes  
 You pay $2,000 less per 
year ($170 less per 
month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $50 more per 
year ($4 more per month) 
in taxes than now 
Which alternative would 
you like your 
Congressman to vote for? 
 
 
  
Figure 3.1 A Sample Budget Trade-off Question 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 4 
PREFERENCE ASYMMETRY IN STATED PREFERENCES FOR NON-MARKET GOODS 
AND MONEY 
4.1 Introduction 
Reference-dependent theory proposes that utility does not depend on final wealth 
but rather on the changes in wealth from a reference point, and also that individuals interpret 
options as gains or losses relative to a reference level (usually the status quo). Loss 
aversion implies that a difference in a dimension is generally greater when that difference is 
evaluated as a loss instead of as a gain (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). It has been 
suggested that loss aversion and reference dependency are the primary sources of the 
disparity between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA) (Bateman et 
al., 1997). Although the gap between WTP and WTA has been investigated and well 
documented in previous stated-preference (SP) studies (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002), only 
a few studies (De Borger & Fosgerau, 2008; Hess et al., 2008; Masiero & Hensher, 2010) 
have separately investigated asymmetry in preferences for changes in the opposite direction 
from status quo in non-market goods and money. 
Loss aversion in riskless choices occurs when the utility function is steeper in the 
loss domain than in the gains domain. The present study formally assumed a basic utility 
function  , where the observable part of this utility function   reflects the different 
processing of gains and losses as: 
 
 ( )   {
  ( )            
   ( )          
 
(4.1) 
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where x is a deviation from the status quo and 𝛌 > 0 is a loss-aversion coefficient or index 
(Köbberling & Wakker, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). If the ratio of the steepness of 
the utility function for losses and gains 𝛌 is greater than 1, this indicates a kink at the 
reference level. Loss aversion indicates a structural change between gains and losses that 
assumes different rates of diminishing marginal utility above and below the reference level. 
The loss-aversion coefficient has also been used as the degree of loss aversion or 
preference asymmetry in previous stated-preference studies (Hess et al., 2008; Masiero & 
Hensher, 2010).  
A meta-analysis of 45 studies (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002) showed that 1) the 
WTA/WTP ratio was not significantly different between hypothetical markets and real 
transactions; 2) incentive compatible elicitation yielded higher ratios; and 3) ratios were the 
highest for public and non-market goods. Loss aversion seems to disappear only for traded 
goods that are purchased for exchange rather than use (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005). SP 
methods are likely to exhibit loss aversion because they are mostly used for the valuation of 
non-market goods with low substitutability. The majority of the studies that investigated 
reference dependency on non-market goods used contingent valuation (CV) methods, and 
most focused on the comparison of WTP and WTA values in between-sample experiments.  
Another popular SP method involves discrete-choice experiment (DCE) surveys that 
offer hypothetical alternatives with varying attribute levels and ask respondents to choose 
among alternatives in a series of questions. A few relatively recent DCE studies have 
investigated preference asymmetry and diminishing sensitivity (De Borger & Fosgerau, 
2008; Hess et al., 2008; Hjorth & Fosgerau, 2011; Lanz et al., 2009; Masiero & Hensher, 
2010; Masiero & Hensher, 2011). These studies investigated whether preferences for an 
attribute differed if the attribute was defined negatively or positively in relation to a reference 
point. All of these studies investigated preferences for transportation options, with a focus on 
time and money trade-offs, except for one that investigated preferences for water-supply 
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services. The transportation studies used pivot experimental designs (Hess & Rose, 2009; 
Train & Wilson, 2008) in which the levels of travel time and travel cost from a subject’s 
recent journey were increased and decreased, thereby creating individual-specific levels for 
both variables. Results showed that models that allow non-linear parameterization of utility 
or linear parameterization of utility that allows asymmetric preferences for decreases and 
increases in attributes outperformed the commonly used models whose continuous 
variables assumed symmetric preferences. These studies also found evidence of 
asymmetric preferences such that the utility function was steeper in the losses domain than 
in the gains domain. 
One of the advantages of using a DCE is that it allows the investigation of preference 
asymmetry in monetary as well as non-monetary attributes. Previous DCE studies have 
found that individuals were much more sensitive to increases in cost (losses) than to 
decreases in cost (gains). Masiero and Hensher (2010) found that the utility function for 
increases in travel cost was 1.3 times steeper than for decreases in travel cost. Hess et al. 
(2008) found that the slopes of the total travel cost for increases were 3.2 to 6.6 times higher 
than those for decreases, depending on the sample (commuters vs. non-commuters). Lanz 
et al. (2009) found that, compared to the marginal utility for decreases in water bills, the 
marginal utility for increases in water bills was about 13 times higher in a piecewise model 
and 197 times higher in an exponential model. Preference insensitivity for price decreases 
has also been observed in real markets; for example, the price elasticity of eggs was found 
to be -1.10 for increases and -0.45 for decreases (Putler, 1992).  
Another advantage of a DCE survey is that it allows researchers to calculate different 
welfare measures for the same sample. Previous DCE studies that estimated WTP and 
WTA values reported that models that did not allow asymmetric preferences overestimated 
WTP and underestimated WTA (Masiero & Hensher, 2010). The WTA/WTP ratio ranged 
from 3 to 65; the highest ratio was reported for preferences for water supply services (Lanz 
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et al., 2009). Hjorth and Fosgerau (2011), who investigated how loss aversion was 
correlated with individual characteristics in a DCE study, found that it increased by age and 
decreased by education.  
The present study investigated the implications of preference asymmetry in stated 
preferences for non-market goods and money. The first research question concerned 
whether an individual treats gains and losses differently when his or her decision mostly 
affects others rather than mostly affecting the individual and his or her family. To resolve this 
issue, this study approached the question of valuing gains and losses from two distinct 
perspectives and contexts, using two DCE surveys. The first survey investigated 
preferences for public programs with associated individual tax burdens; the second survey 
quantified preferences for quality-of-life features in a country with associated cost of living. 
The first survey elicited social preferences where individuals’ decisions had direct 
implications for others in need. In the second survey, individuals couldn’t change societal 
levels of quality-of-life attributes but their decisions could (hypothetically) make a difference 
for themselves according to their choices of where they would like to live. All of the attribute 
levels were specified as increases and reductions from the status quo.  
Two factors were expected to influence social preferences differently than private 
decisions. The first factor was subjects’ ideological perspectives on the appropriate role of 
government. I expected that some ideological groups (e.g., conservatives) would be willing 
to reduce public programs while objecting to program increases; therefore, I did not expect 
conservatives to be loss-averse to public programs. I formed this expectation because 
conservatives in general are against government involvement in public life and support 
smaller roles for government in general. Altruism was the second factor that I expected to 
influence social preferences. Because reducing public programs could lead some current 
beneficiaries to lose their benefits, and some recipients could suffer substantially from even 
small changes in their benefits, altruism could cause some individuals to be strongly against 
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reducing public programs (so that the current beneficiaries could continue to be aided by 
them). Increasing such programs might not elicit similar emotional reactions in other 
individuals, however, because they might think that people who had not benefited from 
public programs had survived anyway and would not be harmed by continuing in their 
current lifestyles.  
Unlike previous studies that have focused on loss aversion using one commodity at a 
time, the second research question of the present study focused on how subjects valued 
gains and losses in multiple goods in a joint-evaluation setting. When individuals are asked 
to make tradeoffs between two or more goods, they may need to give up one good to be 
able to increase another one. If subjects value losses differently than gains, this discrepancy 
could affect how they trade one good for another. Therefore, this paper includes a 
discussion of the implications of preference asymmetry on the marginal rate of substitution 
(MRS) between goods. 
The third research question of the present study concerned whether preference 
asymmetry changes according to the method of payment or the method of transaction. 
Previous studies have shown that individuals have asymmetric preferences for cost 
increases and reductions; the majority focused on out-of-pocket payments for private goods 
that generally constitute a smaller share of individual income. By contrast, I investigated 
whether subjects have different perceptions of gains and losses in income taxes and cost-
of-living expenses. I expected different findings between these two types of payments, and 
from previous studies, for several reasons. First, the marginal propensity to spend on taxes 
or cost of living could differ based on the “mental accounting” theory, which assumes that 
individuals assign activities to specific budget accounts; for example, expenditures are 
grouped into categories (e.g., housing, food, entertainment, etc.) and money assigned to 
one mental account is not a perfect substitute for the money assigned to another account. 
Second, taxes constitute a smaller share of a household’s income while cost of living 
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constitutes a larger share of a household’s budget. Third, I expected to find correlations 
between ideology and income-tax preferences.  
The fourth research question of the present study concerned different welfare 
measures, using the same sample, in the context of preference asymmetry. Unlike previous 
studies that have found large disparities between WTP and WTA estimates, I compared how 
the disparity between welfare measures changes with different non-market goods and types 
of payment. Investigating preference asymmetry in both the numerator (for goods) and the 
denominator (for money) allowed me to determine the major source of the WTA/WTP 
disparity.  
Study data is presented in the second section and model specifications are 
presented in the third section. Study findings are provided in the fourth section. The 
implications of these findings are discussed in the fifth section.  
4.2 Data 
This paper used data from two DCE surveys. The first survey (hereafter, budget 
survey) elicited individuals’ social preferences for budget alternatives with changes in 
household tax amounts and the number of beneficiaries of public programs. These amounts 
and numbers were defined as increases and decreases from the status quo. The public 
programs were defined as no change (status quo), decreases and increases of 50% and 
25% in the number of current beneficiaries. These levels were presented in both relative 
(e.g. 50% improvement) and absolute terms (e.g. 640,000 children can participate). The tax 
attribute was defined as $2000 more/less, $300 more/less, $50 more/less than the current 
taxes paid by a household and same as now (status quo). The public programs included an 
early-childhood program, a food-safety monitoring program, a job-training program and a 
disaster-relief program. Table 4.1 presents the attributes and levels used in the budget 
survey. 
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The second survey (hereafter, country survey) asked individuals to assume that they 
had to move to a new country and to therefore evaluate hypothetical countries; these were 
defined in terms of quality-of-life attributes including environmental quality, childhood 
poverty and access to health care, and cost of living. The quality-of-life attributes were 
defined as no change (status quo) and at levels 50% and 25% better and worse than 
comparable U.S. statistics. Because cost of living is highly associated with annual 
household income, the cost of living in the country survey was indexed to subjects’ own 
annual household income. The cost-attribute levels were the dollar amounts that 
corresponded to same as now (status quo) and 20%, 5% and 1% of annual household 
income.28 Table 4.2 presents the attributes and levels used in the country survey. Both 
survey instruments are presented in Appendices B and C. 
Both surveys followed a similar style in terms of offering multiple commodities and 
offering increases and decreases from the status quo level (see figures 4.1 and 4.2). 
Increases in public programs, improvements in quality-of-life attributes and reductions in 
costs were considered as gains; decreases were considered as losses. The two surveys 
differed in terms of context and payment vehicles. The budget survey asked subjects to 
reveal social preferences on issues related to public policy, whereas the country survey 
asked subjects to indicate their individual preferences about decisions that would only affect 
themselves and their families. The former used taxes which were expected to be correlated 
with ideology; the latter used cost of living, which constituted a larger share of income.  
A D-efficient design was created in SAS (Kuhfeld, 2005) to create the trade-off 
questions. The trade-off tasks were divided into 14 blocks to reduce subject burden. Two 
trade-off questions were included in each block to test for the transitivity of preferences. 
According to transitivity, a fundamental axiom of utility theory (Just et al., 2004), if a subject 
                                                 
28
 For example, the levels for a subject with a household income of $52,000 were $10,400 less per year, $2,600 
less per year, $520 less per year, same as now, $520 more per year, $2,600 more per year and $10,400 
more per year. 
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chooses Alternative A over Alternative B in one choice set, and Alternative B over 
Alternative C in another choice set, he or she will pick Alternative A over Alternative C in a 
third choice set. 
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of the block versions. To minimize 
possible order effects, the sequence of the trade-off questions was randomized. 
Preferences were investigated according to whether subjects were likely to be non-attendant 
or insensitive to the cost attribute. Using an equality-constrained latent-class model 
developed by Scarpa et al. (2009), a class of subjects with likely-zero utility weights for the 
cost attribute was identified. Appendix D provides detailed information on the internal-validity 
tests. 
Both surveys were designed as web-enabled questionnaires. Face-to-face personal 
interviews with a convenience sample were used to evaluate the draft survey instruments. 
These interviews helped to refine the descriptions of the public programs in the budget 
survey and the quality-of-life attributes in the country survey. The pretest interviews were 
also used to test the language of the text and to confirm that subjects were capable of 
answering the trade-off questions. The web-survey instruments were pilot-tested with 300 
subjects to evaluate the attribute-level ranges, especially the cost-attribute levels. The web-
based survey instruments were hosted on a secure site and were administered in June 2012 
by GfK Knowledge Networks to their nationally representative general-population panel. The 
budget survey targeted 2,000 subjects and the country survey targeted 1,000 subjects. 
The surveys were administed in two sections in order to provide subjects with time to 
think (TTT) (Whittington et al., 1992) before they answered the trade-off questions. Subjects 
were first given the motivation of the study and briefly presented with some information on 
the public programs or country features they were being asked to evaluate. Subjects were 
then presented with the budget or country trade-off questions before they were given time to 
think about the survey. They were asked to return to the second part of the survey within 1 
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to 10 days. In the second part of the survey, before the trade-off questions, subjects were 
presented with “cheap talk” text (Ajzen et al., 2004; Cummings & Taylor, 1999) that asked 
them to consider the consequences of paying higher or lower taxes on their incomes or 
having a lower or higher cost of living. Both the TTT protocol and the cheap talk text were 
used to mitigate the hypothetical nature of the surveys.  
4.3 Model Specification 
Statistical analysis of the DCE data was based on random-utility theory. Five 
different model specifications were developed to investigate reference dependency and 
preference asymmetry; some of the models were also controlled for nonlinearity. The 
symmetric linear model specified each attribute as a set of continuous variables assuming 
symmetric preferences around the status quo, whereas the symmetric nonlinear model 
incorporated nonlinearity by adding squares of variables to the model. The empirical 
symmetric linear and nonlinear models were defined as: 
              (4.2a) 
           (  )
 
                (4.2b) 
where    denoted the parameter associated with   ,     denoted a non-monetary attribute 
k,     denoted the parameter associated with the square of attribute k,   and    denoted the 
parameters associated with      and      . The asymmetric linear model allowed for 
asymmetric preferences for changes from the status quo by specifying two linear variables 
for each attribute, one for increases and one for decreases. The empirical asymmetric linear 
model was defined as: 
       
     
      
     
                          (4.3a) 
where     
  denoted decreases and     
  denoted increases in attribute k,         and 
        denoted increases and decreases in the cost attribute, respectively. The nonlinearity 
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of gains and losses was incorporated into the model by adding the squares of the variables 
in equation 4.3a: 
       
     
      
     
      
  (    
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  (    
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 (       )
        
 (       )
  
(4.3b) 
The categorical model did not impose any functional-form specification for the non-monetary 
attributes; dummy coding was used where the status quo categories were omitted. The cost 
attribute was added as a continuous variable and nonlinearity was assumed for the cost 
variables. The empirical categorical model was specified as: 
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      (   )
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(4.4) 
The degree of asymmetry in stated preferences was calculated as the ratio between 
the slope of the utility function for a loss and the slope of the utility function for a 
corresponding gain. This ratio, for example 
|    | 
|    |
 for the cost attribute in the asymmetric 
linear model, shows the marginal utility of losses to gains. The degree of asymmetry would 
be 
|         
        | 
|         
        |
 for the asymmetric nonlinear model, in which the mean values are 
usually used for         and        . 
Compensating and equivalent variations were calculated for gains and losses 
(Knetsch, 2010). Under the assumption that the utility associated with the status quo was 
zero, compensating variation was calculated as: 
            
     ⁄   (4.5a) 
             
     ⁄  (4.5b) 
Equation 4.5a illustrates how much subjects are willing to pay for a 1% improvement from 
the status quo. Equation 4.5b illustrates how much they are willing to accept in 
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compensation for a 1% reduction or deterioration from the status quo. The equivalent 
variation was calculated as: 
            
     ⁄  (4.5c) 
             
     ⁄  (4.5d) 
Equation 4.5c illustrates how much subjects are willing to pay to avoid 1% deterioration from 
the status quo. Equation 4.5d illustrates how much they are willing to accept to forgo a 1% 
improvement. These welfare measures would be the same in the symmetric models.  For 
the nonlinear models, compensating variation for a 1% change can be calculated as: 
        (      
         
  ) (         
        )⁄  (4.6a) 
         (      
         
  ) (         
        )⁄  (4.6b) 
and the equivalent variation for a 1% change can be calculated as: 
        (      
         
  ) (         
        )⁄  (4.6c) 
         (      
         
  ) (         
        )⁄  (4.6c) 
These welfare values for 50% increases and decreases from the status quo condition are 
presented in Section 4.4.5. Mixed-logit (also known as random-parameters logit) models 
were employed to analyze the trade-off questions in both surveys. The conditional-logit 
estimates are provided in Appendix L. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Sample Characteristics 
The budget survey consisted of 2,037 observations and the country survey consisted 
of 1,010 observations. Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics, which were very similar 
between the two surveys. The percentage of females (48% vs. 51%) and whites (76.5% vs. 
78%) in the sample was slightly lower than in the general population.29 African Americans 
(9% vs. 13%) and Hispanics (9% vs. 17%) were underrepresented in the sample; college 
                                                 
29
 The information on the general population statistics was retrieved from the website of the U.S. Census Bureau, 
accessed at http://www.census.gov/ on March 13, 2013. 
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graduates were slightly overrepresented (34% vs. 30%). The median income of the sample 
($67k) was higher than the U.S. median household income ($53k). The full descriptive 
statistics on the survey questions are presented in appendices H and I. 
Slightly more than 1% of the subjects always picked Alternative A or Alternative B in 
their answers to all of the trade-off questions in both surveys. These subjects also failed the 
transitivity test and were very likely to go through the survey without paying close attention 
to the questions. For these reasons, these subjects were dropped from the final analysis. 
About 9% of the subjects failed the transitivity test in both surveys, which is a comparable 
failure rate to that of other DCE studies (Ryan & San Miguel, 2000; Ryan & Bate, 2001; 
Özdemir et al., 2010). Subjects who failed the transitivity test did not have significantly 
different preferences for the cost attribute than others had indicated in the preliminary 
analysis. Therefore, these subjects were included in the final analysis.  
About 35% and 33% of the subjects in the budget and country surveys, respectively, 
were identified as likely non-attendant to the cost attribute. Identifying as liberal in the 
budget survey and and reporting a higher level of annual household income in the country 
survey were positively associated with being likely non-attendant to the cost attribute. 
Insensitivity to the cost attribute in this study was within the range of the statistics reported 
by studies that have investigated likely non-attendance to a cost attribute (Gilbride et al., 
2006; Hensher, 2008; Lagarde, 2012). However, because 33–35% of the subjects in this 
study were non-attendant to the cost attribute, the model estimation for these preferences 
was controlled by including interaction terms between the cost variables and the dummy 
variable that indicated insensitivity to the cost attribute. The marginal utility of income (MUM) 
was calculated based on only the main-effects cost parameters, under the assumption that 
that the MUM for subjects who were likely to be non-attendant to the cost attribute was not 
different than the MUM for the rest of the sample. Appendix D provides detailed information 
on the internal-validity test results. 
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4.4.2 Asymmetric Preferences for Non-Market Goods and Marginal Rate of 
Substitution 
Table 4.4 presents the random-parameter estimates and standard deviations for the 
symmetric linear, asymmetric linear and categorical models for the budget survey. In the 
symmetric linear model, the random-parameter estimates were significantly positive for the 
program attributes at the 1% level. 30  The random-parameter estimates for program 
decreases in the asymmetric model were significantly negative, whereas the estimates for 
program increases were significantly positive. The categorical model estimates were parallel 
to the estimates from the asymmetric model. The findings from all three models indicate that 
subjects significantly valued program increases as well as perceived losses from program 
decreases.  
In the asymmetric linear and categorical models, the utility function for program 
decreases was significantly steeper than the utility function for the corresponding increases 
for each program type,31 which indicates a kink at the status quo level (Figure 4.3). In the 
categorical model, the marginal utility for program decreases was 2.03 to 11.82 times larger 
than the marginal utility for program increases. In the asymmetric model, the degree of 
asymmetry was the largest for the food-safety program (4.33), followed by the early-
childhood program (2.90). The standard deviations for 50% changes were larger than those 
for 25% changes but the same for the corresponding gains and losses. These results 
indicate that taste heterogeneity was not different between gains and losses in the 
categorical model. However, the standard deviations for program decreases in the 
asymmetric model were larger than those for program increases, which indicated more 
heterogeneous preferences for losses than gains. Moreover, in the categorical model, 
                                                 
30
 Hereafter, significance was noted at the 1% level unless a different significance level is specified. 
31
The null hypothesis is              . The wald statistics is defined as 
(          )
  (   (    )     (    )      (         ))⁄  where the covariance between the coefficients 
equal to zero in this study. The statistics was compared to a chi-squared distribution. 
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subjects discriminated between the adjacent attribute levels better for program decreases 
than increases. For all four programs, the disutility from a 50% program decrease was 
significantly larger than the disutility from a 25% program decrease. The utility associated 
with a 50% program increase was larger than a 25% program increase, but the difference 
was only significant for two (early-childhood and job-training) of the four programs. Overall, 
preferences for program reductions were more pronounced than preferences for program 
increases.  
Table 4.5 presents the random-parameter estimates and standard deviations for the 
symmetric and asymmetric nonlinear models for the budget survey. The parameter 
estimates associated with (  )
 
   were significantly negative in the symmetric model, which 
indicated a diminishing marginal utility for public programs. In the asymmetric model, the 
parameter estimates for (  )
 
 were significant only for decreases in the job-training 
program. Reductions in the job-training program reduced the utility at an increasing rate. 
Preferences remained asymmetric even when nonlinearity was accounted for. The degree 
of asymmetry was smaller for one of the four program attributes (disaster-relief program) in 
the asymmetric nonlinear model, compared to the degree of asymmetry in the asymmetric 
linear model.  
Table 4.6 presents the random-parameter estimates and standard deviations for the 
symmetric linear, asymmetric linear and categorical models for the country survey. The 
random-parameter estimates were significantly positive for the quality-of-life attributes in the 
symmetric linear model, which indicated that subjects significantly both valued 
improvements in the quality-of-life attributes and perceived losses from deterioration in the 
quality-of-life attributes. In the asymmetric linear and categorical models, the estimates 
associated with deterioration in the quality-of-life attributes were significant and negative. 
However, estimates associated with improvements in the quality-of-life attributes were 
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significantly positive for the access-to-health-care attribute and were not significant for the 
other attributes. The symmetric linear model, therefore, was found to misrepresent 
preferences for improvements in childhood poverty and environmental quality. 
As with the budget survey, the utility function for deteriorations in quality-of-life 
attributes was significantly steeper than the utility function for improvements in quality-of-life 
attributes in both the asymmetric and categorical models. In the asymmetric linear model, 
the degree of asymmetry was the largest for childhood poverty (27.67), closely followed by 
environmental quality (23.08); last was access to health care (7.37). In the categorical 
model, subjects significantly discriminated between the adjacent attribute levels for 
deteriorations in the quality-of-life attributes. This was not the case for improvements in the 
quality-of-life attributes, however:  improvements in childhood poverty and environmental 
quality were found to be not significant.  
Table 4.7 presents the random-parameter estimates and standard deviations for the 
symmetric and asymmetric nonlinear models for the country-survey data. The parameter 
estimates associated with (  )
 
 were significantly negative in the symmetric nonlinear 
model, which indicated a diminishing marginal utility for the quality-of-life attributes. The 
asymmetry in preferences persisted in the asymmetric nonlinear model but the parameter 
estimates for (  )
 
 were not significant. 
Based on data from the asymmetric and categorical models, the country survey was 
similar to the budget survey in terms of the preferences for decreases/deterioration but not 
for increases/improvements. In both surveys, subjects did not like giving up on programs or 
reducing quality-of-life levels. However, although they supported program expansions in the 
budget survey, they supported only improvements in access to health care in the country 
survey. This insensitivity to improvements in the quality-of-life attributes in the country 
survey was indicative of a much larger asymmetry in preferences for these attributes than 
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the ones observed for the public programs in the budget survey. It is possible that subjects 
were already familiar with the status-quo conditions and therefore found the status-quo 
childhood poverty and environmental-quality conditions to be tolerable, but did not want 
deterioration in unfamiliar conditions for their own quality of life. 
The MRS between two goods was investigated in the context of asymmetric 
preferences. Considering the MRS between other programs and job training, the MRS was 
larger than 1 only for the early-childhood program in the symmetric linear model (job training 
was used as the numeraire). The MRS between the early-childhood and the job-training 
programs was also larger than 1 when only program increases were compared and when 
only program decreases were compared in the asymmetric linear model. Specifically, 
subjects were willing to give up a 1.15% increase in the job-training program for a 1% 
increase in the early-childhood program and were willing to give up a 1.46% decrease in the 
job-training program for a 1% decrease in the early-childhood program. Although the 
magnitudes were different, subjects favored changes in the early-childhood program over 
changes in the job-training program, whether these changes were increases or decreases. 
This was not always the case for the disaster-relief program, however. In the asymmetric 
linear model, subjects favored increases in the job-training program over increases in the 
food-safety program and favored decreases in the food-safety program over decreases in 
the job-training program. Subjects were willing to give up a 0.58% increase in the job-
training program for a 1% increase in the food-safety program; however, they were willing to 
give up a 1.19% decrease in the job-training program for a 1% decrease in the food-safety 
program. These findings show that, depending on the direction of the comparison, subjects 
could have different MRS between two goods.  
4.4.3 Asymmetric Preferences for Changes in Money 
The random-parameter estimates for increases in cost were significantly negative, 
whereas estimates for reductions in cost were significantly positive both in the budget and 
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country surveys, based on both the asymmetric and categorical models. The slope of the 
utility for the cost increase was significantly steeper than the slope for the cost reduction 
with a kink at the status quo, which indicated that subjects’ perceptions of losses from 
increases in cost were larger than their valuations of the corresponding reductions in cost. 
The marginal utility for a tax increase was 32 times higher than the one for a tax decrease in 
the budget survey (8 times higher for changes in cost of living in the country survey based 
on the asymmetric linear model). 
The parameter for       was significantly negative whereas the parameter for       
was significantly negative only at the 10% level in the budget survey. The parameters 
associated with the square of changes in the cost-of-living attribute were significantly 
negative at the 1% level in the country survey. These findings suggest a diminishing MUM 
for both taxes and cost of living. The preference asymmetry persisted but became smaller 
after nonlinearity was controlled for in the asymmetric nonlinear model. The ratio between 
the cost-increase parameter and the cost-reduction parameter decreased to 15 for taxes in 
the budget survey, but decreased to 5 for cost of living in the country survey. 
The results on the cost attributes show that stated preferences were asymmetric not 
only for goods but also for money. Subjects perceived reductions in forgone spending on 
cost of living and taxes much differently than possible new spending on the same items, and 
this effect was especially apparent for taxes. I offer two possible reasons for these results: 1) 
Preference for taxes could be more heterogeneous than preferences for cost of living; and 
2) Taxes constitute a smaller portion of income, whereas cost of living in this study was 
indexed to annual household income. These reasons could explain why subjects were not 
very sensitive to reductions in taxes compared to reductions in cost of living. In other words, 
insensitivity to tax increases led to a larger difference in the slopes of the utility function for 
tax increases and tax reductions than the difference for changes in cost of living.  
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4.4.4 Asymmetric Preferences by Ideology and Experience 
Standard deviations provide information on unobserved taste heterogeneity. A high 
standard deviation signals more-heterogeneous preferences, whereas a small standard 
deviation signals more-homogeneous preferences. In the asymmetric models, in both 
datasets, taste heterogeneity was higher for decreases than increases in all attributes. In the 
categorical model, taste heterogeneity was generally larger for changes at the 50% level 
than changes at the 25% level for all attributes in the budget survey and also for the access-
to-health-care attribute in the country survey. Note that the other attributes in the country 
survey had parameters that were not significant for improvements in environmental quality 
and childhood poverty, which meant that the standard deviations associated with these 
parameters were smaller. Because standard deviations indicated evidence of high taste 
heterogeneity, I investigated interactions with individual characteristics and attributes and 
found that ideology had a significant effect on preferences in the budget survey. 
 All ideological groups displayed asymmetry in their stated preferences (Table 4.8 
presents the degree of asymmetry for each ideological group). Contrary to expectations, 
conservatives were loss averse to changes in public programs although the loss aversion 
was not as pronounced as the aversion exhibited by the other groups. For liberals, the 
difference between the marginal utility of increases and decreases was significant for 7 out 
of 9 comparisons. Moderates had significant differences for 6 comparisons, whereas 
conservatives had 4 significant differences at the 1% level, 1 at the 5% level and 1 at the 
10% level. The preference asymmetry was largest for the cost attribute among all attributes 
for all ideological groups. The preference asymmetry for the cost attribute was largest for 
liberals, which is explained by the non-significance for liberals of the parameter estimate 
associated with a tax reduction. The asymmetry in preferences for the early-childhood 
program was largest for moderates, whereas the asymmetry in preferences for the food-
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safety and disaster-relief programs was largest for conservatives. The preference 
asymmetry for the job-training program was similar among all three groups. 
Table 4.9 presents the Wald test chi-squared statistics for the difference between a 
25% and a 50% decrease and between a 25% and a 50% increase. The difference in 25% 
and 50% decreases was significant for the early-childhood and food-safety programs for all 
ideological groups; the difference was largest for liberals. The difference in 25% and 50% 
decreases was significant for the job-training and disaster-relief programs for moderates and 
liberals, but not for conservatives. The difference in 25% and 50% increases was significant 
for the early-childhood and food-safety programs only for liberals at the 5% level. The 
difference in 25% and 50% increases was significant for the job-training and disaster-relief 
programs for all ideological groups at the 5% level. Overall, liberals significantly 
discriminated among changes at the 25% and 50% levels for all attributes; moderates did for 
6 out of 8 comparisons; and conservatives did for 4 out of 8 at the 5% and 10% levels.  
This study also investigated whether experience with answering the trade-off 
questions helped decrease the asymmetry in preferences for increases and decreases from 
the status quo. Experience with the trade-off questions was explored by separately 
analyzing the first and second halves of the questions. Subjects were expected to be more 
experienced with the survey tasks by the time they began to answer the second half of the 
questions. Table 4.10 presents the degree of asymmetry for the first and second halves of 
the questions in the budget and country surveys based on the categorical model. The 
estimates from the second half of the questions produced smaller asymmetry in preferences 
for 4 out of 9 variables than the estimates from the first half of the questions in the budget 
survey, whereas the second half produced smaller asymmetry in preferences for all 
variables in the country survey. Also in the country survey, experience with tasks seemed to 
help decrease the asymmetry in preferences but did not eliminate it.  
 
 136 
 
4.4.5 Implications for Welfare Calculations 
The welfare estimates varied based on what was assumed for the MUM. This study 
considered two candidates for MUM: 1) the parameter estimate for increases in cost and 2) 
the parameter estimate for decreases in cost. The choice of measure depends on the 
specific question or situation at hand.  
Table 4.11 presents the welfare estimates for the asymmetric linear, asymmetric 
nonlinear and categorical models for the budget survey. The second and fourth columns 
present welfare losses and gains where the tax-increase parameter was used to calculate 
the MUM; the third and fifth columns show these values where the tax-reduction parameter 
was used to calculate the MUM for the asymmetric models. The next two columns present 
these values for the categorical model.  
The welfare values can be used to compare the different model specifications 
because willingness to pay is free of scale. The values between the asymmetric linear and 
asymmetric nonlinear models were not significantly different when the tax-increase 
parameter was used to calculate the MUM, but they were significantly different for all but two 
parameters at the 1% or 5% level when the tax-reduction parameter was used to calculate 
the MUM. The values between the asymmetric (linear and nonlinear) and categorical models 
were not significantly different for all but one parameter when the MUM was based on the 
tax-increase parameter. When tax reduction was used for the MUM, only 3 parameters were 
not significantly different at the 10% level between the asymmetric linear and categorical 
models; none of the parameters were significantly different between the asymmetric 
nonlinear and categorical models. These findings show that the asymmetric nonlinear model 
produced results that were much closer to the categorical model because both models 
incorporated nonlinear tax variables.  
The welfare values varied substantially based on whether the tax-increase or tax-
decrease parameter was used to calculate the MUM. The values were largest for willingness 
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to accept tax reductions for program decreases and smallest for willingness to pay higher 
taxes for program increases. Using a 50% change in the job-training program as an 
example, subjects were willing to pay $36 per year for a 50% increase and $92 per year to 
avoid a 50% decrease in the program based on the categorical model. Subjects were willing 
to accept $1,376 per year for a 50% decrease in the job-training program and $542 per year 
to forgo a 50% increase in this program.  
Table 4.12 presents the welfare calculations for the attributes that were significantly 
different than zero for the country survey. The values between the asymmetric linear, 
asymmetric nonlinear and categorical models were not significantly different for all but one 
parameter when the cost-increase parameter was used to calculate the MUM. The only 
significant difference was for a 25% decrease in the access to health-care at the 10% level 
between the asymmetric nonlinear and categorical models. When MUM was calculated 
based on the cost-reduction parameter, decreases in all three quality-of-life attributes were 
significantly different between the asymmetric linear and nonlinear models, and between the 
asymmetric linear and categorical models at the 5% and 10% levels. None of the 
parameters were significantly different between the asymmetric nonlinear and categorical 
models. The main differences in welfare values seemed to be associated with how much 
subjects were willing to accept deterioration in the quality-of-life attributes when nonlinearity 
of the cost variables were not accounted for.  
Willingness to accept reductions in cost of living in exchange for deterioration in the 
quality-of-life attributes were much higher than willingness to forgo improvements in these 
attributes. The welfare values for increases in childhood poverty and environmental quality 
were not calculated because subjects did not value improvements in these attributes. For 
access to health care, willingness to accept cost reductions for deterioration were much 
higher than the willingness to pay higher taxes for improvements.  
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The findings show that asymmetry in preferences for increases and decreases from 
the status quo led to wide differences across welfare values and that these differences were 
due to two reasons: 1) asymmetric preferences for the numerators (programs and quality-of-
life attributes), and 2) asymmetric preferences for the denominator (marginal utility of 
income). Within these two forces, the effect of the asymmetric preferences for taxes was 
more pronounced than the other effects because subjects were not as sensitive to 
reductions in taxes as they were to increases in taxes. For example, the slope of the utility 
function for tax reductions was flat for liberals in the budget survey. The use of reductions in 
the tax attribute led a smaller MUM and very high welfare estimates. Similar findings in both 
surveys show that the symmetric model was not a good fit when asymmetric preferences 
existed. Another important finding is that accounting for nonlinearity and especially for 
nonlinearity in the cost attributes produced estimates that were much more reasonable. The 
asymmetric models were a good approximation of the categorical models for both surveys.  
4.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
DCE survey data were used in two different contexts with multiple commodities and 
two different payment vehicles to investigate asymmetry in stated preferences. This paper 
investigated five model specifications: 1) A symmetric linear specification of all variables, 2) 
A symmetric nonlinear specification of all variables, 3) An asymmetric linear specification 
that allowed separate variables for increases and decreases from the status quo, 4) An 
asymmetric nonlinear specification that allowed separate variables for increases and 
decreases from the status quo, and 5) A categorical specification of non-monetary attributes 
and asymmetric nonlinear specification of cost attributes. The asymmetric and categorical 
models showed evidence of preference asymmetry even after nonlinearity was accounted 
for. The slope of the utility function for decreases or deterioration from the status quo was 
much steeper than the slope of the utility function for increases or improvements for non-
market goods. In addition, the utility function for increases in taxes and cost of living (losses) 
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was much steeper than the one for tax and cost reductions. Experience with the trade-off 
tasks seemed to reduce (but not eliminate) the asymmetry in preferences for the country 
survey but did not make a difference in the budget survey. 
This study yielded several important findings. First, preferences for increases and 
decreases in the non-market goods from the status quo were found to be asymmetric in 
both surveys. Asymmetry was observed in social preferences as well as in preferences 
related to private decisions. These results suggest that, apart from being attached to a 
commodity or ownership of a commodity, altruism is likely to lead people to be more averse 
to losses than to enjoy corresponding gains. Reducing the benefits of other people in need 
could have triggered emotional reactions for survey subjects, including conservatives, that 
might not emerge in relation to increasing services for new beneficiaries. It should be noted 
that, during the pretest interviews, some subjects reported that they would not like to take 
rights away from people who were currently benefiting from these programs.  
Second, the results show that the MRS between increases in two programs differed 
from the MRS between decreases in two programs. The magnitude of the MRS as well as 
the ranking of the preference changed for some programs. For example, subjects valued 
increases in the disaster-relief program more than increases in the food-safety program. 
However, they acquired larger losses from decreases in the food-safety program than from 
decreases in the disaster-relief program.  
Third, this study showed evidence of asymmetry in preferences for money even after 
nonlinearity was accounted for. This area has been little studied because previous research 
has mostly bundled preferences for cost and non-cost goods. By contrast, in this study 
money was treated just as another commodity. In addition, using DCE surveys allowed me 
to detangle the preference asymmetry for money from the asymmetry for non-monetary 
goods. The degree of asymmetry was much more pronounced for taxes than for cost of 
living. Taxes had the largest asymmetry among attributes in the budget survey, the 
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asymmetry in preferences for cost of living was not as high as two of the other attributes in 
the country survey. This discrepancy could be due to the difference in the nature of the two 
payment vehicles. Subjects were not as sensitive to tax reductions as they were to 
reductions in cost of living because taxes constituted a small portion of income whereas cost 
of living was indexed to household income. Moreover, subjects were highly sensitive to 
increases in taxes and preferences for taxes were correlated with ideology. The presence of 
an interaction between political ideology and the tax attribute indicated that subjects from all 
ideological groups did not like tax increases; moderates and conservatives like tax 
decreases, while liberals were indifferent.  Interactions between political ideology and the 
cost-of-living attribute were not significant. Liberals’ insensitivity to tax reductions and 
oversensitivity to tax increases caused the asymmetry in preferences for this attribute to be 
larger than the asymmetry for cost of living. The different degrees of asymmetry in 
preferences for changes in taxes and cost of living showed that money in one mental 
account was not a perfect substitute for money in another mental account. Future research 
could investigate the correlation between preference asymmetry and different types of 
payment vehicles in SP studies or method of payment in general.   
Fourth, subjects discriminated different levels of changes in the losses domain better 
than different levels of changes in the gains domain. Only liberals significantly discriminated 
between 25% and 50% increases in the budget survey. They were indifferent to tax 
reductions, however, possibly because the range of the tax reductions was not large enough 
for this group. This insensitivity in the gains domain does have significant implications for 
welfare calculations in SP studies, however, because most research has been based on 
improvements in non-market goods. Insensitivity to different levels of improvements could 
help explain why some SP studies have not passed the scope test. The cheap-talk method 
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could be used to ask individuals to pay attention the magnitude of each individual level, as 
was done successfully in a DCE study by Ozdemir et al. (2009).32 
Fifth, the random-parameter estimates show that a symmetric specification was not a 
good representation of preferences when preferences were asymmetric. A symmetric model 
was also unsuccessful in capturing evidence that preferences for a range of attributes could 
be insignificant (as they were in this study). In the country data, for example, asymmetric 
and categorical models both showed that preferences for improvements in childhood 
poverty and environmental quality were insignificant; such preferences in this range were 
not be captured by a symmetric model. The log likelihood and AIC statistics also showed 
that the asymmetric linear and nonlinear models fit the data the best in both surveys, closely 
followed by the categorical model.  
Sixth, the differences in welfare measures were quite large, similar to the ones 
reported by Lanz et al. (2009), and even larger than those reported in the DCE studies on 
transportation preferences that investigated preference asymmetry. Accounting for 
nonlinearity, especially in the cost attributes, reduced the difference in welfare measures. 
The large asymmetry in preferences for public programs and quality-of-life attributes, 
compared to preferences for the goods evaluated in other DCE studies, could be due to the 
non-market nature of the goods evaluated in this study and possibly to the low substitution 
for these goods in this study. In addition, the preference asymmetry observed both in the 
numerator (public program or quality-of-life attribute) and denominator, especially for 
changes in taxes, widened this difference even more. As previously stated, the choice of 
parameter to be used as the MUM depends on the specific situation. Using the cost-
reduction parameter to calculate the MUM, however, can lead to very high welfare values 
when subjects are not as sensitive to cost reductions as they are to cost increases.   
                                                 
32
 In this study, cheap talk was used to ask subjects to pay attention to how changes in taxes or cost of living 
affect their income. Ozdemir et al. (2009) asked subjects to pay special attention to each tax or cost level. 
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4.6 Tables 
Table 4.1 Attributes and Levels in the Budget Survey 
Attribute Level 
Intensive early-
childhood 
development 
program  
 50% worse:210,000 children can participate 
 25% worse:320,000 children can participate 
 No change:430,000 children can participate 
 25% improvement:530,000 children can participate 
 50% improvement:640,000 children can participate 
Job-training 
program 
 50% worse:3 million people can participate 
 25% worse:4.5 million people can participate 
 No change:6 million people can participate 
 25% improvement:7.5 million people can participate 
 50% improvement: 9 million people can participate 
Food-safety 
monitoring 
program 
 50% worse:200,000 severe food poisoning cases 
 25% worse:165,000 severe food poisoning cases 
 No change: 130,000 severe food poisoning cases 
 25% improvement:100,000 severe food poisoning cases 
 50% improvement:65,000 severe food poisoning cases 
Disaster-relief 
program 
 50% worse:90,000 households can be assisted 
 25% worse:140,000 households can be assisted 
 No change:180,000 households can be assisted  
 25% improvement:230,000 households can be assisted 
 50% improvement:270,000 households can be assisted 
Effects on 
household taxes 
 You pay $2,000 more per year ($170 more per month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $300 more per year ($25 more per month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $50 more per year ($4 more per month) in taxes than now 
 No change: Same amount of tax credits as now 
 You pay $50 less per year ($4 less per month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $300 less per year ($25 less per month) in taxes than now 
 You pay $2,000 less per year ($170 less per month) in taxes than now 
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Table 4.2 Attributes and Levels in the Country Survey 
Attribute Description Level 
Environmental 
quality 
 Percentage of deaths due to air 
pollution  
 Percentage of rivers that do not 
meet water-quality standards for 
fishing and swimming 
 Percentage of total land are 
protected 
  50% worse than the US 
  25% worse than the US 
  Same as the US 
  25% better than the US 
  50% better than the US 
Childhood 
Poverty 
 Percentage of children live in 
poverty 
 The high school graduation rate of 
teenagers living in poverty 
 The pregnancy rate among poor 
teenage girls 
  50% worse than the US 
  25% worse than the US 
  Same as the US 
  25% better than the US 
  50% better than the US 
Health care 
 Percentage of people that have 
high-quality health insurance with 
affordable co-payments 
 The average waiting time to see a 
specialist 
 The average number of hospital 
bed 
  50% worse than the US 
  25% worse than the US 
  Same as the US 
  25% better than the US 
  50% better than the US 
Cost of livingϮ 
 You would have $11,000 less per year to spend ($917 per month) 
 You would have $2,750 less per year to spend ($229 per month) 
 You would have $550 less per year to spend ($46 per month) 
 Same as now 
 You would have $550 more per year to spend ($46 per month) 
 You would have $2,750 more per year to spend ($229 per month) 
 You would have $11,000 more per year to spend ($917 per month) 
Ϯ The cost of living levels were indexed to a subject’s annual household income. The levels that were 
shown here are for an annual household income of $55,000. 
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Table 4.3 Demographic Information 
 Budget 
Survey 
N=2037 
Country 
Survey 
N=1010 
Gender, %   
Male 52 52 
Female 48 48 
Age, mean (SD), years 52 (16) 52 (16) 
Marital status, %   
Married 60 58 
Widowed 5 5 
Divorced/separated 13 13 
Single 16 17 
Living with partner 6 7 
Race/ethnicity, %   
White 76 77 
Hispanic 8 8 
African-American 9 9 
2 or more races 3 3 
Other 3 3 
Highest education, %   
Less than high school graduate 8 8 
High school or equivalent (e.g., GED) 27 27 
Some college  30 32 
Bachelor’s or graduate degree (e.g., BA, BS) 35 33 
Household Income, mean (SD), $ 72K (49K) 71K (48K) 
Household size, mean (SD) 2.6 (1.5) 2.6 (1.3) 
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Table 4.4 Budget Survey Mixed-Logit Random-Parameter Estimates for the Linear and 
Categorical Models  
 
Symmetric 
Linear 
Asymmetric 
Linear 
Categorical 
 
Coef. 
(St. Err) 
St. Dev. 
(St. Err) 
 
Coef. 
(St. Err) 
St. Dev. 
(St. Err) 
 
Coef. 
(St. Err) 
St. Dev. 
(St. Err) 
 
Early 
childhood  
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.021*** 
(0.001) 
    
Decrease 
  
-0.032*** 
(0.002) 
0.044*** 
(0.003) 
  
Increase 
  
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.027*** 
(0.003) 
  
50% decrease 
    
-1.462*** 
(0.099) 
1.575*** 
(0.108) 
25% decrease 
    
-0.848*** 
(0.076) 
0.728*** 
(0.114) 
25% increase 
    
0.305*** 
(0.075) 
0.728*** 
(0.114) 
50% increase 
    
0.530*** 
(0.094) 
1.575*** 
(0.108) 
Food safety  
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
    
Decrease 
  
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.028*** 
(0.003) 
  
Increase 
  
0.004*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
  
50% decrease 
    
-0.952*** 
(0.086) 
0.951*** 
(0.112) 
25% decrease 
    
-0.512*** 
(0.070) 
0.238 
(0.207) 
25% increase 
    
0.043 
(0.073) 
0.238 
(0.207) 
50% increase 
    
0.184*** 
(0.085) 
0.951*** 
(0.112) 
Job training  
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.016*** 
(0.001) 
    
Decrease 
  
-0.022*** 
(0.002) 
0.035*** 
(0.003) 
  
Increase 
  
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.021*** 
(0.003) 
  
50% decrease 
    
-0.977*** 
(0.089) 
1.185*** 
(0.110) 
25% decrease 
    
-0.809*** 
(0.077) 
0.720*** 
(0.099) 
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Symmetric 
Linear 
Asymmetric 
Linear 
Categorical 
25% increase 
    
0.200*** 
(0.077) 
0.720*** 
(0.099) 
50% increase 
    
0.385*** 
(0.090) 
1.185*** 
(0.110) 
Disaster relief  
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
    
Decrease 
  
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.027*** 
(0.003) 
  
Increase 
  
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.017*** 
(0.003) 
  
50% decrease 
    
-0.791*** 
(0.088) 
0.997*** 
(0.109) 
25% decrease 
    
-0.447*** 
(0.071) 
0.400*** 
(0.144) 
25% increase 
    
0.220*** 
(0.075) 
0.400*** 
(0.144) 
50% increase 
    
0.270*** 
(0.087) 
0.997*** 
(0.109) 
Tax
+
 
-1.006*** 
(0.029) 
NA     
Tax increase 
  
-10.912*** 
(0.461) 
NA 
-10.420*** 
(0.494) 
NA 
Tax decrease 
  
0.336*** 
(0.042) 
NA 
0.796*** 
(0.270) 
NA 
Tax increase^2 
    
-0.666*** 
(0.211) 
NA 
Tax decrease^2 
    
-0.238* 
(0.132) 
NA 
Non-attendant 
to cost 
attribute 
1.017*** 
(0.038) 
NA   
  
Higher 
 
 
10.590*** 
(0.457) 
NA 
10.371*** 
(0.479) 
NA 
Lower 
  
-0.588*** 
(0.068) 
NA 
-0.531*** 
(0.066) 
NA 
Version 
  
   
 
Version 2 -0.058*** 
(0.022) 
0.001 
(0.047) 
-0.076*** 
(0.028) 
0.023 
(0.095) 
-0.073*** 
(0.028) 
0.009 
(0.081) 
Version 3 0.020 
(0.023) 
0.001 
(0.062) 
0.031 
(0.031) 
0.134 
(0.105) 
0.028 
(0.030) 
0.043 
(0.141) 
Version 4 -0.029 
(0.023) 
0.0002 
(0.041) 
-0.042 
(0.028) 
0.019 
(0.073) 
-0.032 
(0.028) 
0.0005 
(0.064) 
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Symmetric 
Linear 
Asymmetric 
Linear 
Categorical 
Log Likelihood 
-7576 -6185 -6314 
AIC 
1.148 0.939 0.960 
***  indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at 
the 10% level.  
+ 
Tax variables are divided by 1000 to allow for faster convergence.  
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Table 4.5 Budget Survey Mixed-Logit Random-Parameter Estimates of the Nonlinear 
Models 
 
Symmetric 
Nonlinear 
Asymmetric 
Nonlinear 
 
Coef. 
(St. Err) 
St. Dev. 
(St. Err) 
 
Coef. 
(St. Err) 
St. Dev. 
(St. Err) 
 
Early childhood  
0.0157*** 
(0.0011) 
0.0255*** 
(0.0013)   
Childhood^2 
2.19E-04*** 
(2.20E-05) 
2.35E-04*** 
(5.04E-05)   
Decrease   
-0.0410*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0412*** 
(0.0038) 
Increase   
0.0130** 
(0.0055) 
0.0279*** 
(0.0034) 
 
Decrease^2   
1.86E-04* 
(1.01E-04) 
3.02E-04* 
(1.70E-04) 
Increase^2   
-3.73E-05 
(1.08E-04) 
9.76E-05 
(2.01E-04) 
Food safety  
0.0071*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0155*** 
(0.0012)   
Food^2 
-2.10E-04*** 
(2.14E-05) 
1.69E-04** 
(6.88E-05)   
Decrease   
-0.0225*** 
(0.0052) 
0.0241*** 
(0.0053) 
Increase   
-0.0025 
(0.0055) 
0.0133* 
(0.0077) 
Decrease^2   
4.60E-05 
(1.02E-04) 
3.29E-04* 
(1.69E-04) 
Increase^2   
1.36E-04 
(1.08E-04) 
1.72E-04 
(2.43E-04) 
Job training  
0.0106*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0193*** 
(0.0013) 
  
Job^2 
1.83E-04*** 
(2.31E-05) 
3.30E-04*** 
(4.57E-05) 
  
Decrease   
-0.0448*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0350*** 
(0.0027) 
Increase   
0.0078 
(0.0056) 
0.0156* 
(0.0087) 
Decrease^2   
4.59E-04*** 
(1.02E-04) 
8.84E-06 
(5.27E-04) 
Increase^2   
6.56E-06 
(1.11E-04) 
3.24E-04** 
(1.59E-04) 
Disaster relief 
0.0071*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0150*** 
(0.0012) 
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Symmetric 
Nonlinear 
Asymmetric 
Nonlinear 
Disaster^2 
-1.51E-04*** 
(2.15E-05) 
1.54E-04** 
(6.89E-05) 
  
Decrease   
-0.0189*** 
(0.0052) 
0.0226*** 
(0.0040) 
Increase   
0.0105* 
(0.0055) 
0.0112* 
(0.0066) 
Decrease^2   
4.09E-05 
(1.02E-04) 
3.09E-04*** 
(1.16E-04) 
Increase^2   
-7.05E-05 
(1.10E-04) 
2.67E-04** 
(1.21E-04) 
Taxes 
-1.5505 
(0.0498) 
NA 
  
Taxes^2 -0.4149 
(0.0171) 
NA 
  
Higher   -10.7237*** 
(0.4840) 
NA 
Lower   0.8274*** 
(0.2859) 
NA 
Higher^2   -0.5183** 
(0.2094) 
NA 
Lower^2   -0.2474* 
(0.1401) 
NA 
Non-attendant to 
cost attribute 
1.5365 
(0.0575) 
NA   
Higher 
 
 11.4628*** 
(0.5765) 
NA 
Lower 
  
-0.5442*** 
(0.0698) 
NA 
Version 2 -0.0616** 
(0.0257) 
0.0214 
(0.0650) 
-0.0768*** 
(0.0286) 
0.0311 
(0.1038) 
Version 3 0.0373 
(0.0274) 
0.0822 
(0.0814) 
0.0346 
(0.0310) 
0.1269 
(0.1017) 
Version 4 -0.0246 
(0.0261) 
0.0118 
(0.0579) 
-0.0337 
(0.0287) 
0.0232 
(0.0734) 
N of subjects 
1896  1896  
Log Likelihood 
-6768  -6166  
AIC 
1.03  0.94  
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Table 4.6 Country Survey Main-Effects Mixed-Logit Random-Parameter Estimates of 
the Linear and Categorical Models 
 
Symmetric 
Linear 
Asymmetric 
Linear 
Categorical 
 
Coef. 
(St. Err) 
St. Dev. 
(St. Err) 
 
Coef. 
(St. Err) 
St. Dev. 
(St. Err) 
 
Coef. 
(St. Err) 
St. Dev. 
(St. Err) 
 
Poverty  
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
0.014*** 
(0.001) 
    
Decrease 
  
-0.031*** 
(0.002) 
0.022*** 
(0.003) 
  
Increase 
  
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
  
50% decrease 
    
-1.637*** 
(0.118) 
1.244*** 
(0.155) 
25% decrease 
    
-0.838*** 
(0.086) 
0.427* 
(0.242) 
25% increase 
    
-0.023 
(0.098) 
0.624*** 
(0.229) 
50% increase 
    
0.037 
(0.096) 
0.564** 
(0.251) 
Environment  
0.010*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.001) 
    
Decrease 
  
-0.028*** 
(0.002) 
0.028*** 
(0.003) 
  
Increase 
  
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
  
50% decrease 
    
-1.535*** 
(0.118) 
1.042*** 
(0.182) 
25% decrease 
    
-0.678*** 
(0.090) 
0.128 
(0.258) 
25% increase 
    
0.044 
(0.090) 
0.840*** 
(0.177) 
50% increase 
    
0.034 
(0.094) 
0.623*** 
(0.207) 
Health Care  
0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.015*** 
(0.001) 
    
Decrease 
  
-0.043*** 
(0.003) 
0.034*** 
(0.003) 
  
Increase 
  
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
  
50% decrease 
    
-2.253*** 
(0.150) 
1.576*** 
(0.176) 
25% decrease 
    
-0.942*** 
(0.089) 
0.008 
(0.277) 
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Symmetric 
Linear 
Asymmetric 
Linear 
Categorical 
25% increase 
    
0.309*** 
(0.086) 
0.829*** 
(0.156) 
50% increase 
    
0.370*** 
(0.101) 
1.064*** 
(0.155) 
Cost of living
+ 
-0.131*** 
(0.006) 
NA     
Cost increase 
  
-0.583*** 
(0.032) 
NA 
-0.607*** 
(0.036) 
NA 
Cost decrease 
  
0.073*** 
(0.008) 
NA 
0.114*** 
(0.014) 
NA 
Cost increase^2 
    
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
NA 
Cost decrease^2 
    
-0.002*** 
(0.0005) 
NA 
Non-attendant to 
cost attribute 
0.127*** 
(0.006) 
NA     
Cost increase 
  
0.585*** 
(0.032) 
NA 
0.669*** 
(0.040) 
NA 
Cost decrease 
  
-0.059*** 
(0.010) 
NA 
-0.150*** 
(0.011) 
NA 
 
   
Log Likelihood 
-3909 -3279 -3283 
AIC 
1.125 0.946 0.952 
***  indicates significance at the 1% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level and * indicates significance at 
the 10% level.  
+ 
Cost-of-living variables are divided by 1000 to allow for faster convergence.  
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Table 4.7 Country Survey Mixed-Logit Random-Parameter Estimates of the Nonlinear 
Models 
 
Symmetric 
Nonlinear 
Asymmetric 
Nonlinear 
 
Coef. 
(St. Err) 
St. Dev. 
(St. Err) 
 
Coef. 
(St. Err) 
St. Dev. 
(St. Err) 
 
Childhood poverty 
0.0139*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0142*** 
(0.0015) 
  
Poverty^2 
-2.80E-04*** 
(2.74E-05) 
2.45E-04*** 
(6.48E-05) 
  
Decrease 
  
-0.0369*** 
(0.0057) 
0.0112* 
(0.0066) 
Increase 
  
-0.0059 
(0.0068) 
0.0178*** 
(0.0049) 
Decrease^2 
  
8.72E-05 
(1.10E-04) 
4.72E-04*** 
(8.93E-05) 
Increase^2 
  
1.06E-04 
(1.31E-04) 
1.08E-04 
(2.36E-04) 
Environmental quality 
0.0121*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0136*** 
(0.0015) 
  
Environment^2 
-2.78E-04*** 
(2.57E-05) 
2.00E-04*** 
(6.74E-05) 
  
Decrease 
  
-0.0235*** 
(0.0064) 
0.0284*** 
(0.0034) 
Increase 
  
-0.0073 
(0.0062) 
0.0139*** 
(0.0046) 
Decrease^2 
  
-1.20E-04 
(1.25E-04) 
1.01E-04 
(2.12E-04) 
Increase^2 
  
-1.26E-04 
(1.24E-04) 
1.21E-04 
(1.67E-04) 
Health Care 
0.0223*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0188*** 
(0.0015) 
  
Health^2 
-3.71E-04*** 
(3.03E-05) 
3.62E-04*** 
(5.03E-05) 
  
Decrease 
  
-0.0345*** 
(0.0061) 
0.0268*** 
(0.0079) 
Increase 
  
-0.0118** 
(0.0057) 
0.0083 
(0.0127) 
Decrease^2 
  
-2.26E-04* 
(1.22E-04) 
4.70E-04** 
(1.96E-04) 
Increase^2 
  
-1.10E-04 
(1.13E-04) 
3.55E-04*** 
(1.28E-04) 
Cost of living 
-0.1818*** 
(0.0085) 
NA   
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Symmetric 
Nonlinear 
Asymmetric 
Nonlinear 
Cost^2 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0002) 
NA   
Higher   
-0.5902*** 
(0.0344) 
NA 
Lower   
0.1156*** 
(0.0140) 
NA 
Higher^2   
-0.0019*** 
(0.0006) 
NA 
Lower^2   
-0.0017*** 
(0.0005) 
NA 
Non-attendant to cost 
attribute 
0.1751*** 
(0.0093) 
NA   
Higher   
0.6497*** 
(0.0377) 
NA 
Lower   
-0.0507*** 
(0.0108) 
NA 
 
    
N of subjects 
997  997  
Log Likelihood 
-3552  -3257  
AIC 
1.02  0.94  
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Table 4.8 Preference AsymmetryϮ by Ideology in the Budget Survey 
 Moderates Liberals Conservatives 
Early childhood     
   50% change 3.79*** 2.28*** 1.88* 
   25% change 3.83*** 2.32*** 1.68 
Food safety     
   50% change 4.29*** 7.51*** 4.29*** 
   25% change 2.14* 5.96*** 30.81*** 
Job training     
   50% change 2.52*** 3.13*** 1.23 
   25% change 3.57*** 3.57*** 3.57*** 
Disaster relief     
   50% change 1.41 2.00*** 5.01** 
   25% change 1.69 1.69 1.69 
    
Tax    
Marginal increase 
versus decrease 
63.59*** 384.57*** 17.34*** 
Ϯ Preference asymmetry was calculated as the ratio of the marginal utility of losses to the marginal 
utility of corresponding gains. 
*** indicates significant difference at the 1% level, ** indicates significant difference at the 5% level and * 
indicates significant difference at the 10% level. The null hypothesis is               . The wald statistics is 
defined as (          )
  (   (    )     (    )      (         ))⁄  where the covariance between the 
coefficients equal to zero in this study. The statistics was compared to a chi-squared distribution. 
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Table 4.9 Wald Test Statistics on the Attribute-Level Difference by Ideology for the 
Budget Survey 
 Moderates Liberals Conservatives 
Early childhood     
   50% versus 25% 
reduction 
10.5*** 21.5*** 3.1* 
   50% versus 25% 
increase 
1.2 4.8** 1.2 
Food safety     
   50% versus 25% 
reduction 
8.9*** 10.6*** 8.9*** 
   50% versus 25% 
increase 
0.0 4.4** 1.9 
Job training     
   50% versus 25% 
reduction 
4.4** 11.5*** 2.3 
   50% versus 25% 
increase 
3.3* 3.3* 3.3* 
Disaster relief     
   50% versus 25% 
reduction 
6.0** 16.8*** 0.2 
   50% versus 25% 
increase 
5.6** 5.6** 4.4** 
Ϯ The null hypothesis is               . The wald statistics is defined as 
(          )
  (   (    )     (    )      (         ))⁄  where the covariance between the 
coefficients equal to zero in this study. The statistics was compared to a chi-squared distribution. 
***  indicates significant difference at the 1% level, ** indicates significant difference at the 5% level and * 
indicates significant difference at the 10% level.  
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Table 4.10 Preference AsymmetryϮ by Task Experience 
 Budget Survey Country Survey 
 First half Second half First half Second half 
Early childhood / Childhood poverty 
   50% change 2.13*** 2.67*** 36.63*** 6.15*** 
   25% change 3.18*** 1.78*** 13.64*** 4.53*** 
Food safety / Environmental quality 
   50% change 8.85*** 3.88*** 20.89*** 11.77*** 
   25% change 5.58*** 26.46*** 23.73*** 2.12*** 
Job training / Health care 
   50% change 1.58*** 3.45*** 12.97*** 3.08*** 
   25% change 2.58*** 4.56*** 4.92*** 1.58*** 
Disaster relief  
   50% change 3.68*** 1.22***   
   25% change 3.18*** 0.74***   
Tax / Cost of living 
Marginal increase 
versus decrease 
31.36*** 35.94*** 9.43*** 7.90*** 
Ϯ
 Preference asymmetry was calculated as the ratio of the marginal utility of losses to the marginal 
utility of corresponding gains. 
***  indicates significant difference at the 1% level, ** indicates significant difference at the 5% level 
and * indicates significant difference at the 10% level. The null hypothesis is               . The 
wald statistics is defined as (          )
  (   (    )     (    )      (         ))⁄   where the 
covariance between the coefficients equal to zero in this study. The statistics was compared to a chi-
squared distribution. 
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Table 4.11 Budget Survey Mean Annual Welfare Values per Household ($) 
 
Asymmetric  
Linear 
Asymmetric  
Nonlinear 
Categorical 
Marginal utility 
of income
Ϯ
 
Cost 
increase 
Cost 
decrease 
Cost 
increase 
Cost 
decrease 
Cost 
increase 
Cost 
decrease 
Early childhood        
50% decrease 148 4,796 146 2,150 138 2,058 
25% decrease 74 2,398 73  1,075 80 1,194 
25% increase 25 828 25 379 29 429 
50% increase 51 1,655 51 758 50 746 
Food safety        
50% decrease 87 2,821 93  1,369 90 1,341 
25% decrease 43 1,410 46 685 48 721 
25% increase 10 326 10 146 4 61 
50% increase 20 651 20  292 17 259 
Job training        
50% decrease 101 3,287 100  1,481 92 1,376 
25% decrease 51 1,643 50  740 76 1,140 
25% increase 22 722 19 275 19 281 
50% increase 44 1,444 37 550 36 542 
Disaster relief        
50% decrease 73 2,366 77 1,142 74 1,113 
25% decrease 36 1,183 39 571 42 630 
25% increase 17 561 16 235 21 310 
50% increase 35 1,121 32 469 25 380 
Ϯ 
For each model, the first column presents the welfare values when the marginal utility of a cost-
increase was used as the marginal utility of income, and the second column presents the welfare 
values when the marginal utility of a cost-decrease was used as the marginal utility of income. 
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Table 4.12 Country Survey Mean Annual Welfare Values per Household ($) 
 
Asymmetric 
Linear 
Asymmetric  
Nonlinear 
Categorical 
Marginal utility of 
income 
Cost 
increase 
Cost 
decrease 
Cost 
increase 
Cost 
decrease 
Cost 
increase 
Cost 
decrease 
Childhood 
Poverty 
   
 
  
50% decrease 2,697 21,625 2,739 14,689 2,678 14,936 
25% decrease 1,349 10,813 1,369 7,344 1,371 7,646 
25% increase       
50% increase       
Environment 
Quality 
   
 
  
50% decrease 2,411 19,334 2,475 13,273 2,512 14,007 
25% decrease 1,206 9,667 1,237 6,636 1,109 6,187 
25% increase       
50% increase       
Access to Health 
Care  
   
 
  
50% decrease 3,673 29,451 3,853 20,665 3,686 20,555 
25% decrease 1,836 14,725 1,926 10,332 1,541 8,591 
25% increase 249 1,999 265 1,423 505 2,816 
50% increase 499 3,998 531 2,847 606 3,379 
Ϯ 
For each model, the first column presents the welfare values when the marginal utility of a cost-
increase was used as the marginal utility of income, and the second column presents the welfare 
values when the marginal utility of a cost-decrease was used as the marginal utility of income. 
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4.7 Figures 
 
If these were the only two alternatives, which one would you want your Congressman 
to vote for? 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Disaster-relief program 
 50% improvement:          
270,000 households 
can be assisted 
 No change:           
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
Intensive early-childhood 
development program  
 50% worse:       
210,000 children can 
participate 
 25% worse:              
320,000 children can 
participate 
Food-safety monitoring 
program 
 25% worse:               
165,000 severe food 
poisoning cases  
 25% improvement:               
100,000 severe food 
poisoning cases 
Effects on household 
taxes  
 You pay $2,000 less 
per year ($170 less per 
month) in taxes than 
now 
 You pay $50 more per 
year ($4 more per 
month) in taxes than 
now 
Which alternative would 
you like your 
Congressman to vote for? 
 
 
  
Figure 4.1 A Sample Budget Trade-off Question  
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If these were the only two alternatives, which country would you choose to live in? 
Country 
Feature 
Current US Levels  Country A  Country B 
Environmental 
Quality 
 3% of all deaths due to 
air pollution 
 40% of rivers fail 
standards 
 8% of total land is 
protected 
 
25% better than 
the US 
 
25% worse than 
the US 
Childhood 
Poverty  
 20% of children live in 
poverty 
 65% graduate high 
school 
 13% teenage 
pregnancy rate 
 
50% worse than 
the US 
 
50% better than 
the US 
Health Care 
 60% have high-quality 
health insurance 
 20 days of waiting time  
to see a specialist 
 1 hospital bed per 350 
people 
 
Same as the US  Same as the US 
Cost of Living 
 You would have 
$5,000 more per 
year to spend 
($420 more per 
month)  
 
You would have 
$5,000 less per 
year to spend 
($420 less per 
month)  
Which country would you choose? 
 
   
Figure 4.2 A Sample Country Trade-off Question 
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Figure 4.1. Preference Asymmetry for Public Programs, Budget Survey 
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Figure 4.3 Preference Asymmetry for Public Programs in the Budget Survey 
  
 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
5.1 WTP Values from the CV vs Budget Surveys 
Both the CV and the budget surveys measured the value of a high-quality early-
childhood program, but the context and framing were different between the two survey 
instruments. First, only the federal program in the CV survey was comparable to the budget 
survey which also targeted a nationwide intervention. Second, the two survey instruments 
targeted different numbers of children for enrolling in early-childhood programs. The federal 
program in the CV survey targeted either 18% or 90% of children in poverty under the age of 
6, depending on the survey version, which corresponds to 1,077,000 and 5,385,000 children 
in poverty. This is much larger than the number of children targeted in the budget survey, 
which ranged from 210,000 to 640,000. This should lead the WTP estimates from this 
survey version to be higher than the budget survey. 
Second, the two surveys provided different amounts of information to the survey 
subjects. The CV survey provided much more information on problems associated with 
childhood poverty, examples from successful early-childhood programs and benefits to 
taxpayers from reducing childhood poverty in the US than the budget survey did. Subjects in 
the CV survey also watched a short video of Heckman, which was not shown to the budget 
survey respondents. This might also lead to higher WTP estimates from the CV survey than 
those from the budget survey. I think this is a more influential factor than the number of 
children because preferences were not sensitive to the number of children when the results 
from the different versions of the CV survey instrument were compared. 
 163 
 
Based on the expectations above, WTP for a federal program in the CV survey 
should be higher than the WTP from the budget survey. The findings confirm these 
expectations. The population-weighted mean annual WTP for enrolling 90% of poor children 
in the US was $436 per household based on the non-parametric estimates and $188 per 
household based on the parametric estimates (Chapter 2). On the other hand, the 
population-weighted mean annual WTP for enrolling 640,000 children was between $34-52 
in the budget survey. The budget survey also included a policy trade-off question where one 
of the budget alternatives offered a 50% increase in the early-childhood program with tax 
increases and everything else was held constant. The nonparametric analysis of this 
question produced a mean annual WTP of $205 per household. This WTP value was much 
higher than the values from the parametric analysis of the rest of the trade-off questions, but 
was still lower than the nonparametric analysis of the CV data. 
The question is then which estimates are more reliable although the two survey 
instruments were not directly comparable. I think that the estimates from the budget survey 
are more reliable than the estimates from the CV survey. First, the CV survey did not pass 
the scope test, and the WTP values were not sensitive to the number of children enrolled in 
the early-childhood program in the CV survey while this was not the case in the budget 
survey. Second, the amount of information given in the budget survey is much closer to the 
knowledge of an average person than the amount of information given in the CV survey. 
Thus, a subject from the budget survey represents an average person better than a subject 
from the CV survey33.  
Third, the budget-allocation framework helped to mitigate possible protest responses 
(due to tax aversion) by offering smaller government: only 1% of the subjects dominated on 
the tax attribute by always picking either a lower tax increase or a higher tax reduction. This 
                                                 
33
 However, if there was an actual referendum, there would be a public debate on the early-childhood program 
and people would receive more information than they have now.  
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implies that the CV survey should offer more conservative estimates than the budget survey. 
However, there are other factors that played a role in subjects’ stated preferences, such as 
being insensitive or non-attendant to the tax attribute. The DCE surveys allow researchers 
to investigate whether subjects were insensitive to the tax attribute. In the budget survey 
33% of the subjects were likely to be insensitive to the tax attribute. Also, the budget-
allocation framework provided a better understanding of the opportunity costs of public 
dollars. These factors affect WTP in the opposite direction of the effect of dominance.  
The methods used to investigate dominance on or insensitiveness to the cost 
attribute in DCE surveys cannot be used for the CV survey because tax is the only attribute 
in the CV survey. However, one of the ways of comparing the two surveys on this topic is to 
investigate the percent of subjects who said “no” to the highest tax level. In the budget 
survey, 89% of subjects said “no” to paying the highest tax level of $2,000 in the policy 
question and this number increased to 94% when subjects who were insensitive to the cost 
attribute were excluded. The percent of “no” responses to the highest tax level was 83%, 
85%, 89% and 92% in the CV survey based on the survey version. These findings show that 
the percent of subjects who said “no” were not much different between the two surveys.  
However, the availability of methods that are used in the budget survey to examine 
dominance and attribute non-attendance makes the budget survey instrument more 
attractive than the CV survey.  
Overall, the attractiveness of the budget survey were 1) it provided the amount of 
information that is much closer to the knowledge of an average person than the CV survey 
did, 2) it presented the opportunity cost of public funding better than the CV survey, 3) it 
presented the problem as a public budgeting problem which helped to reduce protest voting 
against tax increases, and 4) it investigated preferences for program reductions. The budget 
survey revealed that conservatives and others did not want to cut the early-childhood 
program. A more traditional method of investigating only program improvements or 
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increases would not have revealed this information, which would have implied that 
conservatives did care about children in poverty. Because of the reasons listed above, the 
results from the budget survey are recommended for use in policy analysis of the early-
childhood programs. 
5.2 Discussion 
The findings from this study indicate that the population-weighted mean WTP for a 
50% increase in an intensive high-quality early-childhood program was $34 to $52 per year 
per household (chapter 2). This is lower than the annual per household cost of this kind of a 
program (chapter 2). At first glance, the findings from this study appear to contradict findings 
from previous studies that show that the benefits for alleviating the causes of crime, 
unemployment, ill health, and other consequences of social inequities more than offset the 
costs of small-scale, high-quality early-childhood interventions. However, studies that show 
high rates of return on investing in children in poverty quantify a different kind of value for 
reducing childhood poverty than this study obtains. This dissertation research shows how 
much the public is willing to allocate public dollars to early-childhood development by 
surveying a representative sample of US respondents. A plausible interpretation of low WTP 
is that most individuals do not think of the value of poverty reduction as a return on 
investment. Rather, they see poverty reduction as a social issue competing with other uses 
of public funds. Childhood poverty was not perceived as a high-priority social problem in the 
current economic climate when the unemployment rate is high and the national debt is 
growing. 
One of the important findings of this study is that preferences for supporting early-
childhood development programs were correlated with experience and ideological 
perspective (chapters 2). Subjects with children or family member’s children who had 
participated in one of the current government programs on early-childhood had the highest 
willingness to pay for the early-childhood program. This finding indicates that being familiar 
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with the program or being a direct beneficiary of the program led to a higher WTP. It was not 
perhaps so surprising to find that liberals and some moderates were supportive of 
increasing the early-childhood program, while conservatives were not. The interesting part 
of the findings was that all groups, including conservatives and subjects who indicated low 
chances of success for the early-childhood program in helping children break out of poverty, 
were against decreasing the early-childhood program. This could indicate that altruism and 
the short-term benefits to children when they participate to these programs played a role in 
being against to reducing the program (chapters 2 and 4).  
Related to the topic above, subjects were willing to pay to avoid higher childhood 
poverty rates even if they were not willing to pay for reducing the poverty. Subjects from all 
ideological groups were willing to pay to avoid reductions in the early-childhood program in 
the budget survey. The population-weighted mean WTP to avoid a 50% reduction in the 
early-childhood program was $147 to $153 per year per household in the budget survey 
(chapter 2). The population-weighted mean WTP to avoid living in a society with higher 
childhood poverty rates than the US was $2,711 per year per household in the country 
survey. These results indicate that subjects do not want to tolerate higher childhood poverty 
rates. 
Another important finding was that subjects cared strongly about how childhood 
poverty is reduced (chapter 2). One of the main differences between the results of this study 
and the benefits calculated in previous benefit-cost analysis studies is that this study 
assessed the perceived value individuals placed on reducing childhood poverty by 
incorporating preferences for processes as well as outcomes. Involvement of government in 
early-childhood development was a strongly negative factor for conservatives, who had 
several objections to government programs in early-childhood development (chapter 2). 
These concerns clearly affected the individuals’ perceived value of poverty reduction. 
Another indication of the effect of process was that subjects’ did not value the realized 
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benefits of living in a society with lower childhood-poverty rates than the US in the country 
survey, but liberals and some moderates valued being part of the process to reduce 
childhood poverty in the CV and budget surveys (chapter 2). 
Using survey methods and a representative sample of US adult population enabled 
this study to investigate taste heterogeneity in greater detail than is usually possible. The 
findings reported in this study all show evidence on how heterogeneous the preferences 
were for reducing childhood poverty. In previous benefit-cost analysis studies, the benefits 
and costs were calculated for participants and non-participants only. This study investigated 
preferences based on individual-specific characteristics, such as socio-economic 
characteristics and opinions on and attitudes towards the early-childhood program and 
found that ideology, experience and perceived effectiveness (i.e., how effective respondents 
thought the early-childhood  programs would be) had strong associations with supporting 
the early-childhood program.  
A budget-allocation framework in a DCE survey was used to show how to calculate 
welfare changes based on changes in disposable income or reallocation of funding from one 
government program to another (chapter 3). Preferences for budget allocation were 
correlated with ideological perspective, and allocating public dollars from one program to 
another without changing taxes led to changes in economic welfare. Decreasing programs 
led to a welfare loss for all groups while increasing programs in general led to perceived 
welfare gains for liberals and sometimes for moderates. Conservatives in our sample 
preferred the status quo, and perceived losses from decreasing or increasing programs for 
three out of four programs. The only program for which they valued expansions was the job-
training program. While these findings are consistent with expectations, this is the first study 
to quantify the effect of ideology on the value of changes, especially reductions in 
experimentally-controlled budget alternatives. 
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Among the four public programs evaluated in this study, liberals valued increases in 
the early-childhood program the most, while moderates and conservatives valued increases 
in the job-training program the most (chapter 3). However, reductions in the early-childhood 
program had the highest perceived losses for all ideological groups. Subjects in general 
were much more averse to program reductions than they favored program increases, and 
the slope of the utility function for program reductions was much steeper than the slope of 
the utility function for program increases indicating asymmetry in preferences for all 
programs (chapter 4). The degree of preference asymmetry was the highest for the food-
safety program among the four programs.  
This study also showed that the value of one program was not independent of the 
other programs it was compared to (chapter 3). The study findings imply that individuals 
care about the source of the funding for a government program. This finding has 
implications for budget reallocation studies that did not clearly define the opportunity cost. A 
vague definition of the opportunity costs of allocating budget among publicly-provided goods 
could produce invalid estimates because it is not clear what subjects assumed about the 
change in the existing allocation of goods and services.  
What does this mean for using WTP estimates from the budget survey in benefit-cost 
analysis? The answer to this question, unfortunately, is not straightforward. It is not 
surprising that people care about the opportunity cost of public dollars and the funding 
mechanism. Individuals care about whether the funding is coming from increased or new 
taxes, or are reallocated from other public programs. The findings from this study reflect the 
complications of real-life decision making. These complications stem from decision making 
at a time when the perceived opportunity cost of public dollars is very high and when there 
are strong pressures to reduce the public deficit. I think that the benefit-cost analysis studies 
should incorporate and utilize findings from these types of studies where the perceived 
economic value of a publicly-provided good, such as an early-childhood program, was 
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estimated based on people’s opinions. These values are a better representation of public 
preferences in real-life decision making. The WTP values from this study can be used to 
understand whether a public referendum on funding a public program in a realistic policy 
context would pass or not (as is illustrated in chapter 2).  
The budget-allocation framework provides an alternative way of assessing 
preferences for publicly provided goods and services. Tax-reductions together with tax-
increases can be used as an alternative payment vehicle in SP studies. However, the range 
of the tax reduction should be tested carefully to represent different groups. A budget-
allocation scenario which offers increases and decreases in programs (or services) and 
taxes can in general be used to reduce possible aversion to tax increases and big 
government. This type of scenario allows researchers to assess preferences for cutting 
programs and is much more relevant in the current economic situation. 
This study shows asymmetry in preferences for both money and the non-market 
goods included in this study (chapter 4). All ideological groups, including conservatives, 
exhibited much larger losses for reductions in public programs than they valued program 
increases. This could indicate that altruism affects subjects’ preferences asymmetrically.  
The idea of cutting programs could induce different, elevated emotional reactions than 
expanding programs. The degree of asymmetry, however, was higher in preferences for 
quality-of-life attributes that in social preferences. This study suggests that subjects, 
ultimately, were more loss averse for services that would affect their own lives more directly 
than for services that would mostly affect others’ lives.  
This study also indicates large asymmetry in preferences for income taxes and cost 
of living expenses. The degree of asymmetry was much more pronounced for taxes than for 
cost of living. This could be due to the fact that taxes constituted a smaller share of the 
budget and subjects, especially liberals, did not care about tax reductions compared to 
strong dislike for tax increases exhibited by all ideological groups. On the other hand, 
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because cost of living constituted a larger share of subjects’ income, they valued decreases 
in this expense. Cost of living could be a better indicator for calculating the marginal utility of 
income than taxes if cost of living is relevant to the public-policy scenario.  
A symmetric linear specification was a poor representation of preferences when 
preferences were asymmetric (chapter 4). Based on the symmetric model, subjects on 
average valued increasing government programs and perceived losses in decreasing these 
programs. However, categorical and asymmetric models indicated that subjects did not 
necessarily value increases in all four government programs, and they did not always 
significantly differentiate among levels for program increases. A symmetric model was also 
unsuccessful in capturing that preferences were not significantly different than zero in 
certain ranges of an attribute. In the country data, a model that allowed asymmetric 
preferences and a model with categorical variables indicated that preferences for 
improvements in childhood poverty and environmental quality were not significant, in 
contrast with the results from the symmetric model. The log-likelihood and AIC statistics also 
indicated that the asymmetric models fit the data best in both surveys, closely followed by 
the categorical model.  
As in previous studies, these data also indicated large disparities between WTP and 
WTA (chapter 4). The question, then, is which welfare measure should be used? For this 
particular study, I recommend using the parameter associated with cost increases to 
calculate the marginal utility of income. This study is interested in the general public’s 
perceived value of an early-childhood development program. A direct welfare measure for 
this would be to calculate subjects’ WTP using higher taxes as the payment vehicle for 
increasing the early-childhood program. For program reductions it does not necessarily 
make sense to use a WTA measure because the general public has no property rights for 
early-childhood programs. Thus, the public’s perceived value should be measured as WTP 
to avoid program reductions in the case of decreases from the status quo. I also would like 
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to note that using asymmetric nonlinear model, especially a nonlinear representation of the 
cost attribute narrowed the disparity between WTP and WTA, and produced much more 
reasonable values for losses (chapter 4). 
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APPENDIX A 
CONTINGENT-VALUATION SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
SOCIAL SURVEY 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. We are going to ask you questions 
about your thoughts on some social issues. There are no right or wrong answers to the 
questions in this survey. We really want to know what you think. 
 
  
 173 
 
On the next screen, you will be shown a short video clip to determine if you are able to see 
videos on your device. Please be patient as it may take a few moments for the video to load, 
depending on your connection speed. Please be sure to turn up the volume on your device. 
 
 
[DISPLAY] 
[SHOW TEST VIDEO OF 10 SECONDS] 
 
[RADIO] 
[PROMPT IF SKIP] 
 
V1. Did you see the video on the previous screen? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
[if “no” to V1] 
 
V2. Would you like to try again whether you can see the video? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
[if “yes”, show the video again and ask V1 again. If “no” then terminate] 
 
[If ineligible to participate] 
Thank you for your consideration, but you are not eligible to participate in this survey. 
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[DISPLAY] 
[Consent Screen 1] 
Study Purpose  
You are one of about 1500 people in the United States who are being asked to take this 
survey to help us understand opinions on social issues. 
 
Study Duration  
This survey has two parts. It will take about 10-15 minutes to complete the first part. You 
cannot start the second part of the survey until at least 24 hours after you have completed 
the first part. You must finish the second part within 10 days of starting the first part. The 
survey will take about 30 minutes to complete in total.  
 
 
Study Details 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) is doing this study for a foundation. 
UNC has contracted with Knowledge Networks (KN) to collect data. If you have questions 
about this survey, please contact Panel Relations at 800-782-6899 and someone will direct 
your questions to the appropriate person at UNC. 
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[CONSENT SCREEN 2] 
 
Possible Risks or Discomforts  
If any questions make you uncomfortable, you do not need to answer them.  
 
KN will protect your responses under its Privacy Policy. UNC will receive your survey 
responses without any personal identifiers. UNC also will make every effort to protect your 
responses. There is a potential risk of disclosure of the survey data, but the data could not 
be directly tied to you. 
 
Benefits 
There are no direct benefits to you from participating in this study. However, your responses 
are very important to us.  
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[CONSENT SCREEN 3] 
 
Confidentiality 
Many steps have been taken to protect your information. KN will report only your responses 
to UNC, not your name. If the results of this study are presented at scientific meetings or 
published in scientific journals, no information will be included that could identify you or your 
responses personally. 
 
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at UNC has reviewed this research. An IRB is a group 
of people who make sure that the rights of participants in research are protected. The IRB 
may check records of your activity in this research to see if proper procedures were 
followed. 
 
Your Rights  
Your decision to take part in this research study is completely voluntary.  You can refuse to 
answer any question or stop at any point after you begin the survey and still receive your KN 
points for participating in the survey. 
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[PROMPT IF SKIP] 
[CONSENT SCREEN 4] 
 
If you have read the previous screens and agree to participate, please click the Yes 
button, if not, click the No button. 
 
 Yes, I agree to participate. 
 No, I do not agree to participate.  
 
 
[DISPLAY] 
[IF CONSENT= NO OR SKIP] 
 
Thank you for your consideration.  You have exited the survey.  
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CREATE DOV FED: 
1=FEDERAL  
2=STATE 
RANDOMLY ASSIGN RESPONDENTS TO EITHER GROUP 
 
 
 [ASK THESE QUESTIONS TO RESPONDENTS WITH < 25,000 HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE UP TO 4; OR FOR RESPONDENTS WITH <50,000 HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE MORE THAN 4] 
 
We will now ask you some questions on your household taxes. 
 
S3. Did your household receive earned income tax credits when you filed your taxes last 
year? 
 Yes  
 No  
 Not sure/Don’t know  
 
 [IF S3=3 OR REFUSED] 
 
S4. Did someone other than a household member (including professional assistance) help 
your household to fill in your federal income taxes last year? 
 Yes  
 No  
 
[IF (S3=1 OR S4=1) AND FED=1, GROUP=1 =CREDIT RECEIVER. 
ELSE GROUP=2 = TAX PAYER.] 
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[PROMPT IF SKIP] 
 
1.  
A. Here is a list of problems you may be concerned about.  What do you think is the 
most important and least important concern for the country among the items listed 
below?  
 
[SHOW ITEMS NOT SELECTED IN Q1A] 
 
B. Of the remaining concerns, what do you think is the most important and least 
important concern for the country among the items listed below? 
 
MOST 
Important  
(Please check ONE) 
 
LEAST 
Important 
(Please check ONE) 
 
Crime 
 
 
Education 
 
 
Energy 
 
 
Environment 
 
 
Federal budget deficit 
 
 
Health care 
 
 
Homeland Security 
 
 
Housing 
 
 
Illegal Immigration 
 
 
Poverty 
 
 
Unemployment 
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Now we want to tell you about Prof. James Heckman’s research on poverty (having an 
annual income of less than $27,000 for a household with 5 members) in America. Prof. 
James Heckman is an economist at the University of Chicago. In 2000 he won the Nobel 
Prize in Economics.  
 
Prof. Heckman has studied how government social programs --such as job training and 
counseling -- affect the incomes of poor people. He found that many of these government 
programs actually did not help poor people much in the long term. Years later, people who 
participated in job training programs were not making more income than poor people who 
had not participated. People who received counseling were just as likely to be in prison as 
people who had not received counseling.  
 
But Prof. Heckman discovered that one kind of assistance turned out to be very effective in 
breaking the cycle of poverty. His research showed that the best way to help children living 
in poverty was to reach them when they are very young– ages 0-5 year old- to make sure 
they learned both intellectual and social skills very early in life. Prof. Heckman found that 
intensive early childhood development programs helped poor children move out of poverty 
by the time they become adults. 
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2. What do you think the rate of childhood poverty is in your area, compared to the national 
average? 
 Much higher 
 Somewhat higher 
 About the same 
 Somewhat lower 
 Much lower 
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Prof Heckman’s research showed that low levels of intellectual and social skills in poor 
children have led to major economic and social problems in America, such as crime, teen 
pregnancy, drug use, and high school dropout rates. Intellectual and social skills are largely 
developed in early childhood between the ages of 0 to 5. Poverty reduces the chances of 
many children in the United States developing these critical skills.  
 
Based on his research, Prof. Heckman believes that we should completely rethink the way 
we are tackling the problem of poverty in the United States.  He and other researchers are 
convinced that we need to start helping children living in poverty right from birth. If we wait 
until kids are older than 5 years, poverty reduction programs do not work. It is just very hard 
for older children and teenagers to ever catch up. 
 
3. What has been your own experience with poverty? (Please check all that apply) 
 I am not poor now and have never lived in poverty. 
 I grew up in a family in poverty, and my family is still poor. 
 I have been poor in the past, but am not poor now. 
 I was not poor in the past, but am poor now. 
 Members of my family have experienced poverty, but I have not. 
 Families in my neighborhood have experienced poverty. 
 I am not poor now, but I feel like I could easily fall into poverty. I live paycheck 
to paycheck. 
 None of the above. [If chose this option, cannot choose the above 
options.] 
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Two examples of intensive early childhood development programs like the ones Prof. 
Heckman studied are the Perry Preschool Program in Michigan and the Abecedarian 
Program in North Carolina.  
 
Researchers have followed children in the Perry Preschool and Abecedarian Programs 
through their adult lives. They found that these intensive early childhood development 
programs really do work. For example, a child from a poor family who participates in one of 
these intensive early childhood development programs is 
 
 more likely to go to a 4-year college, 
 more likely to have a skilled job, 
 less likely to become a teen parent, and 
 less likely to be arrested for crime. 
 
 
Prof. Heckman found that spending $100 on intensive early childhood programs results in 
about $10 in benefits every year for many years.  
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[OPTIONS 4 AND 5 SHOULD BE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE] 
 
4. What is your opinion about the current government early-childhood programs such as 
Head Start? (Please check all that apply) 
 I do NOT know much about these programs 
 I do NOT think Head Start is successful 
 I think programs like Head Start can help children stay out of trouble 
 I think programs like Head Start can help children break out of poverty 
 I do NOT think programs like Head Start can help children break out of 
poverty 
 I think the government is wasting money on early childhood interventions 
 I think it is NOT the government’s job to fund these programs 
 I think the extended family should help with early child care 
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These intensive early childhood development programs are different from the current 
government programs like Head Start. They provide much higher-quality education and 
other services, and they are more expensive.  Intensive early childhood development 
programs like Prof. Heckman studied would provide babies and young children in poor 
families services such as: 
 
 Educational activities that involve thinking, social and emotional skills, 
 Activities that focus on language development, 
 Adult-child interactions, including talking, showing toys and pictures, and reading to 
babies, 
 On-site health care and nutrition (such as school lunches). 
 
 
5. Have one of your children or a family member’s child participated any current 
government early-childhood program like Head Start? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know/Not sure 
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We would now like to show you a 1-minute video of Prof. Heckman explaining his findings. 
Please click here to access the video.   
 
V3. Did you watch the video on the previous screen? 
 Yes 
 No 
 I tried, but couldn’t see it 
 
[CONTINUE EVEN IF VIDEO FAILED] 
 
 [IF VIDEO=YES] 
 
6. Why does Prof. Heckman think America should invest in early childhood development? 
 America has a large number of poor children 
 Children in early ages are neglected in America 
 Early childhood programs are good investments 
 Don’t know/ Not sure 
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7. How likely do you think it is that intensive early childhood development programs like 
the ones Prof. Heckman studied really can help children break out of poverty if they are 
funded by each of the sources listed below?     
 
 Very 
Unlikely Unlikely 
Neither 
Likely nor 
Unlikely 
Likely 
Very 
Likely 
A. The federal 
government O O O O O 
B. The state 
government O O O O O 
C. Private 
charities or local 
government 
O O O O O 
 
 
CREATE DOV SCOPE: 
1=SCOPE1  
2=SCOPE2 
RANDOMLY ASSIGN RESPONDENTS TO EITHER GROUP 
 
CREATE DOV BID: 
1=$10 
2=$25 
3=$50  
4=$100  
5=$500] 
6=$1000  
7=$2000  
 
RANDOMLY ASSIGN RESPONDENTS TO EACH GROUP 
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[FEDERAL VERSION] 
About 6 million out of 25 million (about a quarter of) children under the age of 6 live in 
poverty in the USA. About 18% of these children participate in current government programs 
like Head Start.  
 
[Federal - Scope 1] 
Suppose that the United States Congress was considering changing the current early 
childhood programs into high-quality intensive early-childhood development programs such 
as Prof. Heckman studied. This nationwide plan would move all the children now in 
programs like Head Start (18% of children living in poverty) into improved, intensive early-
childhood development programs. No additional children would be put into the new 
programs.  
 
Local, private groups would have a major role in the implementation of the new programs. 
 
If the money was approved for this change, children who are now in programs like Head 
Start (about 1 million children) would benefit from the higher-quality programs.  
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[Federal - Scope 2] 
Suppose that the United States Congress was considering changing the current early 
childhood programs into high-quality intensive early-childhood development programs such 
as Prof. Heckman studied and expanding the number of children enrolled.  This nationwide 
plan would enroll almost all (90%) children living in poverty under the age of 6, including all 
the children now in programs like Head Start, in these improved new intensive early-
childhood development programs. 
 
Local, private groups would have a major role in the implementation of the new programs. 
 
If the money was approved for this change, 90% of all children living in poverty under the 
age of 6 throughout the United States (about 5.4 million children) would benefit from the 
higher-quality programs. 
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[FEDERAL] 
Suppose that if the majority of the members of Congress voted YES, the legislation would 
pass; and your household and households like yours would have to pay higher federal taxes 
to pay for this intensive early childhood development program.  
 
[Federal – Scope 1] 
If the Congress voted NO, your taxes and the taxes of other households like yours would 
stay the same, and no children would be moved from current programs into new intensive 
early childhood development programs. 
 
[Federal – Scope 2] 
If the Congress voted NO, your taxes and the taxes of other households like yours would 
stay the same, and the new intensive early childhood development program such as Prof. 
Heckman studied would not be funded. 
 
[Federal – All] 
Now suppose that your representative in Congress sent you a letter asking you how you 
want him or her to vote on this matter. We want to know whether you would want your 
representative to vote for or against funding the new intensive early childhood development 
program if voting for the program would mean that your federal taxes and the federal taxes 
of households like yours would increase.,  
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[STATE VERSION] 
 
About 6 million out of 25 million (about a quarter of) children under the age of 6 live in 
poverty in the USA. About 18% of these children participate in current government programs 
like Head Start.  
 
[State - Scope 1] 
Suppose that the [STATE] state legislature was considering changing the current early-
childhood programs into high-quality intensive early-childhood development programs such 
as Prof. Heckman studied. This statewide plan would move all the children now in programs 
like Head Start in [STATE], into improved, intensive early-childhood development 
programs. No additional children would be put into the new programs.  
 
Local, private groups would have a major role in the implementation of the new programs. 
 
If the money was approved for this change, children who are now in programs like Head 
Start in [STATE] would benefit from the higher-quality programs. 
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[State - Scope 2] 
Suppose that the [STATE] state legislature was considering changing the current early 
childhood programs into high-quality intensive early-childhood development programs such 
as Prof. Heckman studied and expanding the number of children enrolled. This statewide 
plan would enroll almost all (90%) children living in poverty under the age of 6, including the 
children now in programs like Head Start [STATE], in these improved new intensive early 
childhood development programs. 
 
Local, private groups would have a major role in the implementation of the new programs. 
 
If the money was approved for this change, 90% of all children living in poverty under the 
age of 6 in [STATE] would benefit from the higher-quality programs. 
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[STATE] 
 
Suppose that if the majority of the state representatives voted YES, the legislation would 
pass; and your household and other households like yours would have to pay higher state 
taxes to pay for this program.  
 
[State - Scope 1] 
If the state legislature voted NO, your taxes and the taxes of other households like yours 
would stay the same, and no children would be moved from current programs into new 
intensive early childhood development programs. 
 
[State - Scope 2] 
If the state legislature voted NO, your taxes and the taxes of other households like yours 
would stay the same, and the new intensive early childhood development program such as 
Prof. Heckman studied would not be funded. 
 
[State] 
Now suppose that your state representative sent you a letter asking you how you want him 
or her to vote on this matter. We want to know whether you would want your representative 
to vote for or against funding the new intensive early childhood development program if 
voting for the program would mean that your state taxes and the state taxes of other 
households like yours would increase. 
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[ALL Versions - Closing the first part of the survey] 
Now we’d like you to look at a question about how you would want your representative to 
vote, but we do NOT want you to answer the question at this time. We want to give you 
some time to think about whether you would like your representative to vote for these new 
intensive early childhood development programs, and whether you are willing to pay 
increased taxes. You may want to discuss this question with other people to help you decide 
how to answer. Please feel free to do that. 
 
We are interested in how you feel about this legislation. There is no right or wrong answer.   
 
Please assume that enough people would agree with you and that [if FED=1: 
Congress/ if FED=2: the state legislature] would follow your recommendation on 
whether funding these programs or not. 
 
 195 
 
[FEDERAL] 
 
8. If the Congress approved the new intensive early childhood development program, the 
program would be paid for by increasing federal taxes. Suppose that the increased taxes 
your household and households like yours would have to pay for the new intensive 
early-childhood development programs would be $[bid] per year. How would you want 
your representative to vote? 
 
Please also remember that an increase in your taxes means you have to reduce 
spending on other items in your budget.   
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[GREY OUT RADIO BUTTONS SO THAT SUBJECTS CANNOT ANSWER] 
 
[Federal – Scope 1] 
 
Here are the options we want you to think about: 
 For Congress moving the poor children under 6 who are currently in an 
existing government program like Head Start into the new intensive early-
childhood development program and FOR increasing taxes for my household 
and other households like mine by $[bid] per year; or 
 
 Against Congress moving poor children under 6 who are currently in an 
existing government program like Head Start into the new intensive early-
childhood development program; and AGAINST increasing taxes for my 
household and other households like mine by $[bid] per year. 
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[GREY OUT RADIO BUTTONS SO THAT SUBJECTS CANNOT ANSWER] 
 
[Federal – Scope 2] 
 
Here are the options we want you to think about: 
 For Congress enrolling almost all (90%) children living in poverty under the 
age of 6, including all the children now in programs like Head Start, in the 
new intensive early-childhood development programs, and FOR increasing 
taxes for my household and other households like mine by $[bid] per year; or 
 
 Against Congress enrolling almost all (90%) children living in poverty under 
the age of 6, including all the children now in programs like Head Start, in the 
new intensive early-childhood development programs, and AGAINST 
increasing taxes for my household and other households like mine by $[bid] 
per year. 
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[STATE VERSION] 
9. If the state legislature approved the new intensive early childhood development program, 
the program would be paid for by increasing state taxes. Suppose that the increased 
taxes your household and households like yours would have to pay for the new 
intensive early-childhood development programs would be $[bid] per year. How would 
you want your representative to vote? 
 
Please also remember that an increase in your taxes means you have to reduce 
spending on other items in your budget.   
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[GREY OUT RADIO BUTTONS SO THAT SUBJECTS CANNOT ANSWER] 
 
[STATE – Scope 1] 
 
Here are the options we want you to think about: 
 For the state legislature moving the poor children under 6 who are currently 
in an existing government program like Head Start in [STATE] into the new 
intensive early-childhood development program and FOR increasing state 
taxes for my household and other households like mine by $[bid] per year; or 
 
 Against the state legislature moving the poor children under 6 who are 
currently in an existing government program like Head Start in [STATE] into 
the new intensive early-childhood development program and AGAINST 
increasing state taxes for my household and other households like mine by 
$[bid] per year. 
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[GREY OUT RADIO BUTTONS SO THAT SUBJECTS CANNOT ANSWER] 
 
[STATE – Scope 2] 
 
Here are the options we want you to think about: 
 For the state legislature enrolling almost all (90%) children living in poverty 
under the age of 6 in [STATE], including the children now in programs like 
Head Start, in the new intensive early-childhood development programs, and 
FOR increasing state taxes for my household and other households like mine 
by $[bid] per year; or 
 
 Against the state legislature enrolling almost all (90%) children living in 
poverty under the age of 6 in [STATE], including the children now in 
programs like Head Start, in the new intensive early-childhood development 
programs, and AGAINST increasing state taxes for my household and other 
households like mine by $[bid] per year. 
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[ALL Versions] 
We request that you return to the second part of this survey after 24 hours but before 10 
days from now (i.e., between [TIME, Pacific on DATE] Pacific time and [TIME, Pacific on 
DATE] Pacific time) to answer the legislation question, and complete the rest of the 
questionnaire.   
 
 We had one big problem in the past in this type of surveys. Some respondents did not 
return to the second part of the survey. This is a big problem for us since if someone does 
not return to the second part to complete the survey, we cannot use the information he or 
she provided in the first part, either. This means that the time these respondents spent on 
the first part was wasted. Please help our study by returning to complete the second part of 
the survey within the given time period. 
 
You will receive 5,000 points  after you complete the second part of this survey. 
 
[CREATE DOV_TRANSTIME1: RECORD DATE AND TIME WHEN FIRST REACHED THE TRANSITION 
SCREEN ABOVE] 
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Thank you for returning to finish this second part of the survey. 
 
If you would like to review the findings from Prof. Heckman’s research about 
intensive early childhood development programs before proceeding with the 
questions in this part of the survey, click here. 
 
Remember: we asked you to think about whether you would like your representative to vote 
for the new intensive early-childhood development programs, and whether you are willing 
to pay increased taxes. 
 
Please assume that enough people would agree with you and that [if FED=1: 
Congress/ if FED=2: the state legislature] would follow your recommendation on 
whether funding these programs or not. 
 
Remember: we are interested in how you feel about this legislation.  There is no right or 
wrong answer.   
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Before you tell us how you want your representative to vote, we want you to help us with a 
problem we have had in studies like this one. You didn’t really receive a letter from your 
representative asking for your help in making a decision on this matter. But we are asking 
you to tell us what you would do if you had actually received a letter and your opinion really 
could change the way your representative votes.  
 
People sometimes find it hard to do this in our studies. They give different answers to survey 
questions than they actually would do in a real situation. For example, you might not pay 
much attention to the benefits and costs of reducing childhood poverty in a survey because 
your opinions may never be communicated to your representative and are unlikely to 
change how he/she votes. If your representative really did ask you for your opinion, you 
might think harder about whether the actual benefits from reducing childhood poverty are 
worth the increase in annual taxes your household would have to pay. 
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Some people make a decision without considering how much income will be left for them to 
spend after paying increased taxes. So please carefully consider your household income 
before making a decision that would increase your taxes. 
 
Please also assume that corporations would pay their share of the tax increase as well.  
 
If you don't answer the questions as if you were making real decisions, our study results will 
be wrong.  Please help us measure your opinions correctly by answering the question as if it 
were a real decision.  
 
[Federal] 
Please think carefully about how you would want your representative to vote because 
the results of this survey will be shared with national media and are expected to 
influence public policy discussions in the US. 
 
[State] 
Please think carefully about how you would want your representative to vote because 
the results of this survey will be shared with state media and are expected to 
influence public policy discussions in [STATE]. 
 
Your opinion matters to us! 
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[FEDERAL] 
 
10. If the Congress approved the new intensive early childhood development program, the 
program would be paid for by increasing federal taxes. Suppose that the increased taxes 
your household and households like yours would have to pay for the new intensive 
early-childhood development programs would be $[bid] per year. How would you want 
your representative to vote? 
 
Please also remember that an increase in your taxes means you have to reduce 
spending on other items in your budget.   
 
[Federal – Scope 1] 
 For Congress moving the poor children under 6 who are currently in an 
existing government program like Head Start into the new intensive early-
childhood development program and FOR increasing taxes for my household 
and other households like mine by $[bid] per year; or 
 
 Against Congress moving poor children under 6 who are currently in an 
existing government program like Head Start into the new intensive early-
childhood development program; and AGAINST increasing taxes for my 
household and other households like mine by $[bid] per year. 
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[Federal – Scope 2] 
 For Congress enrolling almost all (90%) children living in poverty under the 
age of 6, including all the children now in programs like Head Start, in the 
new intensive early-childhood development programs, and FOR increasing 
taxes for my household and other households like mine by $[bid] per year; or 
 
 Against Congress enrolling almost all (90%) children living in poverty under 
the age of 6, including all the children now in programs like Head Start, in the 
new intensive early-childhood development programs, and AGAINST 
increasing taxes for my household and other households like mine by $[bid] 
per year. 
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[STATE VERSION] 
 
11. If the state legislature approved the new intensive early childhood development program, 
the program would be paid for by increasing state taxes. Suppose that the increased 
taxes your household and households like yours would have to pay for the new 
intensive early-childhood development programs would be $[bid] per year. How would 
you want your representative to vote? 
 
Please also remember that an increase in your taxes means you have to reduce 
spending on other items in your budget.   
 
[State - Scope 1] 
 For the state legislature moving the poor children under 6 who are currently 
in an existing government program like Head Start in [STATE] into the new 
intensive early-childhood development program and FOR increasing state 
taxes for my household and other households like mine by $[bid] per year; or 
 
 Against the state legislature moving the poor children under 6 who are 
currently in an existing government program like Head Start in [STATE] into 
the new intensive early-childhood development program and AGAINST 
increasing state taxes for my household and other households like mine by 
$[bid] per year. 
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[State - Scope 2] 
 For the state legislature enrolling almost all (90%) children living in poverty 
under the age of 6 in [STATE], including the children now in programs like 
Head Start, in the new intensive early-childhood development programs, and 
FOR increasing state taxes for my household and other households like mine 
by $[bid] per year; or 
 
 Against the state legislature enrolling almost all (90%) children living in 
poverty under the age of 6 in [STATE], including the children now in 
programs like Head Start, in the new intensive early-childhood development 
programs, and AGAINST increasing state taxes for my household and other 
households like mine by $[bid] per year. 
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[IF VOTED YES] 
 
12. How certain are you that you would want your representative to vote in favor of 
increased taxes for households like yours to fund the new intensive early-childhood 
development program? 
 
         -2            -1                        0                       +1                  +2    
     Very Uncertain    Uncertain        Not sure           Certain            Very certain 
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[IF VOTED YES] 
 
13. What are the most important and least important reasons that you said you would 
want your representative vote in support of funding the new intensive early-childhood 
development program?  
MOST 
Important  
(Please check 
ONE) 
Reasons 
LEAST 
Important  
(Please check 
ONE) 
 
I want to stop the cycle of parents passing on a 
culture of poverty to their children 
 
 The future of the economy depends on a well-
trained labor force 
 
 It is possible that members of my family will be 
poor in the future and will need these programs 
 
 I want to improve the lives of poor children as 
soon as possible 
 
 Members of my family can benefit from these 
programs 
 
 These programs will reduce crime rates which 
affect us all 
 
 Paying for these programs now will mean lower 
taxes for me in the future because fewer people 
will be in prisons and more people will be paying 
taxes 
 
 Other   
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[IF VOTED NO] 
14. What are the most important and least important reasons that you said you would 
want your representative to vote against funding the new intensive early-childhood 
development program?  
MOST 
Important  
(Please check 
ONE) 
Reasons 
LEAST 
Important  
(Please check 
ONE) 
 
There are more important priorities for my tax 
dollars 
 
 I am against any new taxes  
 I cannot afford the tax increase  
 
I think other government programs should be 
reduced to pay for programs to reduce childhood 
poverty 
 
 
I do not think the new early childhood 
development program would help reducing 
childhood poverty in the [if fed=1:US; if fed=2: 
state]. 
 
 
I do not think the new early childhood 
development program is any better than the 
current early childhood programs like Head Start 
 
 
I do not think it is government’s job to fund these 
programs 
 
 
I do not think the government should be involved 
with the care of very young children; this is the 
family’s responsibility. 
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The government should first fix the ineffective 
current programs like Head Start before investing 
in more children [show if scope=2] 
 
 Other  
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[FEDERAL] 
 
15. Now please think about other people like you who pay federal income taxes every year. 
What percent of these people do you think would want their representative in Congress 
to vote FOR and AGAINST the new intensive early-childhood development program if 
their taxes will be increased by $[bid] per year? 
 
 Percent vote  
FOR _____% 
AGAINST _____% 
 
 
100 % 
[STATE] 
 
16. Now please think about other people like you who pay state taxes every year in 
[STATE]. What percent of these people do you think would want their state 
representative to vote FOR and AGAINST the new intensive early-childhood 
development program in [STATE] if their state taxes will be increased by $[bid] per year? 
 
 Percent vote  
FOR _____% 
AGAINST _____% 
 
 
100 % 
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[IF VOTED NO] 
[Federal – Scope 1] 
17. Do you think you would still want your representative to vote NO if the increased taxes of 
$[bid] could provide sufficient funds to not only change the existing programs like Head 
Start into the new intensive early-childhood development programs studied by Prof. 
Heckman, but also to enroll almost all (90%) children living in poverty under the age of 6 
in the United States in the new intensive early-childhood development programs? 
Remember that about 1 million children under 6 years of age are in existing programs 
(This is about 18% of the children in the USA who live in poverty). 
 I would still want my representative to vote NO even if almost all children 
living in poverty could be included. 
 If almost all children living in poverty under the age of 6 could be included in 
the new intensive early-childhood development programs, I would want my 
representative to vote YES and I would agree to pay $[bid] per year. 
 Don’t know/ Not sure  
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[IF VOTED YES] 
[Federal – Scope 2] 
 
18. Do you think you would still want your representative to vote YES if the  increased taxes 
of $[bid] per year for households like yours would only provide sufficient funds to change 
the existing programs into the new intensive early-childhood development programs 
studied by Prof. Heckman, but not enroll any additional children? Remember that about 
1 million children under 6 years of age are in existing programs. (This is about 18% of 
the children in the USA who live in poverty).  
 I would still want my representative to vote YES. 
 If only 18% of the children in poverty – those who are now in the existing 
government programs like Head Start  - were included in the new intensive 
early-childhood development programs, I would not agree to  pay $[bid] per 
year. 
 Don’t know/ Not sure  
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[IF VOTED NO] 
[State – Scope 1] 
 
19. Do you think you would still want your state representative to vote NO if the increased 
state taxes of $[bid] per year for households like years could provide sufficient funds to 
not only change the existing programs like Head Start into the new intensive early-
childhood development programs studied by Prof. Heckman, but also to enroll almost all 
(90%) children living in poverty under the age of 6 in [STATE] in the new intensive 
early-childhood development programs?  
 I would still want my representative to vote NO even if almost all poor children 
in [STATE] could be included. 
 If almost all children living in poverty under the age of 6 in [STATE] could be 
included in the new intensive early-childhood development programs, I would 
want my representative to vote YES and I would agree to pay $[bid] per year. 
 Don’t know/ Not sure  
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[IF VOTED YES] 
[State – Scope 2] 
 
20. Do you think you would still want your state representative to vote YES if the increased 
taxes of $[bid] per year for households like yours would only provide sufficient funds to 
change the existing programs in [STATE]  into the new intensive early-childhood 
development programs studied by Prof. Heckman, but not enroll any additional children? 
Remember that nationally about 1 million children under 6 years of age are enrolled in 
existing programs (This is about 18% of the children in the USA who live in poverty). 
That’s probably a pretty good estimate of the percentage of children living in poverty that 
are enrolled in the existing programs in [STATE]. 
 I would still want my representative to vote YES. 
 If only the children in the existing government programs like Head Start were 
included in the new intensive early-childhood development programs, I would 
not agree to pay $[bid] per year. 
 Don’t know/ Not sure 
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[ALL Versions] 
 
21. Between the first time you logged off of the survey (the end of the first session) and 
when you logged on to complete the survey today, which of the following did you do?: 
[Please check all that apply.]  
 I thought about whether I would be willing to  pay increased taxes for 
funding the new intensive early-childhood development program 
 I discussed whether I would be willing to pay increased taxes  for funding 
the new intensive early-childhood development program with someone 
else. 
 I read some additional information about early childhood intervention 
programs 
 I read additional information about the current government programs such 
as Head Start 
 I did not think about this survey at all. 
 
[NUMBER BOX 0-999] 
[SHOW IF Q21=1,2,3,4] 
 
22. About how much time did you spend thinking and/or discussing about the early 
childhood development programs? 
Total number of minutes: ____________ 
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[IF Q21=2] 
 
23. [IF YES TO DISCUSSED] Whom did you talk to? Please check all that apply. 
 My spouse/partner 
 My children 
 My parents 
 My friends 
 Others (please specify) _______________________ 
 
 
 [IF Q21=3,4] 
24.  [IF YES TO READ]  Where did you find the information you read? Please check all 
that apply. 
 Websites/Internet 
 Books 
 Newspapers or magazines 
 Brochures or pamphlets 
 Other (please specify) : _____________________ 
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Now we will ask you some questions to learn your opinion about the current state of 
things in the US. 
 
25. Some people in the United States have better jobs and higher incomes than others. The 
table below lists some of possible reasons for these differences in people’s incomes and 
jobs. Using a 1–5 scale, where ‘1’ means not at all important and ‘5’ means extremely 
important, please tell us how important each reason is for why some people have better 
jobs and higher incomes than others.  
 Not at all 
important 
   
Extremely 
important 
A. Willingness to take risks 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
B. Money inherited from 
families 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
C. Hard work and initiative    1________2_______3_______4________5 
D. Ability or talent that a person 
is born with 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
E. Taking advantage of others 
to get ahead 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
F. Good luck, being in the right 
place at the right time 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
G. Physical appearance and 
good looks 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
H. Connections and knowing 
the right people 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
I. Being a member of a 
particular race or ethnic 
group 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
J. Getting the right education or 
training 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
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K. A person’s gender, that is 
whether they are male or 
female 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
 
 
 
26. In your opinion, do most poor people in the US have a chance of escaping from poverty, 
or is there very little chance of escaping? 
 
1_____________2_____________3_____________4_____________5 
Very little 
chance of 
escaping 
   Very high  
chance of 
escaping 
 
 
 
27. Do you agree or disagree with the statement: 
“The way things are in America right now, people like me and my family have a good 
chance of improving our standard of living over the next ten years.”  
1____________2____________3____________4____________5 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Strongly 
agree 
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28. Which of the following groups do you think should have the greatest responsibility and 
the least responsibility for helping the poor? 
 
GREATEST 
responsibility 
(Please check 
ONE) 
 LEAST 
responsibility 
(Please check 
ONE) 
o Churches o 
o Private charities 
(community service 
organizations) 
o 
o Federal government o 
o State/local 
government 
o 
o Families and relatives 
of poor people  
o 
o Poor themselves o 
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29. Do you feel you are asked to pay more than you should in federal income taxes, about 
the right amount, or less than you should? What about poor people? What about rich 
people? 
 
A. My household  I am paying more than I should 
 I am paying about the right amount 
 I am paying less than I should 
 Don’t know/ Not sure 
 
B. Poor people  They are paying more than they should 
 They are paying about the right amount 
 They are paying less than they should 
 Don’t know/ Not sure 
 
C. Rich people  They are paying more than they should 
 They are paying about the right amount 
 They are paying less than they should 
 Don’t know/ Not sure 
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30. Do you think the government should make it more difficult for people to buy a hand gun 
than it is now, make it easier for people to buy a hand gun, or keep these rules about the 
same as they are now? 
 More difficult  
 Make it easier  
 Keep these rules about the same   
 Don’t know/ Not Sure 
 
31. Please check the opinion about abortion on the list below that best agrees with your 
view.  
 By law, abortion should never be permitted.  
 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the 
woman’s life is in danger.  
 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of 
personal choice.  
 Don’t know/ Not Sure 
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32. Here is a list of the political views that people might hold. Which one describes your 
political views the best?  
 Extremely liberal 
 Liberal 
 Slightly liberal  
 Moderate; middle of the road  
 Slightly conservative  
 Conservative  
 Extremely Conservative  
 Libertarian 
 
This is the end of the survey. Thank you very much for your participation.  
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APPENDIX B 
BUDGET SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
SOCIAL SURVEY 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. We are going to ask you questions 
about your thoughts on some social issues. There are no right or wrong answers to the 
questions in this survey. We really want to know what you think. 
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[CONSENT SCREEN 1] 
 
Study Purpose  
You are one of about 1500 people in the United States who are being asked to take this 
survey to help us understand opinions on social issues. 
 
Study Duration  
This survey has two parts. It will take about 10-15 minutes to complete the first part. You 
cannot start the second part of the survey until at least 24 hours after you have completed 
the first part. You must finish the second part within 10 days of starting the first part. The 
survey will take about 30 minutes to complete in total.  
 
 
Study Details 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) is doing this study for a foundation. 
UNC has contracted with Knowledge Networks (KN) to collect data. If you have questions 
about this survey, please contact Panel Relations at 800-782-6899 and someone will direct 
your questions to the appropriate person at UNC. 
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[CONSENT SCREEN 2] 
 
Possible Risks or Discomforts  
If any questions make you uncomfortable, you do not need to answer them.  
 
KN will protect your responses under its Privacy Policy. UNC will receive your survey 
responses without any personal identifiers. UNC also will make every effort to protect your 
responses. There is a potential risk of disclosure of the survey data, but the data could not 
be directly tied to you. 
 
Benefits 
There are no direct benefits to you from participating in this study. However, your responses 
are very important to us.  
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[CONSENT SCREEN 3] 
 
Confidentiality 
Many steps have been taken to protect your information. KN will report only your responses 
to UNC, not your name. If the results of this study are presented at scientific meetings or 
published in scientific journals, no information will be included that could identify you or your 
responses personally. 
 
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at UNC has reviewed this research. An IRB is a group 
of people who make sure that the rights of participants in research are protected. The IRB 
may check records of your activity in this research to see if proper procedures were 
followed. 
 
Your Rights  
Your decision to take part in this research study is completely voluntary.  You can refuse to 
answer any question or stop at any point after you begin the survey and still receive your KN 
points for participating in the survey. 
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[PROMPT IF SKIP] 
[CONSENT SCREEN 4] 
 
If you have read the previous screens and agree to participate, please click the Yes 
button, if not, click the No button. 
 
 Yes, I agree to participate. 
 No, I do not agree to participate.  
 
 
 [IF CONSENT= NO OR SKIP] 
 
Thank you for your consideration.  You have exited the survey.  
 
 
 231 
 
CREATE DOV FED: 
1=FEDERAL  
2=STATE 
RANDOMLY ASSIGN RESPONDENTS TO EITHER GROUP 
 
 
 [ASK THESE QUESTIONS TO RESPONDENTS WITH < 25,000 HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE UP TO 4; OR FOR RESPONDENTS WITH <50,000 HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE MORE THAN 4] 
 
We will now ask you some questions on your household taxes. 
 
S3. Did your household receive earned income tax credits when you filed your taxes last 
year? 
 Yes  
 No  
 Not sure/Don’t know  
 
 [IF S3=3 OR REFUSED] 
 
S4. Did someone other than a household member (including professional assistance) help 
your household to fill in your federal income taxes last year? 
 Yes  
 No  
 
[IF (S3=1 OR S4=1) AND FED=1, GROUP=1 =CREDIT RECEIVER. 
ELSE GROUP=2 = TAX PAYER.] 
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[PROMPT IF SKIP] 
 
1.  
A. Here is a list of problems you may be concerned about.  What do you think is the 
most important and least important concern for the country among the items listed 
below?  
 
[SHOW ITEMS NOT SELECTED IN Q1A] 
 
B. Of the remaining concerns, what do you think is the most important and least 
important concern for the country among the items listed below? 
 
MOST 
Important  
(Please check ONE) 
 
LEAST 
Important 
(Please check ONE) 
 
Crime 
 
 
Education 
 
 
Energy 
 
 
Environment 
 
 
Federal budget deficit 
 
 
Health care 
 
 
Homeland Security 
 
 
Housing 
 
 
Illegal Immigration 
 
 
Poverty 
 
 
Unemployment 
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CREATE DOV VERSION: 1-4 
RANDOMLY ASSIGN RESPONDENTS TO ONE OF FOUR VERSIONS. 
 
HOW DO YOU THINK WE SHOULD DIVIDE UP BUDGETS? 
Recently both the US Congress and state legislatures have been debating government 
budgets, trying to decide which government programs to cut, which ones to increase, and 
whether to reduce taxes or increase taxes.  
 
In this survey we are going to ask you some questions about what you think the government 
should do about budgets and taxes for three government programs:  
[Version =1] 
 An intensive early-childhood development program for children in poverty 
 A food-safety monitoring program 
 A job-training program 
[Version =2] 
 A disaster-relief program 
 An intensive early-childhood development program for children in poverty 
 A food-safety monitoring program 
[Version =3] 
 A job-training program 
 A disaster-relief program 
 An intensive early-childhood development program for children in poverty 
[Version =4] 
 A food-safety monitoring program 
 A job-training program 
 A disaster-relief program 
 
Suppose the US Congress is going to vote on how federal spending should be divided 
between these three programs. Suppose also that your Congressman sent you a letter 
asking you how you think he or she should vote on this matter. We want to know whether 
you think spending for each program should be cut, held at its current level, or increased.   
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Decisions about spending affect results of the programs. We will explain how spending 
changes could affect the results of these three particular programs.  
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SHOW THE THREE SOCIAL PROGRAMS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR EACH VERSION. 
 
[Version =1] 
 An intensive early-childhood development program for children in poverty 
 A food-safety monitoring program 
 A job-training program 
 
[Version =2] 
 A disaster-relief program 
 An intensive early-childhood development program for children in poverty 
 A food-safety monitoring program 
 
[Version =3] 
 A job-training program 
 A disaster-relief program 
 An intensive early-childhood development program for children in poverty 
 
[Version =4] 
 A food-safety monitoring program 
 A job-training program 
 A disaster-relief program 
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An Intensive Early-Childhood Development Program 
There are 6 million children under 6 years old living in poverty (having an annual income of 
less than $27,000 for a household with 5 members) in the US. That is one in four children 
(25%).  Children living in poverty are more likely to drop out of high school, be unemployed, 
commit crime and become teen parents. These children are very likely to be poor as adults 
as well. New research shows that the best way to break the cycle of poverty-- and make 
sure poor children move out of poverty by the time they are adults-- is to enroll them in 
intensive childhood development programs when they are very young (0-5 years old). Once 
children fall behind, it is very hard for them to catch up when they are older (6-12 years old) 
or teenagers. 
 
New intensive early-childhood development programs provide high-quality care and 
schooling for babies and young children in poor families until they enter kindergarten. These 
programs include: 
 Educational activities that involve thinking, social, and emotional skills, 
 Activities that focus on language development, 
 Adult-child interactions, including talking, showing toys and pictures, and reading 
to babies, and 
 On-site health care and nutrition (such as school lunches). 
 
About 1.1 million children under the age of 6 currently participate in the standard early 
childhood programs. If the existing government programs such as Head Start were changed 
to work like these new intensive early-childhood development programs, then current 
government funding would be enough for only about 430,000 children (7% of the children 
under 6 currently living in poverty). 
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2. What has been your own experience with poverty? (Please check all that apply) 
 I am not poor now and have never lived in poverty. 
 I grew up in a family in poverty, and my family is still poor. 
 I have been poor in the past, but am not poor now. 
 I was not poor in the past, but am poor now. 
 Members of my family have experienced poverty, but I have not. 
 Families in my neighborhood have experienced poverty. 
 I am not poor now, but I feel like I could easily fall into poverty. I live paycheck 
to paycheck. 
 None of the above. [If chose this option, cannot choose the above 
options.] 
 
3. Has one of your children or a family member’s children participated in any government 
early-childhood programs? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don’t know/Not sure 
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Suppose that all existing early-childhood programs are turned into new intensive early-
childhood development programs. 
 
More spending for these new intensive early-childhood development programs means that 
more children in poverty can participate in such programs. 
 
Less spending for these new intensive early-childhood development programs means that 
fewer children in poverty can participate in such programs.  
 
Questions later in this survey will ask you to think about budget changes that would affect 
the number of children who can participate in these new intensive early-childhood 
development programs instead of the existing government programs. 
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A Food-Safety Monitoring Program 
People can get food poisoning from bad food or drinks. Food poisoning is quite common. It 
is usually mild, but sometimes causes fatal illness. Food poisoning especially can be 
dangerous for children, elderly, sick people, and pregnant women. Typical symptoms 
include nausea, vomiting, stomach pain, and diarrhea. In severe cases, food poisoning can 
lead to brain damage and even death. In the US, food poisoning causes about 50 million 
illnesses, 130,000 hospitalizations, and up to 3,000 deaths each year. Recent cases of 
wide-spread food poisoning have been caused by tainted peanut butter, ground beef, 
chicken, eggs, milk, spinach, lettuce and cantaloupes. 
 
Food-safety inspectors check both domestic and imported food. These programs: 
 Regulate safety and labeling of domestic and imported food;  
 Inspect food facilities such as warehouses, manufacturers and shippers;  
  Prohibit food processing plants from importing crops into the US if their products 
are found to be unhealthy; and 
 Examine animals destined for human food before and after slaughter, and check 
that plants are operating in a sanitary manner. 
 
Food-safety programs cannot possibly check everything. Instead, these programs focus 
largely on high-risk food, such as meat, poultry and egg products and on facilities that are 
more likely to have problems.    
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4. Within the last 5 years, have you or someone in your household had food poisoning? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not sure 
 
5. How likely do you think is your chance of getting food poisoning sometime during the 
next 12 months?  
 Not likely at all  
 Somewhat unlikely 
 Neutral 
 Somewhat likely 
 Very likely 
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More spending for food-safety programs would mean more spending for food inspections, 
and reduced chances that contaminated food would reach consumers.  
 
Less spending for food-safety programs would mean more cases of food poisoning. 
 
Questions later in this survey will ask you to think about budget changes that would affect 
the number of food poisoning cases. 
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A Job-Training Program  
Currently 13 million people are unemployed in the US, and 8 million people are employed 
part-time, because they were unable to find a full-time job. Also, an estimated 2.5 million 
additional people have given up looking for work. About 6 million adults participated in 
government job training programs in 2010. The goal of these programs is to reduce the 
unemployment rate in the country and raise wages. 
 
Job-training programs particularly target people who are unemployed or have low-wage jobs 
because their skills do not match the jobs available.  These programs: 
 Train workers who are unemployed to improve their skills and to learn new skills;    
 Train workers with low-wage jobs to get jobs in industries that offer better wages 
and more job security; and 
 Help workers develop skills to succeed on the job and stay employed. 
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6. Have you or a member of your household lost a job within the last three years?  
 Yes [next question] 
 No [skip to next page] 
 
[IF Q6=YES] 
7.  [If YES to Q6] Have you or a family member participated in any government job-training 
program?  
 Yes [next question] 
 No [skip to next page] 
 
[IF Q7=YES] 
8.  [If YES to Q7] What kind of training did you or your family member receive? (Please 
check all that apply.) 
 Computer skills 
 Communication skills 
 Skills for green jobs 
 Management/Administrative skills 
 Sales skills 
 Job interview skills 
 Skills for operation of heavy equipment 
 Other ________________________________ 
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More spending for job-training programs means that more unemployed people can benefit 
from these programs.  
 
Less spending for job-training programs means that fewer unemployed people can benefit 
from these programs.  
 
Questions later in this survey will ask you to think about budget changes that would affect 
the number of people who can participate in these programs. 
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A Disaster-Relief Program  
In 2005 about 1.5 million people lost their homes after Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans 
and the Gulf Coast. About 275,000 people were sheltered right after the storm.  In 2010 
about 80 disasters that led to lost lives and property were declared in the US. If each 
household claimed the $13,000 maximum amount allowed for property damage, the current 
level of funding for government disaster-relief programs could assist about 180,000 
households per year.   
 
Disaster-relief programs help people affected by hurricanes, tornados, floods, earthquakes, 
fires, and acts of terrorism. These programs: 
 Train full-time and volunteer personal on emergency management; 
 Coordinate response efforts with communities, and nongovernmental 
organizations; 
 Provide relief shelters, temporary housing, and permanent housing for 
survivors of disasters; and 
 Provide financial help to people who lose their homes and property. 
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9. Have you, a relative, or friend ever had to stay in a relief shelter or temporary housing, or 
received help  because of a disaster, such as tornado, earthquake, hurricane, or flood?  
 Yes 
 No 
 
10. In your opinion, how likely is it that a large natural disaster would affect  your area in the 
next ten years?  
 Not likely at all  
 Somewhat unlikely 
 Neutral 
 Somewhat likely 
 Very likely 
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More spending will increase the number of households who can be provided with financial 
help for their damaged property after a disaster.   
 
Less spending will decrease the number of households who can be helped for their 
damaged property after a disaster.  
 
Questions later in this survey will ask you to think about budget changes that would affect 
the number of households that can be helped for their damaged property based on the 
maximum amount that is allowed per household. 
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[IF GROUP=2] 
[TAX VERSION] 
 
Effects on Household Taxes  
 
[IF VERSION=1] 
Every year the taxes of your household and households like yours pay for these three 
government programs (early-childhood, food-safety, and job-training programs). 
 
[IF VERSION=2] 
Every year the taxes of your household and households like yours pay for these three 
government programs (disaster-relief, early-childhood, and food-safety programs). 
 
[IF VERSION=3] 
Every year the taxes of your household and households like yours pay for these three 
government programs (job-training, disaster-relief, and early-childhood programs). 
 
[IF VERSION=4] 
Every year the taxes of your household and households like yours pay for these three 
government programs (food-safety, job-training, and disaster-relief programs). 
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[TAX VERSION] 
 If total government spending increases, assume that the taxes for your household 
and households like yours would have to increase, and tax credits some low-income 
households receive would have to decrease. 
 To keep the taxes and tax credits the same, assume that an increase in spending for 
one program would require a decrease in spending for another program. 
 If total spending for these government programs is cut, assume that the taxes for 
your household and households like yours would decrease, and tax credits some 
low-income households receive would increase. 
 
Questions later in this survey will ask you to think about budget changes that would affect 
the amount of taxes your household and households like yours pay for these social 
programs.  
 
For example, suppose that your household currently pays $1,000 per year in taxes.  Later in 
the survey we may ask you to assume that your household pays $2,000 less per year in 
taxes. In this case, we want you to assume that your household would receive the difference 
back ($1,000) as a tax refund check from the government. 
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[IF GROUP=1] 
[CREDIT VERSION] 
 
Effects on Household Tax Credits  
 
[IF VERSION=1] 
Every year the government receives pay for these three government programs (early-
childhood, food-safety, and job-training programs). 
 
[IF VERSION=2] 
Every year the government receives pay for these three government programs (disaster-
relief, early-childhood, and food-safety programs). 
 
[IF VERSION=3] 
Every year the government receives pay for these three government programs (job-training, 
disaster-relief, and early-childhood programs). 
 
[IF VERSION=4] 
Every year the government receives pay for these three government programs (food-safety, 
job-training, and disaster-relief programs). 
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[CREDIT VERSION] 
 
 If total government spending increases, assume that the tax credits your household 
and households like yours receive would have to decrease, and taxes other 
households pay would have to increase. 
 To keep the tax credits and taxes the same, assume that an increase in spending for 
one program would require a decrease in spending for another program. 
 If total spending for these government programs is cut, assume that the tax credits 
your household and households like yours receive would increase, and taxes other 
households pay would decrease. 
 
Questions later in this survey will ask you to think about budget changes that would affect 
the amount of tax credits your household and households like yours receive.  
 
For example, suppose that your household currently receives $1,000 per year in tax credits.  
Later in the survey we may ask you to assume that your household receives $2,000 less per 
year in tax credits. In this case, we want you to assume that your household would pay the 
difference ($1,000) as taxes.  
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[ALL VERSIONS] 
Remember that we want you to suppose that your Congressman sent you a letter asking 
you how he or she should vote on how federal spending should be divided between the 
three programs.  
 
Later in the survey, we will ask you to compare two possible budget alternatives. Each 
alternative shows the effect on program results and [if group=1: tax credits/if group=2: taxes] 
if spending on these programs changes.   For each question, we need you to tell us which 
alternative (A or B) you would want your Congressman to vote for if these were the only 
alternatives available.  We will show you an example of a choice question in the next 
screen. 
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[FOR ALL EXAMPLE TABLES AND CONJOINT TABLES, RANDOMIZE THE ORDER OF THE 
ATTRIBUTES, BUT KEEP ONE ORDER THROUGOUT PER RESPONDENT] 
 
[TAX VERSION] 
When you make your decision about which alternative (A or B) to choose, consider carefully 
the effect on your household taxes presented in each alternative. For example, in the 
sample question below, consider the two budget alternatives A and B. 
[Version =1] 
EXAMPLE QUESTION 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Intensive early-childhood 
development program  
 25% worse:       
320,000 children can 
participate 
 No change:              
430,000 children can 
participate 
Food-safety monitoring 
program 
 No change:               
130,000 severe food 
poisoning cases  
No change:               
130,000 severe food 
poisoning cases 
Job-training program 
 No change:                  
6 million people can 
participate 
No change:                 
6 million people can 
participate 
Effects on household 
taxes  
 You pay $1,000 less 
per year ($80 less per 
month) in taxes than 
now 
 No change:          
Same amount of taxes 
as now 
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[Version =2] 
EXAMPLE QUESTION 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Disaster-relief program 
 No change:          
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
 No change:           
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
Intensive early-childhood 
development program  
 25% worse:       
320,000 children can 
participate 
 No change:              
430,000 children can 
participate 
Food-safety monitoring 
program 
 No change:               
130,000 severe food 
poisoning cases  
No change:               
130,000 severe food 
poisoning cases 
Effects on household 
taxes  
 You pay $1,000 less 
per year ($80 less per 
month) in taxes than 
now 
 No change:          
Same amount of taxes 
as now 
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[Version =3] 
EXAMPLE QUESTION 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Job-training program 
 No change:                  
6 million people can 
participate 
No change:                 
6 million people can 
participate 
Disaster-relief program 
 No change:          
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
 No change:           
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
Intensive early-childhood 
development program  
 25% worse:       
320,000 children can 
participate 
 No change:              
430,000 children can 
participate 
Effects on household 
taxes  
 You pay $1,000 less 
per year ($80 less per 
month) in taxes than 
now 
 No change:          
Same amount of taxes 
as now 
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[Version =4] 
EXAMPLE QUESTION 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Food-safety monitoring 
program 
 No change:               
130,000 severe food 
poisoning cases  
No change:               
130,000 severe food 
poisoning cases 
Job-training program 
 25% worse:                
4.5 million people can 
participate 
No change:                 
6 million people can 
participate 
Disaster-relief program 
 No change:          
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
 No change:           
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
Effects on household 
taxes  
 You pay $1,000 less 
per year ($80 less per 
month) in taxes than 
now 
 No change:          
Same amount of taxes 
as now 
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[TAX version – V1, V2, V3] 
In this example, 
- Alternative A would cut the spending on the early-childhood program, and you would 
pay $1,000 less per year in taxes than now. This corresponds to $80 less per month 
in taxes. However, because of the cut on the program, instead of 430,000 children, 
about 320,000 children can participate in the program, and the rest of the children 
would not be able to participate in any government early-childhood programs. 
 
- Alternative B would not change the current spending on these programs, so you 
would pay the same amount of taxes as you pay now. The program results would 
remain the same as well.   
 
 
[TAX version – V4] 
In this example, 
- Alternative A would cut the spending on the job-training program, and you would pay 
$1,000 less per year in taxes than now. This corresponds to $80 less per month in 
taxes. However, because of the cut on the program, instead of 6 million people, 
about 4.5 million people can participate in the program, and the rest would not be 
able to participate in any government job-training programs. 
 
- Alternative B would not change the current spending on these programs, so you 
would pay the same amount of taxes as you pay now. The program results would 
remain the same as well.   
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[CREDIT VERSION] 
 
When you make your decision about which alternative (A or B) to choose, consider carefully 
the effect on your household tax credits presented in each alternative. For example, in the 
sample question below, consider the two budget alternatives A and B. 
[Version =1] 
EXAMPLE QUESTION 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Intensive early-childhood 
development program  
 25% worse:       
320,000 children can 
participate 
 No change:              
430,000 children can 
participate 
Food-safety monitoring 
program 
 No change:               
130,000 severe food 
poisoning cases  
No change:               
130,000 severe food 
poisoning cases 
Job-training program 
 No change:                  
6 million people can 
participate 
No change:                 
6 million people can 
participate 
Effects on household tax 
credits 
 You receive $1,000 
more per year ($80 
more per month) in tax 
credits than now 
 No change:          
Same amount of tax 
credits as now 
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[Version =2] 
EXAMPLE QUESTION 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Disaster-relief program 
 No change:          
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
 No change:           
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
Intensive early-childhood 
development program  
 25% worse:       
320,000 children can 
participate 
 No change:              
430,000 children can 
participate 
Food-safety monitoring 
program 
 No change:               
130,000 severe food 
poisoning cases  
No change:               
130,000 severe food 
poisoning cases 
Effects on household tax 
credits 
 You receive $1,000 
more per year ($80 
more per month) in tax 
credits than now 
 No change:          
Same amount of tax 
credits as now 
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[Version =3] 
EXAMPLE QUESTION 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Job-training program 
 No change:                  
6 million people can 
participate 
No change:                 
6 million people can 
participate 
Disaster-relief program 
 No change:          
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
 No change:           
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
Intensive early-childhood 
development program  
 25% worse:       
320,000 children can 
participate 
 No change:              
430,000 children can 
participate 
Effects on household tax 
credits 
 You receive $1,000 
more per year ($80 
more per month) in tax 
credits than now 
 No change:          
Same amount of tax 
credits as now 
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[Version =4] 
EXAMPLE QUESTION 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
Food-safety monitoring 
program 
 No change:               
130,000 severe food 
poisoning cases  
No change:               
130,000 severe food 
poisoning cases 
Job-training program 
 25% worse:                
4.5 million people can 
participate 
No change:                 
6 million people can 
participate 
Disaster-relief program 
 No change:          
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
 No change:           
180,000 households 
can be assisted 
Effects on household tax 
credits 
 You receive $1,000 
more per year ($80 
more per month) in tax 
credits than now 
 No change:          
Same amount of tax 
credits as now 
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[CREDIT version – V1, V2, V3] 
In this example, 
- Alternative A would cut the spending on the early-childhood program, and you would 
receive $1,000 more per year in tax credits than now. This corresponds to $80 more 
per month in tax credits. However, because of the cut on the program, instead of 
430,000 children, about 320,000 children can participate in the program, and the rest 
of the children would not be able to participate in any government early-childhood 
programs. 
 
- Alternative B would not change the current spending on these programs, so you 
would receive the same amount of tax credits as you receive now. The program 
results would remain the same as well.   
 
 
[CREDIT version – V4] 
In this example, 
- Alternative A would cut the spending on the job-training program, and you would 
receive $1,000 more per year in tax credits than now. This corresponds to $80 more 
per month in tax credits. However, because of the cut on the program, instead of 6 
million people, about 4.5 million people can participate in the program, and the rest 
would not be able to participate in any job-training programs. 
 
- Alternative B would not change the current spending on these programs, so you 
would receive the same amount of tax credits as you receive now. The program 
results would remain the same as well.   
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Now we’d like you to look at the budget-choice questions. We do not want you to answer 
these questions at this time. We would like to give you some time to think about your 
preferences for choosing between two budget alternatives with different levels of [if group=1: 
tax credits/if group=2: taxes] and different program results for the [Version =1: new intensive 
early childhood development program, food-monitoring program and job-training program] / 
[Version =2: disaster-relief program, new intensive early childhood development program 
and food-monitoring program] / [Version =3: job-training program, disaster-relief program 
and new intensive early-childhood development program] / [Version =4: food-safety 
program, job-training program and disaster-relief program]..  
 
We will ask you to answer these questions when you return to the survey next time. You 
may want to discuss these questions with other people to help you decide how to answer.  
Please feel free to do that.  
 
We are interested in how you feel about these choices for your own family.  There are no 
right or wrong answers.   
 
Please assume that enough people would agree with you and that Congress would 
follow your recommendation about keeping or changing spending on these 
programs. 
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[PLEASE SEE EXCEL DESIGN FILE FOR CONJOINT DESIGN] 
[CREATE DOV BLOCK: 1-14] 
[USE SAME BLOCK NUMBER FOR BEFORE AND AFTER TIME TO THINK CONJOINT TABLES] 
[RANDOMIZE SETS. RECORD ORDER] 
[SET ORDER DIFFERS BEFORE AND AFTER TIME TO THINK] 
[DO NOT SHOW POLICY QUESTION IN THE FIRST PART] 
[PROGRAM SUCH THAT RESPONDENTS CANNOT ANSWER THE QUESTIONS] 
 
Please think about the following question. You will be asked to 
answer it later. 
If these were the only two alternatives, which one would you want your Congressman 
to vote for? 
 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
     
     
     
Effects on household and 
[if group=1: tax credits/if 
group=2: taxes] 
 
 
 
 
Which alternative would 
you like your 
Congressman to vote for? 
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[At the end of trade-off questions] 
We request that you return to the second part of this survey after 24 hours but before 10 
days from now (i.e., between [TIME, Pacific on DATE] Pacific time and [TIME, Pacific on 
DATE] Pacific time) to answer questions about your choice between two budget-
alternatives, and complete the rest of the questionnaire.  
 
We had one big problem in the past in this type of surveys. Some respondents did not return 
to the second part of the survey. This is a big problem for us since if someone does not 
return to the second part to complete the survey, we cannot use the information he or she 
provided in the first part, either. This means that the time these respondents spent on the 
first part was wasted. Please help our study by returning to complete the second part of the 
survey within the given time period. 
 
You will receive 5,000 points after you complete the second part of this survey. 
 
[CREATE DOV_TRANSTIME1: RECORD DATE AND TIME WHEN FIRST REACHED THE TRANSITION 
SCREEN ABOVE] 
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[SECOND PART OF THE SURVEY] 
 
Thank you for returning to finish this second part of the survey. 
 
In the next 8 [if version=4: 7] questions, we will ask you to compare two possible budget 
alternatives. Each alternative shows the effect on program results and [if group=1: tax 
credits/if group=2: taxes] if spending on these programs changes.   For each question, 
please tell us which alternative (A or B) you would want your Congressman to vote for if 
these were the only alternatives available.   
 
You may access to the information on the programs and taxes [/tax credits] by 
clicking <hyperlink>here</hyperlink>. 
 
Please assume that enough people would agree with you and that Congress would 
follow your recommendation about keeping or changing spending on these 
programs. 
 
Remember, we are interested in how you feel about these choices for your own family.  
There are no right or wrong answers.   
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Before you tell us how you want your Congressman to vote, we want you to help us with a 
problem we have had in studies like this one. You didn’t really receive a letter from your 
Congressional representative asking for your help in making a decision on budget priorities. 
But we are asking you to tell us what you would do if you had actually received a letter and 
your opinion really could change the way your Congressman votes.   
 
People sometimes find it hard to do this in our studies. They give different answers in a 
survey than they actually would do in a real situation. For example, you might not pay much 
attention to the benefits and costs of the budget choices in a survey because your opinions 
may never be communicated to your Congressman and are unlikely to change how he/she 
votes. If your Congressman really did ask you for your opinion, you might think harder about 
these budget choices and whether you would agree to [if group=1: receive lower tax credits / 
if group=2: pay more taxes]. 
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Please also consider your household income before making a decision. Some people tend 
to make a decision without considering how much income they will have to spend on living 
expenses after [if group=1:receiving lower tax credits / if group=2: paying increased taxes].   
 
Please also assume that corporations would be paying their share of the tax increase as 
well.  
 
If you don't answer the questions as if you were making real decisions, our study results will 
be wrong.  Please help us measure your opinions accurately by thinking about the questions 
as if they were real decisions before deciding which budget alternative (A or B) you would 
choose.  
 
Please think carefully about your choices because the results of this survey will likely 
be shared with national media and may influence public policy discussions in the US. 
 
Your opinion matters to us! 
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If these were the only two alternatives, which one would you want your Congressman 
to vote for? 
 
  Alternative A  Alternative B 
     
     
     
Effects on household 
taxes [tax credits] 
 
 
 
 
Which alternative would 
you like your 
Congressman to vote for? 
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[SHOW ONLY AFTER “POLICY” QUESTION IN THE DESIGN] 
[NUMER BOX 0-100] 
[AUTOMATICALLY UPDATE SUM] 
[DO NOT ALLOW TO PROCEED UNTIL SUM IS 100] 
[SHOW POLICY QUESTION AGAIN WITH ANSWERS SELECTED AND GREYED OUT] 
 
[TAX version] 
13. Now please think about other people like you who pay federal income taxes every year. 
What percent of these people do you think would vote for each budget-alternative in the 
question above? 
 Percent vote  
Alternative A _____% 
Alternative B _____% 
 
 
100 % 
 
[CREDIT version] 
Now please think about other people like you who receive federal income tax credits every 
year. What percent of these people do you think would vote for each budget-alternative in 
the question above? 
 Percent vote  
Alternative A _____% 
Alternative B _____% 
 
 
100 % 
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13. How well do you think the government programs described in this survey actually work in 
producing successful outcomes? 
 
[SHOW ONLY THE PROGRAMS THAT ARE RELEVANT TO THE VERSION] 
 
 Does not 
work at all 
   Works 
very 
well 
Don’t 
know 
The intensive early-childhood 
development program in 
helping children break out of 
poverty when they become 
adults 
      1_______2_______3_______4_______5  
The food-safety monitoring 
program in reducing cases of 
food poisoning 
      1_______2_______3_______4_______5  
The job-training programs 
helping unemployed people 
find jobs 
      1_______2_______3_______4_______5  
The disaster-relief program in 
assisting households for their 
damaged property 
      1_______2_______3_______4_______5  
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16. Between the first time I logged off of the survey (the end of the first session) and when I 
logged on to complete the survey today: 
 I thought about which social programs are important. 
 I discussed which social programs are important with someone else. 
 I read some additional information about [Version 1=early-childhood, food-
safety or job-training programs.] \ [Version 2 = disaster-relief, early-childhood 
intervention or job-training programs.] \ [Version 3 = food-safety, disaster-
relief or early-childhood intervention programs.] \ [Version 4 = job-training, 
food-safety or disaster-relief programs.] 
 I did not think about this survey at all 
 
[IF Q16=1,2,3] 
17. About how much time did you spend thinking and/or discussing about social programs? 
 
Total number of minutes: _______________ 
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[IF Q16=2] 
 
18.  [IF YES TO DISCUSSED] Whom did you talk to?  
 My spouse/partner 
 My children 
 My parents 
 My friends 
 Others (please specify) _______________________ 
 
 
[IF Q16=3] 
19.  [IF YES TO READ]  Where did you find the information you read? 
 Websites/internet 
 Books 
 Newspapers or magazines 
 Brochures or pamphlets 
 Other (please specify) : _____________________ 
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Now we will ask you some questions to learn your opinion about the current state of 
things in the US. 
 
20. Some people in the United States have better jobs and higher incomes than others. The 
table below lists some of the possible reasons for these differences in people’s incomes 
and jobs. Using a 1–5 scale, where ‘1’ means not at all important and ‘5’ means 
extremely important, please tell us how important each reason is for why some people 
have better jobs and higher incomes than others.  
 
 Not at all 
important 
   
Extremely 
important 
L. Willingness to take risks 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
M. Money inherited from 
families 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
N. Hard work and initiative    1________2_______3_______4________5 
O. Ability or talent that a person 
is born with 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
P. Taking advantage of others 
to get ahead 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
Q. Good luck, being in the right 
place at the right time 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
R. Physical appearance and 
good looks 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
S. Connections and knowing 
the right people 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
T. Being a member of a 
particular race or ethnic 
group 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
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U. Getting the right education or 
training 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
V. A person’s gender, that is 
whether they are male or 
female 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
 
 
21. In your opinion, do most poor people in the US have a chance of escaping from poverty, 
or is there very little chance of escaping? 
 
1____________2____________3____________4____________5 
Very little 
chance of 
escaping 
   Very high  
chance of 
 escaping 
 
 
22. Do you agree or disagree with the statement: “The way things are in America right now, 
people like me and my family has a good chance of improving our standard of living over 
the next ten years.” 
 
1____________2____________3____________4____________5 
Strongly 
disagree 
   Strongly 
agree 
 
 276 
 
23. Which of the following groups do you think should have the greatest responsibility and 
the least responsibility for helping the poor? 
 
GREATEST 
responsibility 
(Please check 
ONE) 
 LEAST 
responsibility 
(Please check 
ONE) 
o Churches o 
o Private charities 
(community service 
organizations) 
o 
o Federal government o 
o State/local 
government 
o 
o Families and relatives 
of poor people  
o 
o Poor themselves o 
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24. [TAX version] Do you feel you are asked to pay more than you should in federal taxes, 
about the right amount, or less than you should? What about poor people? What about 
rich people?  
 
[CREDIT version] Do you feel poor people are asked to pay more than they should in 
federal taxes, about the right amount, or less than they should? How about rich people? 
 
 
D. My household  I am paying more than I should 
 I am paying about the right amount 
 I am paying less than I should 
 Don’t know/Not sure 
 
E. Poor people  They are paying more than they should 
 They are paying about the right amount 
 They are paying less than they should 
 Don’t know/Not sure 
 
F. Rich people  They are paying more than they should 
 They are paying about the right amount 
 They are paying less than they should 
 Don’t know/Not sure 
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25. Do you think the government should make it more difficult for people to buy a hand gun 
than it is now, make it easier for people to buy a hand gun, or keep these rules about the 
same as they are now? 
 More difficult  
 Make it easier  
 Keep these rules about the same   
 Don’t know/ Not Sure 
 
26. Please check the opinion about abortion on the list below that best agrees with your 
view.  
 By law, abortion should never be permitted.  
 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the 
woman’s life is in danger.  
 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of 
personal choice.  
 Don’t know/ Not Sure 
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27. Here is a list of the political views that people might hold. Which one describes your 
political views the best?  
 Extremely liberal 
 Liberal 
 Slightly liberal  
 Moderate; middle of the road  
 Slightly conservative  
 Conservative  
 Extremely Conservative  
 Libertarian 
 
 
This is the end of the survey. Thank you very much for your participation. 
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APPENDIX C 
COUNTRY SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
SOCIAL SURVEY 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey. We are going to ask you questions 
about your thoughts on some social issues. There are no right or wrong answers to the 
questions in this survey. We really want to know what you think. 
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[CONSENT SCREEN 1] 
 
Study Purpose  
You are one of about 1500 people in the United States who are being asked to take this 
survey to help us understand opinions on social issues. 
 
Study Duration  
This survey has two parts. It will take about 10-15 minutes to complete the first part. You 
cannot start the second part of the survey until at least 24 hours after you have completed 
the first part. You must finish the second part within 10 days of starting the first part. The 
survey will take about 30 minutes to complete in total.  
 
 
Study Details 
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC) is doing this study for a foundation. 
UNC has contracted with Knowledge Networks (KN) to collect data. If you have questions 
about this survey, please contact Panel Relations at 800-782-6899 and someone will direct 
your questions to the appropriate person at UNC. 
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[CONSENT SCREEN 2] 
 
Possible Risks or Discomforts  
If any questions make you uncomfortable, you do not need to answer them.  
 
KN will protect your responses under its Privacy Policy. UNC will receive your survey 
responses without any personal identifiers. UNC also will make every effort to protect your 
responses. There is a potential risk of disclosure of the survey data, but the data could not 
be directly tied to you. 
 
Benefits 
There are no direct benefits to you from participating in this study. However, your responses 
are very important to us.  
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[CONSENT SCREEN 3] 
 
Confidentiality 
Many steps have been taken to protect your information. KN will report only your responses 
to UNC, not your name. If the results of this study are presented at scientific meetings or 
published in scientific journals, no information will be included that could identify you or your 
responses personally. 
 
The Institutional Review Board (IRB) at UNC has reviewed this research. An IRB is a group 
of people who make sure that the rights of participants in research are protected. The IRB 
may check records of your activity in this research to see if proper procedures were 
followed. 
 
Your Rights  
Your decision to take part in this research study is completely voluntary.  You can refuse to 
answer any question or stop at any point after you begin the survey and still receive your KN 
points for participating in the survey. 
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[PROMPT IF SKIP] 
[CONSENT SCREEN 4] 
 
If you have read the previous screens and agree to participate, please click the Yes 
button, if not, click the No button. 
 
 Yes, I agree to participate. 
 No, I do not agree to participate.  
 
 
 [IF CONSENT= NO OR SKIP] 
 
Thank you for your consideration.  You have exited the survey.  
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[PROMPT IF SKIP] 
 
1.  
A. Here is a list of problems you may be concerned about.  What do you think is the 
most important and least important concern for the country among the items listed 
below?  
 
[SHOW ITEMS NOT SELECTED IN Q1A] 
 
B. Of the remaining concerns, what do you think is the most important and least 
important concern for the country among the items listed below? 
 
MOST 
Important  
(Please check ONE) 
 
LEAST 
Important 
(Please check ONE) 
 
Crime 
 
 
Education 
 
 
Energy 
 
 
Environment 
 
 
Federal budget deficit 
 
 
Health care 
 
 
Homeland Security 
 
 
Housing 
 
 
Illegal Immigration 
 
 
Poverty 
 
 
Unemployment 
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PREFERENCES FOR MOVING TO ANOTHER COUNTRY 
 
Suppose that for some reason you and your family had to move to another country.  
Suppose also that you could choose between two English-speaking countries.  We want you 
to assume that you pay the same amount of taxes as you pay now, and you would have the 
same level of household income as you now have in the U.S. However, the cost of living 
and the environmental, social, and health conditions are different in the two countries. Here 
are the features of these two imaginary countries that we will ask you to think about: 
 Environmental quality 
 Childhood poverty 
 Health care 
 Cost of living 
 
These two countries are similar to the US in all other aspects. Then we will ask you which of 
the two countries you would rather live in. 
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Country Feature: Environmental Quality 
You may want to consider environmental quality in thinking about which country you would 
want to live in.  Here are some measures of environmental quality in the US: 
 
Environmental quality in the US What does this mean? 
3% of all deaths are caused by air 
pollution. 
Air pollution can cause lung and heart problems, 
such as asthma and heart attacks.  As a result, 
some people die sooner than they would if air 
pollution levels were lower.  
About 40% of rivers do not meet 
water-quality standards for fishing 
and swimming. 
Low water quality affects people’s health if they 
eat fish caught in polluted rivers or if they swim in 
these rivers. 
About 8% of total land area is 
protected.  
Protected lands provide many services for 
outdoor activities such as fishing, hiking, and 
educational programs. They also protect rare 
plants and animals. 
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Questions later in this survey will ask you to compare countries with different levels of 
environmental quality. The levels of environmental quality are defined relative to the current 
environmental quality in the US: 
 
  
Same quality as the 
US 
 
3% all deaths due to air pollution 
40% of rivers fail standards 
8% of total land area is protected 
25% worse than the 
US 
 
4% all deaths due to air pollution 
50% of rivers fail standards 
6% of total land area is 
protected 
50% worse than the 
US 
 
5% all deaths due to air pollution 
60% of rivers fail standards 
4% of total land area is 
protected 
25% better than the 
US 
 
2% all deaths due to air pollution 
30% of rivers fail standards 
10% of total land area is 
protected 
50% better than the 
US 
 
1% all deaths due to air pollution 
20% of rivers fail standards 
12% of total land area is 
protected 
BETTER WORSE 
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2. Within the last year, about how many days did you or your family avoid some outdoor 
activity because of air pollution?  
 None 
 1-2 days 
 2-5 days 
 5-10 days 
 10-20 days 
 More than 20 days 
 
3. Within the last 5 years, how many different national or state parks have you visited?  
 None 
 1-2 parks 
 3-5 parks 
 6-10 parks  
 More than 10 parks 
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Country Feature: Childhood Poverty 
You may want to consider how much childhood poverty there is in thinking about which 
country you would want to live in. Here are some measures of childhood poverty in the US: 
 
Poverty in the US What does this mean? 
About 20% of children live in 
poverty.  
About one in five children in the US lives in a 
family with income less than the poverty level 
of $27,000 for a household of five. Most of 
these children will be poor as adults. 
The high school graduation rate 
of teenagers living in poverty is 
about 65%.  
The national high school graduation rate is 
80%, higher than the rate for the teens living in 
poverty. Children living in poverty are more 
likely to drop out of high school, be 
unemployed, and commit crimes.  
The pregnancy rate among poor 
teenage girls is about 13%. 
The national teen pregnancy rate is 7%, much 
lower than the rate for teens living in poverty. 
Children born to teen mothers are more likely 
to experience family conflict, bad role models, 
and low income as adults.  
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Questions later in this survey will ask you to compare countries with different levels of 
childhood poverty. The levels of childhood poverty are defined relative to the current poverty 
levels in the US: 
 
 
Same quality as the 
US 
 
20% of children live in poverty 
65% graduate high school 
13% teenage pregnancy rate 
25% worse than the 
US 
 
25% of children live in poverty 
50% graduate high school 
16% teenage pregnancy rate 
50% worse than the 
US 
 
30% of children live in poverty 
32% graduate high school 
20% teenage pregnancy rate 
25% better than the 
US 
 
15% of children live in poverty 
80% graduate high school 
10% teenage pregnancy rate 
50% better than the 
US 
 
10% of children live in poverty 
98% graduate high school 
6% teenage pregnancy rate 
BETTER WORSE 
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4. What has been your own experience with poverty? (Please check all that apply) 
 I am not poor now and have never lived in poverty. 
 I grew up in a family in poverty, and my family is still poor. 
 I have been poor in the past, but am not poor now. 
 I was not poor in the past, but am poor now. 
 Members of my family have experienced poverty, but I have not. 
 Families in my neighborhood have experienced poverty. 
 I am not poor now, but I feel like I could easily fall into poverty. I live paycheck 
to paycheck. 
 None of the above. [If chose this option, cannot choose the above 
options.] 
 
 
5. What do you think the rate of childhood poverty is in your area, compared to the national 
average? 
 Much higher 
 Somewhat higher 
 About the same 
 Somewhat lower 
 Much lower 
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Country Feature: Health Care 
You may want to consider access to affordable, high-quality health care in thinking about 
which country you would want to live in.  Here are some measures of health care in the US: 
 
Health care in the US What does this mean? 
About 60% of people have high-quality 
health insurance with affordable co-
payments. 
People without good health insurance might 
have to pay out of their own income or 
savings to cover the cost of their treatment, 
put off treatment until their condition gets 
worse, or do without treatment. 
The average waiting time to see a 
specialist is about 20 days.  
When there are too few specialists in an 
area, people have to wait to get treatment.  
During that time their condition could get 
worse and become more difficult to treat. 
The average number of hospital beds 
is 1 per 350 people in the general 
population. 
When there are too few hospital beds in an 
area, some people have to wait to get an 
operation or other treatment in hospitals. 
During that time their condition could get 
worse and become more difficult to treat. 
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Questions later in this survey will ask you to compare countries with different levels of 
access to health care. The levels of health-care quality are defined relative to the current 
health-care quality in the US: 
 
  
Same quality as the US 
 
60% have high-quality insurance 
20 days of waiting time  to see a specialist 
1 hospital bed per 350 people  
25% worse than the 
US 
 
45% have high-quality insurance 
25 days of waiting time 
1 hospital bed per 440 people  
50% worse than the 
US 
 
30% have high-quality insurance 
1 month of waiting time 
1 hospital bed per 525 people  
25% better than the 
US 
 
75% have high-quality insurance 
15 days of waiting time 
1 hospital bed per 260 people  
50% better than the 
US 
 
90% have high-quality insurance 
10 days of waiting time 
1 hospital bed per 175 people  
BETTER WORSE 
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6. How would you rate your current health insurance coverage? 
 Good  
 Fair  
 Poor 
 I do not have a health insurance coverage now 
 
7. What is the longest you have had to wait to see a specialist? 
 No more than a few days 
 About 1 week 
 About 2 weeks 
 About 3 weeks 
 About 1 month 
 About 2 months 
 About 3 months 
 More than 3 months 
 Not applicable 
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Country Feature: Cost of Living 
You may want to consider the annual or monthly cost of living in thinking about which 
country you would want to live in.  An increase in the cost of living means that you would 
have less money to spend after buying the goods and services you do now.  A decrease in 
the cost of living means that you would have more money to spend after buying the goods 
and services you do now. 
 
Questions later in this survey will ask you to think about the cost of living in the two countries 
compared to your current cost of living in the US. You may be asked to assume that the cost 
of living would be higher or lower than now, or the same as now. 
 
If the cost of living decreases, you will have more money to spend than you do now. If the 
cost of living increases, you will have less money to spend than you do now.  
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8. How many times have you moved to a different town or city in your lifetime? 
 
 Never moved 
 1-2 times 
 3-5 times 
 6-10 times 
 More than 10 times 
 
[IF Q8~=1 OR SKIP] 
9. [If not “never moved”] The last time you moved, how important were each of these 
factors in deciding where you chose to live? 
 
 Very Important  Somewhat 
Important 
Not Important 
A. Schools    
B. Health services    
C. Air quality    
D. Crime rate    
E. Housing prices    
F. Cost of living    
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Later in the survey, we will ask you to compare two possible countries.  For each pair of 
countries, we need you to tell us which country (Country A or Country B) you would choose 
to live in if these were the only two alternatives available.   We will show you an example of 
a choice question in the next screen. 
When you make your decision about which of the two alternative countries (A or B) to 
choose, consider carefully the cost of living in each country. For example, in the sample 
question below, consider the two alternative countries below. 
 
Country 
Feature 
Current US Levels  Country A  Country B 
Environmental 
Quality 
 3% of all deaths due to air 
pollution 
 40% of rivers fail standards 
 8% of total land is protected 
 
25% better than 
the US 
 
25% worse than 
the US 
Childhood 
Poverty  
 20% of children live in 
poverty 
 65% graduate high school 
 13% teenage pregnancy 
rate 
 
50% worse than 
the US 
 
50% better than 
the US 
Health Care 
 60% have high-quality 
health insurance 
 20 days of waiting time  to 
see a specialist 
 1 hospital bed per 350 people 
 
Same as the US  Same as the US 
Cost of Living 
 You would have 
$5,000 more per 
year to spend 
($420 more per 
month)  
 
You would have 
$5,000 less per 
year to spend 
($420 less per 
month)  
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In the example above, we want you to assume that: 
 
- In Country A, you would have $5,000 per year more to spend after you buy the 
goods and services you do now. This corresponds to $420 more to spend each 
month.  
- In Country B, you would have $5,000 per year less to spend after you buy the 
goods and services you do now.   This corresponds to $420 less to spend each 
month. 
 
Of course your quality of life depends not only on the cost of living, but also on the 
environmental quality, childhood poverty and health care in the two countries. The two 
countries are better in some respects and worse in others. 
Country A would have 25% better environmental quality than the US today; but the 
childhood poverty would be 50% worse than the US today. 
Country B would have 50% better childhood poverty than the US today; but the 
environmental quality would be 25% worse than in the US today.  
 
Considering the different quality of life in Country A and Country B, and the different cost of 
living, we want to know which country you would choose.  
 300 
 
Now we’d like you to look at the country-choice questions. We do NOT want you to answer 
these questions at this time. We would like to give you some time to think about your 
preferences for choosing between two countries with different environmental quality, 
childhood poverty, quality of health care and cost of living.  
We will ask you to answer these questions when you return to the survey next time. You 
may want to discuss these questions with other people to help you decide how to answer.  
Please feel free to do that.  
 
We are interested in how you feel about these choices for your own family. There are no 
right or wrong answers.   
 
When you consider which country you would like to live in, please assume that everything 
about the two countries is the same except cost of living, environmental quality, childhood 
poverty, and quality of health care.  
 
Please also assume that you will be paying the same amount of taxes you are paying 
now, and your household income will not change when you think about moving to a 
different country, but the cost of living may change.  
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Please think about the following question. You will be asked to answer it later. 
 
If these were the only two alternatives, which country would you choose to live in? 
 
Country 
Feature 
Current US Levels  Country A  Country B 
Environmental 
Quality 
 3% of all deaths due to air 
pollution 
 40% of rivers fail standards 
 8% of total land is protected 
 
   
Childhood 
Poverty 
 20% of children live in poverty 
 65% graduate high school 
 13% teenage pregnancy rate 
 
   
Health Care 
 60% have high-quality health 
insurance 
 20 days of waiting time  to see 
a specialist 
 1 hospital bed per 350 people 
 
 
  
Cost of Living 
 
   
 
Which country would you choose?   
 302 
 
[At the end of trade-off questions] 
We request that you return to the second part of this survey after 24 hours but before 10 
days from now (i.e., between [TIME, Pacific on DATE] Pacific time and [TIME, Pacific on 
DATE] Pacific time) to answer the questions about your choice between two countries, and 
complete the rest of the questionnaire.  
 
We had one big problem in the past in this type of surveys. Some respondents did not return 
to the second part of the survey. This is a big problem for us since if someone does not 
return to the second part to complete the survey, we cannot use the information he or she 
provided in the first part, either. This means that the time these respondents spent on the 
first part was wasted. Please help our study by returning to complete the second part of the 
survey within the given time period. 
 
You will receive 5,000 points after you complete the second part of this survey. 
 
[CREATE DOV_TRANSTIME1: RECORD DATE AND TIME WHEN FIRST REACHED THE TRANSITION 
SCREEN ABOVE] 
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[SECOND PART OF THE SURVEY] 
 
Thank you for returning to finish this second part of the survey. 
 
In the next 8 questions, we will ask you to compare two possible countries.  For each pair of 
countries, please tell us which country (Country A or Country B) you would choose to live in 
if these were the only two alternatives available.   
 
You may access to the information on the country features (environmental quality, 
childhood poverty, quality of health care and cost of living) by clicking <here>. Please 
assume that everything else about the two countries is the same.  
 
Please also assume that you will be paying the same amount of taxes you are paying 
now, and your household income will not change when you think about moving to a 
different country, but the cost of living may change.  
 
Remember, we are interested in how you feel about these choices for your own family.  
There are no right or wrong answers.  
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Before you tell us which country you prefer in the following questions, we want you to help 
us with a problem we have had in studies like this one. Of course, you really don’t have to 
move to a different country. But we are asking you to think about what you would do if you 
really had to make a decision like this.  
 
People sometimes find it hard to do this in our studies. They give different answers to survey 
questions than they actually would do in a real situation. For example, because it may be 
hard to think about moving to a different country, in the survey you might just pick the 
country that has better health care or the country that has lower childhood poverty. In a real 
decision you probably would think hard about any increase in the cost of living, and whether 
the value of better environment, poverty, and health care would be worth the increase in the 
cost of living.  
 
Please consider the country alternatives very carefully, and make a decision as if 
your family would really have to live in one of the two countries with the quality of life 
and cost of living listed.  
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Please consider your actual household income and any increase in cost of living before 
making a decision. Some people tend to make a decision without considering whether they 
can afford the increased cost of living. 
 
If you don't answer the questions as if you were making real decisions, our study results will 
be wrong.  Please help us measure your opinions correctly by answering each question as if 
it were a real decision before deciding which one of the two alternative countries you would 
choose. 
 
Also please remember that we asked you to pretend that you have to move to another 
country. So, please do not consider where you live now; but compare Country A and 
Country B to each other. 
 
Please think carefully about your choices because the results of this survey will likely 
be shared with national media and may influence public policy discussions in the US. 
 
Your opinion matters to us! 
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If these were the only two alternatives, which country would you choose to live in? 
 
Country 
Feature 
Current US Levels  Country A  Country B 
Environmental 
Quality 
 3% of all deaths due to air 
pollution 
 40% of rivers fail standards 
 8% of total land is protected 
    
Childhood 
Poverty 
 20% of children live in poverty 
 65% graduate high school 
 13% teenage pregnancy rate 
 
   
Health Care 
 60% have high-quality health 
insurance 
 20 days of waiting time  to see 
a specialist 
 1 hospital bed per 350 people 
 
   
Cost of Living 
 
   
 
Which country would you choose?   
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[SHOW ONLY AFTER “POLICY” QUESTION IN THE DESIGN] 
[NUMER BOX 0-100] 
[AUTOMATICALLY UPDATE SUM] 
[DO NOT ALLOW TO PROCEED UNTIL SUM IS 100] 
[SHOW POLICY QUESTION AGAIN WITH ANSWERS SELECTED AND GREYED OUT] 
 
 
10. What percent of Americans do you think would choose to move to each country in the 
question above? 
 Percent vote  
Country A _____% 
Country B _____% 
 100 % 
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11. Have you ever lived in a foreign country for more than one year? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
[IF Q11=NO OR SKIP] 
12. [If answered NO to #11] Have you ever seriously considered moving to a foreign country 
to live for more than one year? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
13. About how many foreign countries have you visited in your lifetime? 
 None 
 1-2 
 3-5 
 More than 5 
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16. Between the first time I logged off of the survey (the end of the first session) and when I 
logged on to complete the survey today:[Please check all that apply] 
 I thought about what was important about moving to a different country. 
 I discussed what was important about moving to a different country with 
someone else. 
 I read some additional information about environmental quality, childhood 
poverty, quality of life, or cost of living. 
 I did not think about this survey at all. 
 
 
[NUMBER BOX 0-999 FOR MINUTES] 
[IF Q16=1,2,3] 
 
17. About how much time did you spend thinking and/or discussing about moving to a 
different country? 
 TOTAL NUMBER OF MINUTES: _______________ 
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[IF Q16=2, 3] 
 
18. [IF YES TO DISCUSSED] Whom did you talk to? Please check all that apply. 
 My spouse/partner 
 My children 
 My parents 
 My friends 
 Others (please specify) _______________________ 
 
 
[IF Q16=4] 
19. [IF YES TO READ]  Where did you find the information you read? 
 Websites/Internet 
 Books 
 Newspapers or magazines 
 Brochures or pamphlets 
 Other (please specify) : _____________________ 
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Now we will ask you some questions to learn your opinion about the current state of 
things in the US. 
20. Some people in the United States have better jobs and higher incomes than others. The 
table below lists some of possible reasons for these differences in people’s incomes and 
jobs. Using a 1–5 scale, where ‘1’ means not at all important and ‘5’ means extremely 
important, please tell us how important each reason is for why some people have better 
jobs and higher incomes than others.  
 
 Not at all 
important 
   
Extremely 
important 
W. Willingness to take risks 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
X. Money inherited from families    1________2_______3_______4________5 
Y. Hard work and initiative    1________2_______3_______4________5 
Z. Ability or talent that a person 
is born with 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
AA. Taking advantage of others to 
get ahead 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
BB. Good luck, being in the right 
place at the right time 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
CC. Physical appearance and 
good looks 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
DD. Connections and knowing 
the right people 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
EE. Being a member of a 
particular race or ethnic group 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
FF. Getting the right education or 
training 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
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GG. A person’s gender, that is 
whether they are male or 
female 
   1________2_______3_______4________5 
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21. In your opinion, do most poor people in the US have a chance of escaping from poverty, 
or is there very little chance of escaping? 
 
1____________2____________3____________4____________5 
Very little 
chance of 
escaping 
   Very high  
chance of 
escaping 
 
 
22. Do you agree or disagree with the statement: “The way things are in America right now, 
people like me and my family have a good chance of improving our standard of living 
over the next ten years.”  
 
1____________2____________3____________4____________5 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   Strongly 
agree 
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23. Which of the following groups do you think should have the greatest responsibility and 
the least responsibility for helping the poor? 
 
GREATEST 
responsibility 
(Please check 
ONE) 
 LEAST 
responsibility 
(Please check 
ONE) 
o Churches o 
o Private charities 
(community service 
organizations) 
o 
o Federal government o 
o State/local government o 
o Families and relatives of 
poor people 
o 
o Poor themselves o 
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24. Do you feel you are asked to pay more than you should in federal income taxes, about 
the right amount, or less than you should? What about poor people? What about rich 
people? 
 
G. My household  I am paying more than I should 
 I am paying about the right amount 
 I am paying less than I should 
 Don’t know/Not sure 
 
H. Poor people  They are paying more than they should 
 They are paying about the right amount 
 They are paying less than they should 
 Don’t know/Not sure 
 
I. Rich people  They are paying more than they should 
 They are paying about the right amount 
 They are paying less than they should 
 Don’t know/Not sure 
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25. Do you think the government should make it more difficult for people to buy a hand gun 
than it is now, make it easier for people to buy a hand gun, or keep these rules about the 
same as they are now? 
 More difficult  
 Make it easier  
 Keep these rules about the same   
 Don’t know/ Not Sure 
 
26. Please check the opinion about abortion on the list below that best agrees with your 
view.  
 By law, abortion should never be permitted.  
 The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the 
woman’s life is in danger.  
 By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of 
personal choice.  
 Don’t know/ Not Sure 
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27. Here is a list of the political views that people might hold. Which one describes your 
political views the best?  
 Extremely liberal 
 Liberal 
 Slightly liberal  
 Moderate; middle of the road  
 Slightly conservative  
 Conservative  
 Extremely Conservative  
 Libertarian 
 
This is the end of the survey. Thank you very much for your participation. 
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APPENDIX D 
INTERNAL VALIDITY 
The following items were investigated to check the internal validity of the data in this 
research.  
 No variation 
 Transitivity test 
 Insensitivity to the cost attribute 
 Dominating on the cost attribute 
 Scope test  
 Income effect 
No Variation 
 The data were checked for subjects whose answers to the trade-off questions in the 
budget and country surveys showed no variation. These subjects always picked either 
Alternative A or Alternative B in all of the trade-off questions. In total, the answers of 31 
(1.5%) and 13 (1.3%) subjects to the budget and country trade-off questions, respectively, 
showed no variation.  
A binomial-probit model was estimated to investigate which subjects were likely to 
show no variation in their responses. The dependent variable was 1 if a subject’s answers to 
the trade-off questions showed no variation (as described above, 0 otherwise). The 
independent variables were individual-specific covariates. The estimates showed that 
subjects with a college degree were less likely to show no variation in their answers, and 
that subjects who indicated that “federal government” should be the group most responsible 
for helping the poor and subjects who were non-attendant to the cost attribute were more 
likely to show no variation in the budget survey (Table D.1).  In the country survey, white 
subjects were less likely to show no variation; and older subjects, subjects who indicated 
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that “federal government” should be the group most responsible for helping the poor, and 
subjects who indicated “poor themselves” should be the group most responsible for helping 
the poor were more likely to show no variation in their responses. Subjects whose answers 
to the trade-off questions showed no variation also failed the transitivity test, and were 
omitted from the final analysis. These subjects were very likely to go through the survey 
without paying particular attention to the questions.  
Transitivity Test 
Transitivity is a fundamental axiom of utility theory and is required for valid welfare 
estimation (Just et al., 2004). Transitivity assumes that if subjects choose Alternative A over 
Alternative B in one choice set, and Alternative B over Alternative C in another choice set, 
they will pick Alternative A over C in a third choice set. Two extra trade-off questions were 
created (in addition to one trade-off question chosen from the design) to construct a 
transitivity test for each block in the DCE surveys. In the budget and country surveys, 195 
(9.6%) and 93 (9.2%) subjects failed the transitivity test, respectively. This rate is much 
lower than the failure rates for internal validity test results in similar studies (Ryan & San 
Miguel, 2000; Ryan & Bate, 2001; Özdemir et al., 2010). 
A binary-probit model was estimated to investigate which subjects were likely to fail 
the transitivity test. The dependent variable was 1 if a subject failed the transitivity test and 0 
otherwise. Subjects with a college degree were less likely to fail the transitivity test in the 
budget survey, while subjects who were non-attendant to the cost attribute were more likely 
to fail the test (Table D.2). No significant correlation was observed for transitivity-test failure 
in the country survey.  
I investigated whether subjects who failed the transitivity test had different 
preferences for the cost attribute than those who did not fail the test. Their preferences for 
the cost attribute were not found to be significantly different than the others in the 
preliminary analysis. Therefore, these subjects were kept in the final analysis. 
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Insensitivity to the Cost Attribute  
 Subjects’ preferences were also tested for insensitivity to the cost attribute. In the CV 
survey, around 1% supported funding the early-childhood program when the tax level was 
more than 5% of their annual household income. These subjects were eliminated from the 
subsequent analysis, as is commonly practiced (Diamond & Hausman, 1994). 
In the budget survey, likely non-attendance to the cost attribute was investigated 
following the method developed by Scarpa and colleagues (Scarpa et al., 2009). The 
attribute non-attendance was identified by using an equality-constrained latent-class 
analysis that estimated the probability of membership in a latent class with zero utility on the 
cost attribute. The other attributes with non-zero utility weights were considered to be 
constant across the latent classes.  
 The latent-class model was estimated with five latent classes. The first latent class 
comprised subjects who simultaneously considered all of the attributes. The second, third, 
and fourth latent classes comprised subjects who ignored one of the non-cost attributes, and 
the fifth comprised subjects who ignored the cost attribute. An individual was considered to 
be non-attendant to the cost attribute if his or her probability of class membership in the fifth 
latent class was highest and greater than 0.5.  
Respectively, 709 (35%) and 329 (33%) of the subjects were classified as likely to be 
non-attendant to the cost attribute in the budget and country surveys. A binomial-probit 
model was estimated to investigate which subjects were likely to be non-attendant. The 
dependent variable was 1 if a subject was identified as non-attendant to the cost, based on 
the above criteria, and 0 otherwise. Liberals, subjects who indicated “federal government” 
should be the group most responsible for helping the poor, and subjects who failed the 
transitivity test were more likely to be non-attendant; subjects who indicated that “poor 
themselves” should be the group most responsible for helping the poor were less likely to be 
non-attendant to the tax attribute in the budget survey (Table D.3). Income was positively 
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associated with non-attendance to cost; subjects who indicated that “poor themselves” 
should be the group most responsible for helping the poor were less likely to be non-
attendant to the cost attribute in the country survey. 
Table D.4 shows findings from a list of DCE studies that investigated likely non-
attendance. Although there are a handful of studies on this topic in the literature, this is not 
an inclusive list but rather a collection generated by a quick search. The table presents the 
percentage of the sample that was likely to be non-attendant to the cost attribute in these 
studies. Non-attendance, which seems to have been a problem not only for environmental 
and health-care goods but also for private goods, has been observed in studies conducted 
in a variety of countries. The non-attendance rate in this study lies somewhere in the middle 
of the range that has been reported in the literature.  
Following suggestions from the literature (Lancsar & Louviere, 2006), I controlled for 
these preferences instead of dropping these subjects. Interaction terms between the cost 
variables (     and     ) and a dummy variable indicating likely non-attendance to the cost 
(       ) were included such that the utility function can be summarized as: 
              ̌                      ̌             (D1) 
where X denotes a vector of all non-monetary attributes, β is a vector of non-monetary 
attribute parameters, and µ indicates the cost-related parameters. The cost-increase (µ+ µ1) 
and the cost-decrease ( ̌   ̌ ) parameters for subjects who were non-attendant to the cost 
equal zero. The main-effects cost-increase parameter (µ) was used to calculate the marginal 
utility of income. For example, WTP for a 50% increase in the early-childhood program was 
calculated as: 
 
     
         
  
 
(D2) 
where        indicates the parameter for increases in the early-childhood program. This 
method of calculating WTP used the mean parameter β for all subjects (excluding subjects 
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with no variation) for non-monetary attributes and the mean parameter µ for the subjects, 
excluding those who were likely non-attendant to the cost attribute (and subjects with no 
variation) for cost increase. This method benefited from information about the preferences of 
these subjects (who were non-attendant to the cost attribute) for the non-monetary attributes 
while preventing the cost-parameter estimates from being very low, which would have led to 
very high WTP values.  
Table D.5 shows the WTP values for the early-childhood program in the budget 
survey for the controlled (with interactions) and uncontrolled (no interactions) estimates. The 
WTP values from the controlled model for moderates and liberals were much smaller than 
the values from the uncontrolled model. While the program-increase parameter was not 
significant for conservatives in the controlled model, it was significantly negative in the 
uncontrolled model. Controlling for likely non-attendance pulled down the upward bias and 
provided reasonable estimates. The results for the other attributes in the budget survey and 
for the attributes in the country survey were very similar.  
As an alternative method, I also investigated whether a marginal-utility-of-income 
(MUM) function could be generated as a function of individual-specific characteristics, 
excluding social ideology (which was correlated with likely non-attendance) in the budget 
survey. The mean MUM was about the same for the whole sample and for subjects who 
were non-attendant to the cost attribute. While the MUM was very robust with various 
specifications of the function, the variations among the subjects were so small that it did not 
affect WTP values.  
Dominating on the Cost Attribute 
 Preferences were investigated for whether subjects dominated on the cost attribute. 
Dominance on the cost attribute was used as an indicator of scenario rejection, especially 
for the tax attribute in the budget survey. A participant was considered as dominating on the 
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cost attribute if he or she chose the alternative with the lower level of cost increase or higher 
level of cost reduction in all of the trade-off questions. 
Only 1% of subjects who completed the budget survey dominated on the tax 
attribute, whereas 10% of subjects who completed the country survey dominated on the 
cost-of-living attribute. A binomial-probit model was estimated to investigate who was likely 
to dominate on the cost attribute. The dependent variable was 1 if a subject dominated on 
the cost attribute as defined above, and 0 otherwise. Male subjects, liberals, subjects who 
indicated that “federal government” should be the group most responsible for helping the 
poor, and subjects in the “tax-credit” version were more likely to dominate on the tax 
attribute in the budget survey (Table D.6). Conservatives were more likely to dominate on 
the cost attribute in the country survey at the 10% significance level. The low level of 
dominance on the tax attribute in the budget survey indicates that possible tax-protest votes 
were eliminated. Perhaps the higher level of dominance on the cost-of-living attribute is not 
surprising, as this attribute was indexed to household income in the country survey. 
Scope Test 
 A between-sample scope test was constructed on the number of children targeted for 
the early-childhood program in the CV survey. The small-program option targeted only the 
beneficiaries of the current government programs, which comprised about 18% of children in 
poverty under the age of 6 in a federal-level program. The large-program option targeted 
90% of children in poverty under the age of 6. The scope test investigated whether WTP for 
a large program was higher than WTP for a small program. The dummy variable for the 
small program was not statistically significant in the parametric analysis of the CV data, 
which indicated that the survey did not pass the scope test. Paper 1 contains additional 
discussion on this finding.  
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Income Effects 
I also investigated whether subjects’ incomes were significantly correlated with their 
preferences. Income was significantly correlated with supporting the early-childhood 
program in the CV data at the 1% significance level. An interaction variable was created 
between the cost attribute and the household income to investigate the income effects in the 
DCE data. The income interaction variable was significant at the 5% level in the budget 
survey but was not significant in the country survey. However, the bid levels for the cost-of-
living attribute in the country survey were indexed to a subject’s annual household income. 
For this reason, the cost levels in this survey have already been adjusted for income. 
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Table D.1 Binomial -Probit Model Estimates for No Variation 
 Budget Survey Country Survey 
 Coefficient 
Stand. 
Error 
P 
value 
Coefficient 
Stand. 
Error 
P 
value 
Income 1.07E-06 2.59E-06 0.678 -6.81E-06 4.11E-06 0.098 
College degree -0.574 0.275 0.037 0.279 0.402 0.487 
White -0.084 0.198 0.669 -0.860 0.239 0.000 
Male -0.025 0.184 0.893 -0.356 0.277 0.198 
Age 0.002 0.006 0.725 -0.017 0.007 0.014 
Social ideology -0.018 0.087 0.834 -0.129 0.187 0.489 
Federal government Ϯ 0.487 0.212 0.022 4.451 0.465 0.000 
Poor themselves Ϯ 0.214 0.200 0.284 4.551 0.450 0.000 
Non-attendant to cost 0.338 0.145 0.020 0.074 0.347 0.831 
Credit version 0.288 0.334 0.388 NA
ұ
   
Version 2 0.383 0.228 0.093 NA   
Version 4 0.390 0.227 0.085 NA   
Constant -2.927 0.422 0.000 -5.238 0.609 0.000 
       
N of observations 
1712   826   
Log Likelihood 
-94   -22   
Degrees of freedom 
12   9   
Ϯ These are the categories for the question on who should be the most responsible group for helping 
the poor.  
ұ 
NA denotes “not applicable”. 
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Table D.2 Binomial-Probit Model Estimates for Failing Transitivity Test 
 Budget Survey Country Survey 
 Coefficient 
Stand. 
Error 
P 
value 
Coefficient 
Stand. 
Error 
P 
value 
Income -3.57E-07 1.03E-06 0.727 -6.25E-07 1.47E-06 0.671 
BS degree -0.220 0.103 0.032 0.012 0.134 0.926 
White -0.064 0.103 0.534 -0.118 0.140 0.398 
Male 0.024 0.089 0.784 -0.109 0.118 0.357 
Age -0.003 0.003 0.352 -0.001 0.004 0.841 
Social ideology -0.018 0.047 0.701 -0.094 0.067 0.160 
Federal government Ϯ 0.205 0.114 0.073 -0.064 0.163 0.693 
Poor themselves Ϯ 0.089 0.102 0.386 -0.018 0.150 0.904 
Non-attendant to cost 0.213 0.092 0.021 NA
ұ
   
Credit -0.023 0.213 0.912 NA   
Version 2 -0.055 0.123 0.653 NA   
Version 3 -0.189 0.133 0.154 NA   
Version 4 0.046 0.123 0.707 NA   
Constant -1.216 0.200 0.000 -1.161 0.278 0.000 
       
N of observations 
1708   824   
Log Likelihood 
-490   -240   
Degrees of freedom 
13   9   
Ϯ These are the categories for the question on who should be the most responsible group for helping 
the poor.  
ұ 
NA denotes “not applicable”. 
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Table D.3 Binomial-Probit Model Estimates for Likely Non-Attendance to the Cost 
Attribute  
 Budget Survey Country Survey 
 Coefficient 
Stand. 
Error 
P 
value 
Coefficient 
Stand. 
Error 
P 
value 
Income 8.00E-07 7.24E-07 0.269 4.13E-06 1.03E-06 0.000 
BS degree 0.010 0.073 0.888 -0.053 0.105 0.611 
White -0.081 0.079 0.305 -0.073 0.109 0.503 
Male 0.011 0.065 0.866 -0.123 0.093 0.185 
Age 0.000 0.002 0.933 -0.002 0.003 0.508 
Social ideology 0.312 0.036 0.000 0.024 0.049 0.619 
Federal government Ϯ 0.188 0.085 0.027 0.061 0.117 0.603 
Poor themselves Ϯ -0.228 0.075 0.002 -0.293 0.111 0.009 
Failed transitivity test 0.237 0.121 0.051 0.145 0.166 0.381 
No variation 0.274 0.298 0.359 -0.463 0.661 0.484 
Credit 
0.020 0.167 0.903 NA
ұ
   
Version 2 
0.007 0.090 0.934 NA   
Version 3 
-0.141 0.094 0.137 NA   
Version 4 
0.090 0.093 0.337 NA   
Constant 
-0.392 0.152 0.010 -0.445 0.192 0.020 
 
      
N of observations 
1708 824 
Log Likelihood 
-1030 -507 
Degrees of freedom 
14 10 
Ϯ These are the categories for the question on who should be the most responsible group for helping 
the poor.  
ұ 
NA denotes “not applicable”. 
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Table D.4 Likely Non-attendance Findings in other DCE Studies 
Study Commodity % Non-attendance to 
the cost attribute 
(Hensher & Greene, 2010) Preferences of car drivers for 
routes in Australia 
4-5% 
(Hensher, 2008) Commuter car trip in Australia 5 to 30% depending on 
the model 
(Scarpa et al., 2009) Rural landscape in Ireland 
(payment vehicle: income and 
value added tax) 
80 to 90% depending on 
the model 
Scarpa, R., Notaro, S. and 
Raffelli, R. (unpublished)  
Alpine grazing areas in Italy 
(payment vehicle: access fee) 
40 to 80% 
(D. Campbell, 2008) Endangered fish species 
conservation in Ireland (payment 
vehicle: income and value added 
tax) 
70% 
(Gilbride et al., 2006) Marketable goods, brand choice 57% 
(Lagarde, 2012) Preferences of healthcare 
providers for clinical guidelines in 
Ghana (payment vehicle: bonus) 
22% 
(Puckett & Hensher, 2008) Road freight  5% 
(Poulos et al., 2012) Household water treatment 
products in India 
74% for cost + one more 
attribute 
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Table D.5 By Ideology: Budget Survey Mean Annual WTP (standard errors in 
parenthesis) per Household, Controlled and Uncontrolled Estimates for Likely Non-
Attendance 
 Moderates Liberals Conservatives 
Early Childhood Program, Controlled 
50% decrease/Enrolling 
210,000 children 
$143 (15) $225 (21) $74 (16) 
50% increase/Enrolling 
640,000 children 
$0 $70 (16) $0 
50% increase/Enrolling 
640,000 children for 
Subjects with 
Experience 
$87 (20) $139 (24) $57 (22) 
Early Childhood Program, Uncontrolled 
50% decrease/Enrolling 
210,000 children 
$960 (93) $1,336 (113) $442 (98) 
50% increase/Enrolling 
640,000 children 
$0 $313 (96) -$372 (93) 
50% increase/Enrolling 
640,000 children for 
Subjects with 
Experience 
$306 (138) $740 (149) $0 
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Table D.6 Binomial-Probit Model Estimates for Dominating on the Cost Attribute 
 Budget Survey Country Survey 
 Coefficient 
Stand. 
Error 
P 
value 
Coefficient 
Stand. 
Error 
P 
value 
Income 3.20E-06 1.97E-06 0.106 1.30E-06 1.25E-06 0.299 
College degree 0.055 0.206 0.789 0.079 0.137 0.566 
White 0.187 0.246 0.447 0.130 0.153 0.397 
Male 0.630 0.195 0.001 -0.065 0.125 0.604 
Age 0.001 0.005 0.884 -0.002 0.004 0.649 
Social ideology 0.498 0.139 0.000 -0.125 0.068 0.068 
Federal government Ϯ 0.638 0.252 0.011 0.070 0.160 0.662 
Poor themselves Ϯ 0.011 0.281 0.968 0.152 0.143 0.286 
Credit version 1.001 0.414 0.016 NA
ұ
   
Version 2 0.182 0.360 0.613 NA   
Version 3 0.698 0.333 0.036 NA   
Version 4 0.647 0.317 0.041 NA   
Constant -4.175 0.508 0.000 -1.498 0.229 0.000 
       
N of observations 1712   826   
Log Likelihood -84   -256   
Degrees of freedom 12   8   
Ϯ These are the categories for the question on who should be the most responsible group for helping 
the poor.  
ұ 
NA denotes “not applicable”. 
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APPENDIX E 
MODEL ESTIMATION 
The estimation of the DCE data depends on the random utility theory. The random 
utility model is based on the idea that even if the subjects know their utility, the researcher 
cannot observe the utility or preferences of subjects perfectly. The utility function, therefore, 
consists of observable (V) and non-observable random elements (ɛ): 
      (         )     (E1) 
where Ui
  is individual i’s utility; Vi(.) is the non-random part of the utility function; P is a 
vector of prices; X is the good of interest; Mi is individual i’s income and Zi is a vector of 
personal characteristics. Omitting the price and individual-characteristics vectors for 
simplicity, if a CV scenario offers an improvement in X from X0 to X
1, holding everything else 
constant, then: 
   ( 
    )    
     ( 
    )    
  (E2) 
Assuming that utility is linear in parameters and the error terms are identically and 
independently distributed (IID), this model can be estimated using either a binomial probit or 
logit model. 
When individuals are offered several alternatives with varying attributes, individual i’s 
indirect utility is expressed as the following equation: 
               (E3) 
where Uii is individual i’s utility for alternative j, Xij is a vector of attribute levels for alternative 
j;  is a vector of attribute parameters and ɛij is a random disturbance term. Assuming the 
disturbance term follows a type I extreme-value error structure, the probability that individual 
i selects alternative j is the standard conditional-logit expression: 
 
        
   (     )
∑    (     )
 
   
 
(E4) 
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where J is the number of alternatives in a choice set. The probability that an alternative will 
be selected is the ratio of the exponentiated utility that an alternative provides, relative to the 
exponentiated sum of the utilities that each alternative in the choice set provides. Since 
conditional-logit models are subject to certain limitations, Revelt and Train have proposed 
using random-parameter or mixed-logit models (Revelt & Train, 1998). Mixed-logit models 
are not subject to the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives, accommodate 
correlations among panel observations, and account for unobserved heterogeneity in tastes 
across subjects. In a mixed-logit model, the probability of selecting alternative j 
characterized by k attributes will be: 
 
         
   (  
    )
∑    (  
    )
 
   
 
(E5) 
              (E6) 
where βk is the population mean of the parameters,     is the individual-specific 
heterogeneity and    is the standard deviation of the distribution of βik around βk. In contrast 
to conditional logit, the stochastic part of utility is allowed to be correlated among 
alternatives and across the sequence of choices. McFadden and Train show that any 
random-utility maximization model can be approximated by some mixed-logit specification 
(McFadden & Train, 2000). For the mixed-logit estimations 500 Halton draws were used. All 
non-monetary variables were specified as normally distributed34. The cost parameters were 
assumed to be nonrandom. 
 Two linear variables were created for each attribute; one for increases and the other 
for reductions. Omitting the individual-specific i for simplicity, the empirical models of the 
budget and country data in chapters 2 and 3 were defined as the following: 
         
        
            ̌        (E7) 
                                                 
34
 Assuming triangular distribution for all parameters produced very similar results. 
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where k indicates a government program in the budget survey, and a quality-of-life attribute 
in the country survey. The marginal WTP was calculated by dividing a non-monetary 
attribute by the estimate of the cost-increase parameter. For example, WTP for a 50% 
increase in the early-childhood program was calculated as the following: 
 
     
         
  
 
(E8) 
where        indicates the parameter for increases in the early-childhood program. 
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APPENDIX F 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE COMMON QUESTIONS IN ALL THREE SURVEYS 
Table F.1 Demographic Information  
Category 
Conservatives 
N=1386 
Moderates 
N=1866 
Liberals 
N=1283 
All 
N=4783Ϯ 
Gender    0.000 
Male 61 50 46 53 
Female 39 50 54 47 
Age, mean (SD), years 54 (16) 52 (16) 51 (16) 52 (16) 
Marital status     
Married 72 57 52 60 
Widowed 5 6 4 5 
Divorced/separated 9 14 14 12 
Single 11 16 21 16 
Living with partner 3 7 9 7 
Race/ethnicity     
White 86 75 71 77 
Hispanic 5 8 11 8 
African-American 4 11 12 9 
2 or more races 3 3 3 3 
Other 2 3 3 3 
Highest education     
Less than high school 
graduate 
7 10 6 8 
High school or 
equivalent (e.g., GED) 
31 30 19 27 
Some college  32 33 27 31 
Bachelor’s or graduate 
degree (e.g., BA, BS) 
30 27 48 34 
Employment, %     
Paid employee 44 48 50 48 
Self employed 10 6 7 7 
Temporary layoff from 
a job 
<1 1 
1 1 
Looking for work 6 8 8 7 
Retired 27 23 22 24 
Disabled 5 9 6 7 
Other 8 6 6 6 
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Category 
Conservatives 
N=1386 
Moderates 
N=1866 
Liberals 
N=1283 
All 
N=4783Ϯ 
Household Income1, mean 
(SD), $ 
69K (45K) 65K (47K) 75K (53K) 71K (49K) 
Household size, mean 
(SD) 
2.7 (1.4) 2.6 (1.4) 2.6 (1.4) 2.6 (1.4) 
1 child between 0-5 12 11 11 11 
2 or more children 
between 0-5 
2 2 2 2 
Ϯ The sum of the number of subjects in each ideological group does not add to 4783 
because some subjects did not answer the questions on ideology and so were not 
designated into any ideological group. 
1Liberals had significantly different income than others at the 5% level. 
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Table F.2 Most Important Social Priority  
Issue 
Conservatives 
N=1386 
Moderates 
N=1866 
Liberals 
N=1283 
All 
N=4783 
Crime 
4.2 5.7 3.9 4.8 
Education 
4.5 9.7 12.7 9.1 
Energy 
1.1 1.7 1.7 1.6 
Environment 
0.5 2.0 4.6 2.3 
Federal budget deficit 
44.8 23.7 13.9 27.3 
Health care 
5.6 10.7 14.8 10.3 
Homeland security 
3.9 4.8 2.3 3.9 
Housing 
0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Illegal immigration 
6.9 6.0 2.3 5.1 
Poverty 
2.1 5.4 7.1 4.9 
Unemployment 
26.0 29.7 36.0 30.2 
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Table F.3 Least Important Social Priority  
Issue 
Conservatives 
N=1386 
Moderates 
N=1866 
Liberals 
N=1283 
All 
N=4783 
Crime 
4.0 5.3 7.6 5.6 
Education 
6.3 3.8 2.0 4.0 
Energy 
8.4 9.9 6.7 8.6 
Environment 
32.3 14.3 7.5 17.9 
Federal budget deficit 
1.5 5.0 8.2 4.8 
Health care 
5.0 2.1 0.8 2.6 
Homeland security 
4.2 5.0 7.6 5.6 
Housing 
18.8 21.5 16.0 19.0 
Illegal immigration 
8.9 23.5 38.9 23.4 
Poverty 
8.4 7.0 3.1 6.3 
Unemployment 
1.9 2.6 1.6 2.1 
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Table F.4 Perceived Local Childhood Poverty Rate, CV and Country Surveys 
Question: “What do you think the 
rate of childhood poverty is in 
your area, compared to the 
national average?” 
Conservatives 
N=792 
Moderates 
N=1049 
Liberals 
N=731 
All 
N=2722Ϯ 
Much higher 4 5 7 5 
Somewhat higher 15 18 20 17 
About the same 31 34 27 31 
Somewhat lower 34 31 32 32 
Much lower 16 12 14 14 
Ϯ This question was not asked in the budget survey. 
 
Table F.5 Participation to Government Early-childhood Program, CV and Budget 
Surveys 
Question: “Has any of your 
children or a family member’s 
child participated government 
early-childhood program?” 
Conservatives 
N=949 
Moderates 
N=1291 
Liberals 
N=898 
All 
N=3308Ϯ 
Yes 13 17 16 15 
No 77 71 74 74 
Don’t know/not sure 9 11 10 10 
Ϯ This question was not asked in the country survey and in version CFJ in the budget survey 
because this version excluded the early-childhood program. 
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Table F.6 Subjects’ Experience with Poverty  
Question: “What has been your 
own experience with poverty? 
(Check all that apply)” 
Conservatives 
N=1242 
Moderates 
N=1687 
Liberals 
N=1163 
All 
N=4318Ϯ 
I am not poor now and have 
never lived in poverty 
30 27 33 30 
I grew up in a family in poverty 
and my family is still poor 
5 10 6 7 
I have been poor in the past, 
but I am not poor now. 
27 22 24 24 
I was not poor in the past, but 
am poor now. 
4 6 5 5 
Members of my family have 
experienced poverty, but I have 
not 
11 9 10 10 
Families in my neighborhood 
have experienced poverty 
11 12 15 12 
I am not poor now, but I feel like 
I could easily fall into poverty. I 
live pay check to pay check 
24 31 26 27 
None of the above 10 9 11 10 
Ϯ This question was not asked in version CFJ in the budget survey because this version 
excluded the early-childhood program. 
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Table F.7 Reasons for Better Jobs and Income, Mean (SD)  
Reason 
Conservatives 
N=1386 
Moderates 
N=1866 
Liberals 
N=1283 
All 
N=4783 
Willingness to take risks 3.37 (1.01) 3.10 (0.96) 2.93 (0.93) 3.13 (0.99) 
Money inherited from 
families1 
2.75 (1.22) 2.93 (1.23) 3.14 (1.26) 2.93 (1.24) 
Hard work and initiative 4.34 (0.84) 4.08 (0.91) 3.93 (0.93) 4.12 (0.91) 
Ability or talent that a person 
is born with1 
3.34 (0.99) 3.31 (0.98) 3.21 (0.98) 3.29 (0.98) 
Taking advantage of others 
to get ahead2 
2.04 (1.19) 2.18 (1.19) 2.22 (1.19) 2.15 (1.19) 
Good luck, being in the right 
place at the right time 
2.78 (1.06) 2.92 (1.08) 2.99 (1.07) 2.90 (1.07) 
Physical appearance and 
good looks1 
2.97 (1.05) 3.00 (1.04) 2.88 (1.03) 2.95 (1.04) 
Connections and knowing 
the right people 
3.47 (1.04) 3.56 (1.02) 3.68 (1.04) 3.57 (1.04) 
Being a member of a 
particular race or ethnic 
group2 
2.25 (1.17) 2.40 (1.14) 2.47 (1.04) 2.38 (1.15) 
Getting the right education or 
training 
3.92 (0.96) 4.08 (0.92) 4.19 (0.85) 4.07 (0.92) 
A person’s gender, that is 
whether they are male or 
female2 
2.20 (1.10) 2.34 (1.08) 2.38 (1.07) 2.31 (1.08) 
1Significantly different between conservatives and liberals, and between moderates and 
liberals at the 5% level. 
2 Significantly different between conservatives and moderates, and between conservatives 
and liberals at the 5% level. 
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Table F.8 Chance of Social Mobility  
 
Conservatives 
N=1386 
Moderates 
N=1866 
Liberals 
N=1283 
All 
N=4783 
Chance of escaping poverty 
for the poor (1:very little, 5: 
very high chance) 
3.32 (1.04) 2.94 (0.97) 2.72 (0.93) 2.99 (1.01) 
My family has a good chance 
of improving our standard of 
living (1:strongly disagree, 
5:strongly agree) 
2.83 (1.15) 2.93 (1.03) 3.08 (1.01) 2.95 1.07) 
 
Table F.9 Greatest Responsibility to Help the Poor  
Question: “Group who should 
have the greatest and the least 
responsibility to help the poor?” 
Conservatives 
N=1386 
Moderates 
N=1866 
Liberals 
N=1283 
All 
N=4783 
Churches 15 7 4 9 
Private charities 15 11 10 12 
Federal government 10 23 37 23 
State/local government 7 13 14 12 
Families and relatives of poor 13 11 7 10 
Poor themselves 40 35 28 34 
 
 
Table F.10 Least Responsibility to Help the Poor  
Question: “Group who should have 
the greatest and the least 
responsibility to help the poor?” 
Conservatives 
N=1386 
Moderates 
N=1866 
Liberals 
N=1283 
All 
N=4783 
Churches 7 15 20 14 
Private charities 4 9 9 8 
Federal government 59 31 18 36 
State/local government 9 8 6 7 
Families and relatives of poor 9 15 24 16 
Poor themselves 12 22 22 19 
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Table F.11 Opinion on Federal Income Tax  
Category 
Conservatives 
N=426 
Moderates 
N=541 
Liberals 
N=409 
All 
N=4783 
My household     
Paying more than I should 46 34 26 35 
Paying about the right amount 43 49 57 49 
Paying less than I should 3 3 6 4 
Don’t know/not sure 6 9 8 8 
Poor people     
Paying more than they should 18 30 40 29 
Paying about the right amount 25 29 29 27 
Paying less than they should 34 15 7 19 
Don’t know/not sure 23 26 24 25 
Rich people     
Paying more than they should 20 5 2 9 
Paying about the right amount 34 15 5 18 
Paying less than they should 39 72 88 66 
Don’t know/not sure 8 8 5 7 
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APPENDIX G 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE CV SURVEY 
Table G.1 Information on Survey Versions (n=1712) 
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Federal Program 885 52 
Scope 1 426 25 
Scope 2 459 27 
State Program 827 48 
Scope 1 410 24 
Scope 2 417 24 
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Table G.2 Demographic Information (n=1712) 
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Gender   
Male 925 54 
Female 787 46 
Age, mean (SD), years 53 (16) n/a 
Marital status   
Married 1027 60 
Widowed 93 5 
Divorced/separated 199 12 
Single 280 16 
Living with partner 113 7 
Race/ethnicity   
White 1333 78 
Hispanic 130 7 
African-American 151 9 
2 or more races 50 3 
Other 48 3 
Highest education   
Less than high school graduate 130 8 
High school or equivalent (e.g., GED) 470 27 
Some college  522 31 
Bachelor’s or graduate degree (e.g., BA, BS) 590 34 
Employment, %   
Paid employee 798 46 
Self employed 126 7 
Temporary layoff from a job 12 1 
Looking for work 131 8 
Retired 425 25 
Disabled 119 7 
Other 101 6 
Household Income, mean (SD), $ 69K (49K) n/a 
Household size, mean (SD) 2.6 (1.4) n/a 
1 child between 0-5 192 11 
2 or more children between 0-5 35 2 
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Table G.3 Ranking of Social Priorities (n=1712) 
Issue 
% of Most 
Important 
Votes 
% of Second-
Most 
Important 
Votes 
% of Least 
Important 
Votes 
% of Second-
Least 
Important 
Votes 
Crime 
5 5 6 7 
Education 
8 11 4 5 
Energy 
2 5 8 13 
Environment 
2 3 18 16 
Federal budget deficit 
26 17 5 5 
Health care 
10 15 3 4 
Homeland security 
3 8 6 8 
Housing 
<1 1 19 18 
Illegal immigration 
5 9 23 14 
Poverty 
5 8 6 9 
Unemployment 
33 18 2 2 
Missing 
0.06 0.12 0.12 0.36 
 
  
 346 
 
Table G.4 Perceived Local Childhood Poverty Rate (n=1712) 
Question: “What do you think the rate of childhood 
poverty is in your area, compared to the national 
average?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Much higher 98 6 
Somewhat higher 310 18 
About the same 536 31 
Somewhat lower 559 33 
Much lower 207 12 
Missing 2 0.12 
 
Table G.5 Subjects’ Experience with Poverty (n=1712) 
Question: “What has been your own experience with 
poverty? (Check all that apply)” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
I am not poor now and have never lived in poverty 506 30 
I grew up in a family in poverty and my family is still 
poor 
193 11 
I have been poor in the past, but I am not poor now. 430 25 
I was not poor in the past, but am poor now. 81 5 
Members of my family have experienced poverty, but I 
have not 
142 8 
Families in my neighborhood have experienced 
poverty 
214 13 
I am not poor now, but I feel like I could easily fall into 
poverty. I live pay check to pay check 
428 25 
None of the above 160 9 
Missing 9 1 
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Table G.6 Opinion on Government Early-childhood Programs (n=1712) 
Question: “What is your opinion about the current 
government early-childhood programs such as Head 
Start? (Check all that apply)” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
I do NOT know much about these programs 648 38 
I do NOT think Head Start is successful 193 11 
I think programs like Head Start can help children stay 
out of trouble 
617 36 
I think programs like Head Start can help children 
break out of poverty 
579 34 
I do NOT think programs like Head Start can help 
children break out of poverty 
177 10 
I think the government is wasting money on early 
childhood interventions 
88 5 
I think it is NOT the government’s job to fund these 
programs 
154 9 
I think the extended family should help with early child 
care 
323 19 
Missing 6 <1 
 
Table G.7 Participation to Government Early-childhood Program (n=1712) 
Question: “Has any of your children or a family member’s 
child participated government early-childhood program?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Yes 247 14 
No 1314 77 
Don’t know/not sure 146 9 
Missing 5 <1 
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Table G.8 Heckman Video (n=1712) 
Question: “Did you watch the video on the previous 
screen?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Yes 1625 95 
No 9 <1 
I tried, but I could not 77 4 
Missing 1 <1 
 
Table G.9 Reason for Investing on Early Childhood (n=1625) 
Question: Why does Prof. Heckman think America should 
invest in early childhood development?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
America has a large number of poor children 89 6 
Children in early ages are neglected in America 58 4 
Early childhood programs are good investments 1413 87 
Don’t know/Not sure 60 4 
Missing 5 <1 
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Table G.10 Funding Source and Likelihood of Success (n=1712) 
Question: How likely do you think it is that intensive early 
childhood development programs like the ones Prof. 
Heckman studied really can help children break out of 
poverty if they are funded by each of the sources listed 
below?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
The federal government   
Very unlikely 221 13 
Somewhat unlikely 235 14 
Neutral 362 21 
Somewhat likely 631 37 
Very likely 247 14 
Missing 16 1 
The state government   
Very unlikely 111 7 
Somewhat unlikely 244 14 
Neutral 392 23 
Somewhat likely 722 42 
Very likely 223 13 
Missing 20 1 
Private charities or local government   
Very unlikely 72 4 
Somewhat unlikely 133 8 
Neutral 361 21 
Somewhat likely 750 44 
Very likely 372 22 
Missing 24 1 
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Table G.11 Time-to-think Related Questions (n=1712) 
Category Number of Subjects Percentage of Subjects 
Activity (check all that apply)    
I thought about whether 
willing to pay 1030 60 
I discussed about whether 
willing to pay 290 17 
I read about early-
childhood programs 87 5 
I read about current 
government programs 94 5 
I did not think about this 
survey at all 507 30 
Missing 10 1 
(If discussed) Whom subjects 
talked to (check all that apply)   
Spouse/partner 201 12 
Children 39 2 
Parents 34 2 
Friends 86 5 
Other 29 2 
(If read) What subjects read 
(check all that apply)   
Websites/internet 114 7 
Books 5 <1 
Newspapers or magazines 27 2 
Brochures and pamphlets 26 2 
Other 23 1 
Time spent thinking or 
discussing, mean (SD) 36 min (45 min) 
Time between the first and 
second part, mean (SD) 58 rs 58 min (35 hrs 54 min) 
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Table G.12 Reasons for Better Jobs and Income (n=1712) 
Reason Mean (SD) 
Willingness to take risks 3.08 (1.0) 
Money inherited from families 2.88 (1.25) 
Hard work and initiative 4.11 (0.91) 
Ability or talent that a person is born with 3.26 (0.99) 
Taking advantage of others to get ahead 2.15 (1.20) 
Good luck, being in the right place at the right time 2.83 (1.08) 
Physical appearance and good looks 2.87 (1.05) 
Connections and knowing the right people 3.50 (1.05) 
Being a member of a particular race or ethnic group 2.35 (1.16) 
Getting the right education or training 4.06 (0.92) 
A person’s gender, that is whether they are male or female 2.27 1.07) 
 
Table G.13 Poverty Related Questions (n=1712) 
 Mean (SD) 
Chance of escaping poverty for the poor (1:very little, 5: very 
high chance) 
3.0 (1.0) 
My family has a good chance of improving our standard of 
living (1:strongly disagree, 5:strongly agree) 
2.9 (1.0) 
 
Table G.14 Responsibility to Help the Poor (n=1712) 
Question: “Group who should have the greatest and the 
least responsibility to help the poor?” 
Greatest 
responsibility 
N (%) 
Least 
responsibility 
N (%)) 
Churches 137 (8) 256 (15) 
Private charities 233 (14) 134 (8) 
Federal government 361 (21) 601 (35) 
State/local government 191 (11) 121 (7) 
Families and relatives of poor 192 (11) 284 (17) 
Poor themselves 595 (35) 307 (18) 
Missing 3 (<1) 9 (<1) 
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Table G.15 Federal Income Tax (n=1712) 
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
My household   
Paying more than I should 620 36 
Paying about the right amount 886 52 
Paying less than I should 63 4 
Don’t know/not sure 132 8 
Poor people   
Paying more than they should 496 29 
Paying about the right amount 466 27 
Paying less than they should 326 19 
Don’t know/not sure 414 24 
Rich people   
Paying more than they should 158 9 
Paying about the right amount 295 17 
Paying less than they should 1149 67 
Don’t know/not sure 104 6 
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Table G.16 Political Perspective (n=1712) 
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Government policy on buying a handgun   
More difficult 715 42 
Make it easier 164 10 
Keep these rules about the same 708 41 
Don’t know/not sure 118 7 
Missing 7 <1 
Abortion   
By law, abortion should never be permitted 212 12 
The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, 
incest or when the woman’s life is in danger 535 31 
By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an 
abortion as a matter of personal choice 847 50 
Don’t know/not sure 107 6 
Missing 11 <1 
Political perspective   
Extremely liberal 49 3 
Liberal 221 13 
Slightly liberal 154 9 
Moderate, middle of the road 522 30 
Slightly conservative 228 13 
Conservative 408 24 
Extremely conservative 79 5 
Libertarian 37 3 
Missing 14 1 
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Table G.17 Contingent Valuation Question: Vote in support of the early-childhood 
program and pay tax increase 
Bid Level 
Total Number of 
Subjects 
Subjects Who 
Voted “Yes” 
Federal Program, Small scale   
$10 61 34 
$25 67 40 
$50 60 20 
$100 56 22 
$300 61 27 
$1,000 67 16 
$2,000 52 8 
Federal Program, Big scale   
$10 77 41 
$25 56 33 
$50 59 35 
$100 59 24 
$300 74 27 
$1,000 56 17 
$2,000 71 12 
State Program, Small scale   
$10 58 41 
$25 56 33 
$50 55 35 
$100 61 29 
$300 60 18 
$1,000 61 11 
$2,000 56 6 
State Program, Big scale   
$10 56 35 
$25 65 36 
$50 58 29 
$100 65 37 
$300 54 16 
$1,000 65 14 
$2,000 52 4 
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Ϯ This statistics excluded the following subjects: 1) Subjects who did not indicate that they 
were “certain” or “very certain” of their answer to this question, 2) Subjects who said “yes” to 
a tax increase that was higher than 5% of subjects’ annual household income. 
 
Table G.18 Certainty on Voting “FOR” (n=861) 
Question: “How certain are you that you would want your 
representative to vote in favor of increased taxes for 
households like yours to fund the new intensive early-
childhood development program? 
Federal State 
Very uncertain 7 (2) 7 (2) 
Uncertain 14 (3) 9 (2) 
Not sure 53 (12) 55 (13) 
Certain 227 (52) 212 (50) 
Very certain 138 (31) 137 (33) 
Missing 1 (<1) 1 (<1) 
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Table G.19 Reason for Voting “FOR” (n=861) 
Question: “What are the most important and least 
important reasons that you said you would want your 
representative vote in support of funding?” 
Most 
important 
Least  
important 
I want to stop the cycle of parents passing on a 
culture of poverty to their children 
395 (46) 30 (4) 
The future of the economy depends on a well-trained 
labor force 
144 (17) 38 (4) 
It is possible that members of my family will be poor 
in the future and will need these programs 
17 (2) 200 (23) 
I want to improve the lives of poor children as soon 
as possible 
92 (11) 24 (3) 
Members of my family can benefit from these 
programs 
20 (2) 331 (38) 
These programs will reduce crime rates which affect 
us all 
52 (6) 27 (3) 
Paying for these programs now will mean lower taxes 
for me in the future because fewer people will be in 
prisons and more people will be paying taxes 
125 (14) 123 (14) 
Other  16 (2) 84 (10) 
Missing 0 (0) 3 (<1) 
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Table G.20 Reason for Voting “AGAINST” (n=835) 
Question: “What are the most important and least 
important reasons that you said you would want your 
representative vote against funding?” 
Most 
important 
Least  
important 
There are more important priorities for my tax dollars 61 (7) 84 (10) 
I am against any new taxes 119 (14) 85 (10) 
I cannot afford the tax increase 236 (28) 125 (15) 
I think other government programs should be reduced 
to pay for programs to reduce childhood poverty 
114 (14) 55 (7) 
I do not think the new early childhood development 
program would help reducing childhood poverty in the 
US/state 
39 (5) 81 (10) 
I do not think the new early childhood development 
program is any better than the current early childhood 
programs like Head Start 
33 (4) 90 (11) 
I do not think it is government’s job to fund these 
programs 
49 (6) 82 (10) 
I do not think the government should be involved with 
the care of very young children; this is the family’s 
responsibility. 
103 (12) 95 (11) 
The government should first fix the ineffective current 
programs like Head Start before investing in more 
children (only for scope 2) 
48 (6) 41 (5) 
Other  32 (4) 95 (11) 
Missing 1 (<1) 2 (<1) 
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APPENDIX H 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE BUDGET SURVEY 
Table H.1 Information on Survey Versions  
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Tax versus Credit   
Tax version 1920 93 
Credit version 141 7 
Program Version   
Version 1 503 24 
Version 2 624 30 
Version 3 469 23 
Version 4 465 23 
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Table H.2 Demographic Information (n=2061) 
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Gender   
Male 1061 51 
Female 1000 49 
Age, mean (SD), years 52(16) n/a 
Marital status   
Married 1237 60 
Widowed 99 5 
Divorced/separated 261 13 
Single 332 16 
Living with partner 132 6 
Race/ethnicity   
White 1576 76 
Hispanic 180 9 
African-American 191 9 
2 or more races 61 3 
Other 53 3 
Highest education   
Less than high school graduate 166 8 
High school or equivalent (e.g., GED) 552 27 
Some college  621 30 
Bachelor’s or graduate degree (e.g., BA, BS) 722 35 
Employment, %   
Paid employee 994 48 
Self employed 156 8 
Temporary layoff from a job 20 1 
Looking for work 135 7 
Retired 474 23 
Disabled 140 7 
Other 142 7 
Household Income, mean (SD), $ 72K (49K) n/a 
Household size, mean (SD) 2.7 (1.5) n/a 
1 child between 0-5 940 11 
2 or more children between 0-5 39 2 
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Table H.3 Ranking of Social Priorities (n=2061) 
Issue 
% of Most 
Important Votes 
% of Second-
Most 
Important 
Votes 
% of Least 
Important 
Votes 
% of Second-
Least 
Important 
Votes 
Crime 4 4 6 9 
Education 10 10 4 4 
Energy 1 5 9 11 
Environment 2 3 18 14 
Federal budget deficit 28 16 4 5 
Health care 11 15 2 4 
Homeland security 4 7 6 7 
Housing 1 2 20 20 
Illegal immigration 5 7 23 14 
Poverty 5 7 6 9 
Unemployment 29 24 2 2 
Missing 0 0 0.1 1 
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Table H.4 Subjects’ Experience with Poverty (n=1596) 
Question: “What has been your own experience with 
poverty? (Check all that apply)” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage 
of Subjects 
I am not poor now and have never lived in poverty 454 28 
I grew up in a family in poverty and my family is still poor 123 8 
I have been poor in the past, but I am not poor now. 337 21 
I was not poor in the past, but am poor now. 76 5 
Members of my family have experienced poverty, but I 
have not 
185 12 
Families in my neighborhood have experienced poverty 204 13 
I am not poor now, but I feel like I could easily fall into 
poverty. I live pay check to pay check 
500 31 
None of the above 169 11 
Missing 19 1 
 
Table H.5 Participation to Government Early-childhood Program (n=1596) 
Question: “Has any of your children or a family member’s 
child participated government early-childhood program?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Yes 256 16 
No 1125 71 
Don’t know/not sure 195 12 
Missing 20 1 
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Table H.6 Had Food Poisoning (n=1592) 
Question: “Within the last 5 years, have you or someone 
in your household had food poisoning?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Yes 286 18 
No 1082 68 
Not sure 206 13 
Missing 18 1 
 
Table H.7 Chance of Getting Food Poisoning (n=1592) 
Question: “How likely do you think is your chance of 
getting food poisoning sometime during the next 12 
months?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Not likely at all 368 23 
Somewhat unlikely 533 34 
Neutral 437 27 
Somewhat likely 198 12 
Very likely 29 2 
Missing 27 2 
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Table H.8 Lost a Job within the Last Three Years (n=1437) 
Question: “Have you or a member of your household 
lost a job within the last three years?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Yes 375 26 
No 1060 74 
Missing 2 0.1 
  
Table H.9 Participated Job-training Program (n=375) 
Question [If YES to Table 8]: “Have you or a family member 
participated in any government job-training program?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Yes 40 
No 332 
 
Table H.10 Type of Training (n=40) 
Question [If YES to Table 9]: “What kind of training did you or 
your family member receive?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Computer skills 19 
Communication skills 10 
Skills for green jobs 3 
Management/administrative skills 7 
Sales skills 5 
Job interview skills 14 
Skills for operation of heavy equipment 3 
Other 9 
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Table H.11 Received Help After a Natural Disaster (n=1558) 
Question: “Have you, a relative, or friend ever had to 
stay in a relief shelter or temporary housing, or received 
help because of a disaster, such as tornado, 
earthquake, hurricane, or flood?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Yes 157 10 
No 1384 89 
Missing 17 1 
  
Table H.12 Chance of a Large Natural Disaster (n=1558) 
Question: “In your opinion, how likely is it that a large 
natural disaster would affect your area in the next ten 
years?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Not likely at all 166 11 
Somewhat unlikely 444 29 
Neutral 332 21 
Somewhat likely 438 28 
Very likely 158 10 
Missing 20 1 
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Table H.13 Likelihood of Successful Program Outcomes  
Question: “How well do you think the government programs 
described in this survey actually work in producing 
successful outcomes?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage 
of Subjects 
The intensive early-childhood development program in 
helping children break out of poverty when they become 
adults (n=1596) 
  
1 Does not work at all 149 9 
2 332 21 
3 411 26 
4 384 24 
5 Works very well 143 9 
Don’t know/ not sure 173 11 
The food-safety monitoring program in reducing cases of 
food poisoning (n=1592) 
  
1 Does not work at all 65 4 
2 237 15 
3 495 31 
4 460 29 
5 Works very well 174 11 
Don’t know/ not sure 157 10 
The job-training programs helping unemployed people find 
jobs (n=1437) 
  
1 Does not work at all 117 8 
2 309 22 
3 444 31 
4 320 22 
5 Works very well 122 8 
Don’t know/ not sure 122 8 
The disaster-relief program in assisting households for their 
damaged property (n=1558) 
  
1 Does not work at all 66 4 
2 246 16 
3 486 31 
4 452 29 
5 Works very well 182 12 
Don’t know/ not sure 122 8 
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Table H.14 Time-to-think Related Questions  
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage 
of Subjects 
Activity (check all that apply) (n=2061)   
I thought about which social programs are important 1262 61 
I discussed which social programs are important with 
someone else 281 14 
I read some additional information about social programs 176 9 
I did not think about this survey at all 618 30 
(If discussed) Whom subjects talked to (n=281)   
Spouse/partner 172 8 
Children 36 2 
Parents 40 2 
Friends 128 6 
Other 30 1 
(If read) What subjects read (n=176)   
Websites/internet 133 6 
Books 12 1 
Newspapers or magazines 72 3 
Brochures and pamphlets 19 1 
Other 19 1 
Time spent thinking or discussing, mean (SD) 44 min (43 min) 
Time interval between the first and second part, mean (SD) 2 days 23hrs 17min (1day 
20hrs 4min) 
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Table H.15 Reasons for Better Jobs and Income (n=2061) 
Reason Mean (SD) 
Willingness to take risks 3.11 (0.98) 
Money inherited from families 2.94 (1.24) 
Hard work and initiative 4.10 (0.91) 
Ability or talent that a person is born with 3.26 (0.97) 
Taking advantage of others to get ahead 2.14 (1.16) 
Good luck, being in the right place at the right time 2.91 (1.06) 
Physical appearance and good looks 3.01 (1.03) 
Connections and knowing the right people 3.61 (1.01) 
Being a member of a particular race or ethnic group 2.40 (1.16) 
Getting the right education or training 4.06 (0.92) 
A person’s gender, that is whether they are male or female 2.33 1.07) 
 
Table H.16 Poverty Related Questions (n=2061) 
 Mean (SD) 
Chance of escaping poverty for the poor (1:very little, 5: very 
high chance) 
2.93 (1.02) 
My family has a good chance of improving our standard of 
living (1:strongly disagree, 5:strongly agree) 
2.90 1.08) 
 
Table H.17 Responsibility to Help the Poor (n=2061) 
Question: “Group who should have the greatest and the 
least responsibility to help the poor?” 
Greatest 
responsibility 
N (%) 
Least 
responsibility 
N (%)) 
Churches 190 (9) 272 (13) 
Private charities 247 (12) 165 (8) 
Federal government 448 (22) 754 (37) 
State/local government 253 (12) 154 (7) 
Families and relatives of poor 205 (10) 317 (15) 
Poor themselves 717 (35) 391 (19) 
Missing 1 (<1) 8 (<1) 
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Table H.18 Federal Income Tax (n=2061) 
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
My household   
Paying more than I should 711 37 
Paying about the right amount 966 50 
Paying less than I should 88 5 
Don’t know/not sure 148 8 
Poor people   
Paying more than they should 597 29 
Paying about the right amount 585 28 
Paying less than they should 377 18 
Don’t know/not sure 495 24 
Rich people   
Paying more than they should 182 9 
Paying about the right amount 375 18 
Paying less than they should 1337 65 
Don’t know/not sure 162 8 
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Table H.19 Political Perspective (n=2061) 
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage 
of Subjects 
Government policy on buying a handgun   
More difficult 874 42 
Make it easier 191 9 
Keep these rules about the same 872 42 
Don’t know/not sure 120 6 
Missing 4 <1 
Abortion   
By law, abortion should never be permitted 228 11 
The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, 
incest or when the woman’s life is in danger 677 33 
By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an 
abortion as a matter of personal choice 1026 50 
Don’t know/not sure 125 6 
Missing 5 <1 
Political perspective   
Extremely liberal 55 3 
Liberal 247 12 
Slightly liberal 227 11 
Moderate, middle of the road 632 31 
Slightly conservative 262 13 
Conservative 501 24 
Extremely conservative 84 4 
Libertarian 42 2 
Missing 11 1 
 
  
 370 
 
Table H.20 Policy Trade-off Question: Chose the budget alternative with 50% increase 
in the early-childhood program with tax increase 
Bid Level 
Total Number of 
Subjects 
Subjects Who 
Chose 50% 
increase in 
program with 
tax increase  
Tax Version   
$10 222 160 
$25 214 131 
$50 193 100 
$100 211 104 
$300 203 71 
$1,000 198 39 
$2,000 192 21 
Tax Version, Subjects insensitive to the 
cost attribute were dropped  
 
$10 149 96 
$25 147 76 
$50 134 56 
$100 137 49 
$300 136 30 
$1,000 127 11 
$2,000 121 7 
Ϯ This statistics excluded the following subjects: 1) Subjects who had no variation in their 
answers to the trade-off questions, 2) Subjects who chose a budget alternative with a tax 
increase that was higher than 5% of subjects’ annual household income. 
 
Table H.21 Inferred Valuation Question  
Category Mean (SD) Median 
Alternative A (Status quo) 63% (22%) 65% 
Alternative B 
(with 50% increase in poverty program and increase in tax) 
37% (22%) 35% 
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APPENDIX I 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON THE COUNTRYSURVEY 
Table I.1 Demographic Information (n=1010) 
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Gender   
Male 527 52 
Female 483 48 
Age, mean (SD), years 52(16) n/a 
Marital status   
Married 585 58 
Widowed 48 5 
Divorced/separated 137 13 
Single 169 17 
Living with partner 71 7 
Race/ethnicity   
White 775 77 
Hispanic 91 8 
African-American 34 9 
2 or more races 79 3 
Other 31 3 
Highest education   
Less than high school graduate 81 8 
High school or equivalent (e.g., GED) 277 27 
Some college  322 32 
Bachelor’s or graduate degree (e.g., BA, BS) 330 33 
Employment, %   
Paid employee 488 48 
Self employed 67 7 
Temporary layoff from a job 6 1 
Looking for work 75 7 
Retired 242 24 
Disabled 71 7 
Other 61 6 
Household Income, mean (SD), $ 71K (48K) n/a 
Household size, mean (SD) 2.6(1.3) n/a 
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Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
1 child between 0-5 119 12 
2 children between 0-5 20 2 
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Table I.2 Ranking of Social Priorities (n=1010) 
Issue 
% of Most 
Important Votes 
% of Second-
Most 
Important 
Votes 
% of Least 
Important 
Votes 
% of Second-
Least 
Important 
Votes 
Crime 6 5 5 6 
Education 9 10 4 6 
Energy 2 5 9 12 
Environment 3 2 18 17 
Federal budget deficit 27 17 5 5 
Health care 8 17 3 3 
Homeland security 4 7 4 8 
Housing 1 1 17 20 
Illegal immigration 5 6 25 13 
Poverty 5 8 7 7 
Unemployment 29 21 2 2 
Missing <1 <1 <1 <1 
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Table I.3 Avoid Outdoor Activity due to Air Pollution (n=1010) 
Question: “Within the last year, about how many days 
did you or your family avoid some outdoor activity 
because of air pollution?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
None 869 86 
1-2 days 56 6 
2-5 days 41 4 
5-10 days 22 2 
10-20 days 12 1 
More than 20 days 9 1 
Missing 1 <1 
 
Table I.4 Visiting National or State Parks (n=1010) 
Question: “Within the last 5 years, how many different 
national or state parks have you visited?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
None 269 27 
1-2 parks 383 38 
3-5 parks 235 23 
6-10 parks 87 9 
More than 10 parks 30 3 
Missing 6 <1 
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Table I.6 Subjects’ Experience with Poverty (n=1010) 
Question: “What has been your own experience with 
poverty? (Check all that apply)” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage 
of Subjects 
I am not poor now and have never lived in poverty 330 33 
I grew up in a family in poverty and my family is still poor 65 6 
I have been poor in the past, but I am not poor now. 250 25 
I was not poor in the past, but am poor now. 55 5 
Members of my family have experienced poverty, but I 
have not 
106 11 
Families in my neighborhood have experienced poverty 118 12 
I am not poor now, but I feel like I could easily fall into 
poverty. I live pay check to pay check 
252 25 
None of the above 99 10 
Missing 1 <1 
 
Table I.7 Perceived Local Childhood Poverty Rate (n=1010) 
Question: “What do you think the rate of childhood 
poverty is in your area, compared to the national 
average?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Much higher 48 5 
Somewhat higher 163 16 
About the same 319 32 
Somewhat lower 319 32 
Much lower 159 15 
Missing 2 <1 
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Table I.8 Quality of Health Insurance (n=1010) 
Question: “How would you rate your current health 
insurance coverage?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Good 616 61 
Fair 246 24 
Poor 44 4 
Don’t have insurance now 103 10 
Missing 1 <1 
 
Table I.9 Wait Time to See a Specialist (n=1010) 
Question: “What is the longest you have had to wait to 
see a specialist?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
No more than a few days 157 16 
About 1 week 152 15 
About 2 weeks 198 20 
About 3 weeks 104 10 
About 1 month 123 12 
About 2 months 62 6 
About 3 months 22 2 
More than 3 months 31 3 
Not applicable 158 16 
Missing 3 <1 
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Table I.10 Number of Moves (n=1010) 
Question: “How many times have you moved to a 
different town or city in your lifetime?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Never moved 117 12 
1-2 times 268 26 
3-5 times 320 32 
6-10 times 198 20 
More than 10 times 101 10 
Missing 6 <1 
 
Table I.11 Important Factors when Moving (n=1010) 
Factor Mean (SD) 
Schools 1.92 (0.88) 
Health services 1.90 (0.77) 
Air quality 1.82 (0.76) 
Crime rate 2.33 (0.74) 
Housing prices 2.50 (0.69) 
Cost of living 2.34 0.71) 
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Table I.12 Lived in a Foreign Country (n=1010) 
Question: “Have you ever lived in a foreign country for 
more than one year?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Yes 135 13 
No 874 87 
Missing 1 <1 
 
Table I.13 Considered Moving to a Foreign Country (n=1010) 
Question: “Have you ever seriously considered moving to 
a foreign country to live for more than one year?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Yes 186 18 
No 685 68 
Not applicable 135 13 
Missing 4 <1 
 
Table I.14 Visited a Foreign Country (n=1010) 
Question: “About how many foreign countries have you 
visited in your lifetime?” 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
None 248 25 
1-2 350 35 
3-5 169 17 
More than 5 241 24 
Missing 2 <1 
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Table I.15 Time-to-think Related Questions  
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage 
of Subjects 
Activity (check all that apply) (n=1010)   
I thought about what was important about moving to a 
different country 568 56 
I discussed what was important about moving to a 
different country with someone else 144 14 
I read some additional information about 
environmental quality, childhood poverty, health care, 
or cost of living 74 7 
I did not think about this survey at all 357 35 
(If discussed) Whom subjects talked to    
Spouse/partner 107 11 
Children 18 2 
Parents 18 2 
Friends 55 5 
Other 5 <1 
(If read) What subjects read    
Websites 56 6 
Books 10 1 
Newspapers or magazines 23 2 
Brochures and pamphlets 2 <1 
Other 9 1 
Time spent thinking or discussing, mean (SD) 45 min (60 min) 
Time interval between the first and second part, mean 
(SD) 
2 days 23hrs 18min (1day 
20hrs 14min) 
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Table I.16 Reasons for Better Jobs and Income (n=1010) 
Reason Mean (SD) 
Willingness to take risks 3.25 (0.96) 
Money inherited from families 3.02 (1.23) 
Hard work and initiative 4.11 (0.91) 
Ability or talent that a person is born with 3.39 (0.98) 
Taking advantage of others to get ahead 2.18 (1.23) 
Good luck, being in the right place at the right time 3.00 (1.06) 
Physical appearance and good looks 3.00 (1.01) 
Connections and knowing the right people 3.62 (1.04) 
Being a member of a particular race or ethnic group 2.39 (1.15) 
Getting the right education or training 4.05 (0.93) 
A person’s gender, that is whether they are male or female 2.38 1.12) 
 
Table I.17 Poverty Related Questions (n=1010) 
 Mean (SD) 
Chance of escaping poverty for the poor (1:very little, 5: very 
high chance) 
3.03 (1.01) 
My family has a good chance of improving our standard of 
living (1:strongly disagree, 5:strongly agree) 
3.04 1.06) 
 
Table I.18 Responsibility to Help the Poor (n=1010) 
Question: “Group who should have the greatest and the 
least responsibility to help the poor?” 
Greatest 
responsibility 
N (%) 
Least 
responsibility 
N (%)) 
Churches 90 (9) 139 (14) 
Private charities 100 (10) 77 (8) 
Federal government 274 (27) 348 (34) 
State/local government 108 (11) 80 (8) 
Families and relatives of poor 97 (9) 154 (15) 
Poor themselves 340 (34) 211 (21) 
Missing 1 (<1) 1 (<1) 
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Table I.19 Federal Income Tax (n=1010) 
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
My household   
Paying more than I should 366 36 
Paying about the right amount 501 50 
Paying less than I should 33 3 
Don’t know/not sure 103 10 
Poor people   
Paying more than they should 302 30 
Paying about the right amount 255 25 
Paying less than they should 182 18 
Don’t know/not sure 265 26 
Rich people   
Paying more than they should 79 8 
Paying about the right amount 184 18 
Paying less than they should 653 65 
Don’t know/not sure 91 9 
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Table I.20 Political Perspective (n=1010) 
Category 
Number of 
Subjects 
Percentage of 
Subjects 
Government policy on buying a handgun   
More difficult 448 44 
Make it easier 89 9 
Keep these rules about the same 406 40 
Don’t know/not sure 65 6 
Abortion   
By law, abortion should never be permitted 120 12 
The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, 
incest or when the woman’s life is in danger 331 33 
By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an 
abortion as a matter of personal choice 486 48 
Don’t know/not sure 68 7 
Political perspective   
Extremely liberal 17 2 
Liberal 109 11 
Slightly liberal 113 11 
Moderate, middle of the road 336 33 
Slightly conservative 118 12 
Conservative 239 24 
Extremely conservative 47 5 
Libertarian 21 2 
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Table I.21 Policy Trade-off Question: Chose the country with 50% lower poverty with 
higher cost of livingϮ 
Bid Level 
Total Number of 
Subjects 
Subjects Who 
Chose 50% lower 
poverty with higher 
cost of living  
$50 138 98 
$100 138 96 
$300 147 84 
$1,000 147 71 
$2,000 142 46 
$5,000 130 26 
$10,000 155 34 
Ϯ This statistics excluded the following subjects: 1) Subjects who had no variation in their 
answers to the trade-off questions, 2) Subjects who chose a country with a cost of living 
increase that was higher than 5% of subjects’ annual household income. 
 
Table I.22 Inferred Valuation Question  
Category Mean (SD) Median 
Country A (Same as the US) 58% (25%) 60% 
Country B 
(with 50% lower poverty and increase in cost of living) 
42% (25%) 40% 
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APPENDIX J 
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
Factor analysis was used to reduce the number of explanatory variables. Principal 
component analysis, which assumes no unique factors, was used to analyze the correlation 
matrix. The factor analysis was performed on 11 attitudinal questions on why some people 
have better jobs and higher incomes than others, 2 questions on the chances of social 
mobility, and 3 questions on ideology (gun control, abortion and self-identification of 
ideology). Table J.1 shows that five factors were sufficient because they had eigenvalues 
higher than 1. 
Table J.2 shows the rotated factor loadings for five factors after using varimax 
rotation. The bold estimates indicate the highest factor loading for each covariate.  
Table J.3 shows the covariates that were highly correlated with each factor, and the 
labels assigned to each factor based on the correlated covariates. For example, factor 3 
was called “social ideology” since it was highly correlated with questions on gun control, 
abortion and self-identified political ideology. This analysis provided factor scores for each 
person for these 5 factors. For example, a high positive score for social ideology indicated 
being a liberal, whereas a highly negative score indicated being a conservative.  
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Table J.1 Factor Analysis, Using the Principal-Component Analysis 
FACTORS Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor 1 3.529 1.380 0.221 0.221 
Factor 2 2.149 0.644 0.134 0.355 
Factor 3 1.505 0.333 0.094 0.449 
Factor 4 1.171 0.127 0.073 0.522 
Factor 5 1.045 0.201 0.065 0.587 
Factor 6 0.844 0.014 0.053 0.640 
Factor 7 0.830 0.084 0.052 0.692 
Factor 8 0.746 0.046 0.047 0.739 
Factor 9 0.700 0.104 0.044 0.782 
Factor 10 0.596 0.028 0.037 0.820 
Factor 11 0.568 0.042 0.036 0.855 
Factor 12 0.525 0.023 0.033 0.888 
Factor 13 0.502 0.029 0.031 0.919 
Factor 14 0.473 0.031 0.030 0.949 
Factor 15 0.442 0.065 0.028 0.977 
Factor 16 0.376 . 0.024 1.000 
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(120) = 1.3e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.000 
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Table J.2 Rotated Factor Loadings 
COVARITES Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Attitudinal questions
ұ
 (Not at all 
important to extremely important) 
     
Willingness to take risks 0.405 -0.170 -0.218 0.317 0.298 
Money inherited 0.564 0.252 0.136 -0.131 -0.079 
Hard work and initiative -0.021 -0.204 -0.200 0.763 0.164 
Ability or talent born with 0.398 0.090 -0.048 0.512 0.005 
Taking advantage of others to get 
ahead 
0.579 0.341 0.056 -0.344 -0.024 
Good luck 0.757 0.119 0.079 -0.017 -0.064 
Physical appearance and good 
looks 
0.478 0.451 -0.060 0.160 -0.017 
Connections and knowing the right 
people 
0.651 0.361 0.088 0.107 -0.108 
Race or ethnicity 0.211 0.813 0.075 -0.041 -0.035 
Education or training -0.082 0.163 0.140 0.762 0.015 
A person’s gender 0.134 0.835 0.061 -0.007 -0.033 
Social mobility questions (less 
likely to more likely) 
     
Chance of escaping from poverty 
for the poor 
-0.071 -0.112 -0.276 0.077 0.756 
Chance of improving the standard 
of living for my household 
-0.045 0.023 0.123 0.063 0.860 
Political ideology questions 
(conservative to liberal) 
     
Gun control  -0.102 0.186 0.662 0.113 -0.016 
Abortion  0.203 -0.117 0.694 -0.022 -0.032 
Self-identified political ideology  0.059 0.111 0.802 -0.119 -0.039 
ұ 
This question asks how important each category is for why some people have better jobs and higher 
incomes than others.  
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Table J.3 Covariates Associated with and Labels for Each Factor  
Factors Covariates Associated with the Factor 
Factor 1: Wealth because of luck 
Willingness to take risks, money inherited, 
taking advantage of others to get ahead, good 
luck, physical appearance and good looks 
Factor 2: Wealth because of bias 
Physical appearance and good looks, race or 
ethnicity and a person’s gender 
Factor 3: Social ideology  
Gun control, abortion and self-identified 
political ideology 
Factor 4: Wealth because of hard 
work and intelligence 
Hard work and initiative, ability or talent born 
with and education or training 
Factor 5: Chance of social mobility 
Chance of escaping from poverty for the poor, 
chance of improving the standard of living for 
my household 
 
  
 388 
 
APPENDIX K 
ESTIMATES 
Table K.1 Budget Survey Mixed-Logit Parameter Estimates and Standard Deviations 
(standard errors in parenthesis)  
 
Moderates Liberals Conservatives Main-Effects 
 Parameter 
(St. Error) 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
St. Deviation 
(St. Error) 
Early childhood 
Decrease 
-0.031*** 
(0.003) 
-0.049*** 
(0.004) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.038*** 
(0.003) 
Increase 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Increase (for 
Subjects with 
Experience) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.030*** 
(0.005) 
0.012**  
(0.005) 
NA 
Food safety  
Decrease 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-0.027*** 
(0.003) 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.028*** 
(0.003) 
Increase 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
Job training  
Decrease 
-0.026*** 
(0.002) 
-0.026*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.033*** 
(0.003) 
Increase 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.021*** 
(0.003) 
Disaster relief  
Decrease 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Increase 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.018*** 
(0.003) 
Taxes (non-random) 
Higher 
-10.799*** 
(0.446) 
NA 
Lower 
0.205*** 
(0.047) 
0.003 
(0.061) 
0.569*** 
(0.053) 
NA 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level, and *** indicates at the 
1% level 
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Table K.1 Budget Survey Mixed-Logit Parameter Estimates, continued 
 
Main-Effects 
 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
St. Deviation 
(St. Error) 
Interactions 
Child_inc * Food_inc 
4.54E-04*** 
(8.72E-05) 
NA 
Job_inc * Disaster_inc 
3.17E-04*** 
(9.28E-05) 
NA 
Scale  
Version 2 
-0.077*** 
(0.029) 
0.015 
(0.454) 
Version 3 
0.020 
(0.031) 
0.132 
(0.102) 
Version 4 
-0.038 
(0.031) 
0.023 
(0.301) 
Non-attendant to the cost attribute 
Higher 
10.467*** 
(0.445) 
NA 
Lower 
-0.481*** 
(0.063) 
NA 
   
N of observations 1896 
Log Likelihood -6052.083 
Degrees of freedom 42 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level, and *** indicates at the 
1% level 
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Table K.2 Country Survey Mixed-Logit Parameter Estimates and Standard Deviations 
 Beta Standard Deviation 
 Coefficient St. Error Coefficient St. Error 
Childhood poverty 
Worse -0.035*** 0.002 0.022*** 0.003 
Worse for 
Conservatives 
-0.024*** 0.003   
Better -0.001 0.002 0.017*** 0.004 
Environmental quality 
Worse -0.031*** 0.002 0.027*** 0.003 
Worse for 
Conservatives 
-0.021*** 0.004   
Better 0.001 0.002 0.016*** 0.003 
Health care 
Worse -0.043*** 0.003 0.034*** 0.003 
Better 0.006*** 0.002 0.016*** 0.004 
Cost of living 
Higher -0.583*** 0.032   
Lower 0.072*** 0.008   
Non-attendant to the cost attribute 
Higher 0.586*** 0.032   
Lower -0.058*** 0.010   
     
N of observations 997    
Log Likelihood -3270.586    
Degrees of freedom 18    
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level, and *** indicates at the 
1% level 
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APPENDIX L 
SIMPLE MODEL ESTIMATES  
CV Survey 
Table L.1 presents the mean annual WTP based on the parametric and 
nonparametric estimates, while Table L.2 presents these values for each ideological group. 
The mean WTP values from the nonparametric estimates were much higher than those from 
the parametric estimates. The mean WTP values from the nonparametric estimates were 
higher for the federal program than state programs, but this was not necessarily the case for 
the values from the parametric estimates. They were also slightly smaller for a small-scale 
program than for a large-scale program at the federal level, but the reverse was the case at 
state-level programs.  
Liberals had the highest mean WTP values for each type of program while 
conservatives had the lowest mean WTP values, except for the big-scale state programs 
where moderates had the lowest mean WTP (Table L.2). The range of the mean WTP 
values based on the parametric analysis was narrower for different types of programs than 
the range of the mean Turnbull WTP values. This might be due to the fact that the 
parametric analysis control for other socio-economic characteristics as well. Based on the 
non-parametric estimators, all ideological groups had positive WTP for the early-childhood 
program unlike the results from the parametric analysis where conservatives had negative 
mean WTP. The negative WTP values can be explained by two reasons: 1) distributional 
assumptions in the binomial-probit model, and 2) the bid distribution in the CV survey was 
out of range for conservatives in the sample. Negative WTP in this context indicates that 
conservatives were not willing to pay for the early-childhood program.  
Budget Survey 
Table L.3 presents the conditional-logit estimates of symmetric, asymmetric and 
categorical models, respectively, for the budget survey before controlling for non-attendance 
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to the cost attribute. The parameter estimates were all significant and positive for the 
programs and negative for tax in the symmetric model which indicates that utility was 
positively correlated with program increases and tax reductions, and negatively with 
program decreases and tax increases. The parameter estimates for program decreases 
were significantly negative based on the asymmetric and categorical models. The parameter 
estimates for program increases were either not significant or significantly positive, except 
for increases in food-safety program, which has a significantly negative sign. The tax 
parameter was significantly negative for increases and significantly positive for reductions 
based on the asymmetric and categorical models. The main difference between the models 
where non-attendance to the cost attribute was uncontrolled (Table L.3) and controlled 
(Table L.4) was that the parameter estimates for increases in 3 programs became 
significantly positive in the controlled model. 
All of the mean WTP values based on the symmetric model, and WTP values for 
50% program decreases based on the asymmetric and categorical models were smaller 
based on the controlled models than the corresponding uncontrolled models (Table L.5). 
The WTP values were significantly positive for 50% increases in programs, except for the 
food-safety program based on the controlled model, while subjects were not willing to pay 
for program increases based on the uncontrolled models.  
The attributes were interacted with ideology, and Table L.6 presents the asymmetric 
model estimates for each ideological group. The parameter estimates for program 
reductions were significantly negative for ideological groups, but preferences for program 
increases varied by ideology. The parameter estimates for program increases were 
significantly positive for moderates and liberals, while the parameter estimate is significant 
for conservatives only for increases in the job-training program. 
Table L.7 presents the model estimates investigating nonlinearity of the variables. The 
square of each variable in Table L.4 was included for the symmetric and asymmetric 
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models. The parameter estimates were all significant in the symmetric model. In the 
asymmetric model, however, the parameter estimates for program decreases were 
significantly negative, but only the parameter estimate for increases in the early-childhood 
program was significant. Two of the parameter estimates for program increases became 
insignificant when their squares were included in the model. All the squared variables had 
significantly negative parameter estimates in the symmetric model, which indicates that the 
utility for programs and taxes are changing at a decreasing rate. However, among the 
squared variables in the asymmetric model, only the parameter estimates associated with 
the decrease in job-training program and increases in taxes were significant. The utility 
function for reductions in the job-training program decreases at an increasing rate and the 
utility function for increases in taxes decreases at a decreasing rate.  
Country Survey 
Table L.8 presents the conditional-logit estimates of the symmetric, asymmetric and 
categorical models, respectively, for the country survey before controlling for non-
attendance to the cost attribute. The parameter estimates were all significant and positive 
for the quality-of-life attributes and negative for cost-of-living in the symmetric model which 
indicates that utility was positively correlated with quality-of-life improvements and cost-of-
living reductions, and negatively with quality-of-life deterioration and cost-of-living increases. 
The parameter estimates for deterioration in the quality-of-life attributes were significantly 
negative based on the asymmetric and categorical models. However, the parameter 
estimates for improvements in the quality-of-life attributes significantly negative for childhood 
poverty and environmental quality in the asymmetric model, and only for childhood poverty 
in the categorical model. Improvements in access to health care was not significantly 
different than zero in the asymmetric model. The only improvement that subjects 
significantly value was for a 25% improvement in health care in the categorical model. The 
cost-of-living parameter was significantly negative for increases and significantly positive for 
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reductions. In the models where non-attendance to the cost attribute was controlled (Table 
L.9), the parameter estimates for improvements in childhood poverty and environmental 
quality became insignificant, and estimates for improvements in health care became 
significantly positive. 
All of the mean WTP values based on the symmetric model, and WTP values for 
50% deterioration in quality-of-life attributes based on the asymmetric and categorical 
models were smaller based on the controlled models than the corresponding uncontrolled 
models (Table L.10). Subjects only valued improvements in health care based on the 
controlled models. 
Table L.11 presents the asymmetric model estimates for each ideological group. The 
parameter estimates for deterioration in quality-of-life attributes were significantly negative 
for ideological groups, but preferences for improvements varied by ideology. The parameter 
estimate for improvements in health care was significantly positive for moderates and 
liberals, while conservatives did not value any improvements.  
Table L.12 presents the model estimates investigating nonlinearity of the variables in 
the country survey by including the square of each variable in the symmetric and 
asymmetric models. The parameter estimates associated with squared variables were all 
significant in the symmetric model while they were only significant for the cost-of-living in the 
asymmetric model. The utility function for increases in cost-of-living decreases at a 
decreasing rate, and the utility function for reductions in cost-of-living increases at a 
decreasing rate. 
Overall the categorical and asymmetric models fit the budget and country data better 
than the symmetric model with smaller (in magnitude) log-likelihood and AIC. These models 
also denoted preference asymmetry between increases and decreases from the status quo. 
Controlling for non-attendance to the cost attribute produced parameter estimates closer to 
expectations and more reasonable WTP estimates. The models with square of variables 
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indicate that preference asymmetry persisted even after controlling for nonlinearity. Overall 
the pattern of the estimates and WTP values from the conditional-logit models were parallel 
to the results from the mixed-logit model estimates for both the budget and country surveys. 
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Table L.1 CV Survey Mean Annual WTP Values per Household from the 
Nonparametric and Parametric Estimates 
 
Turnbull 
Estimator 
(standard errors 
in parenthesis) 
Kristom 
Estimator 
Parametric 
Estimates 
(standard errors 
in parenthesis) 
Federal program – Small scale  $402 (58) $522 $203 (76) 
Federal program – Big scale
 
$497 (63) $599 $188 (75) 
State program – Small scale $345 (55) $449 $211 (78) 
State program – Big scale $330 (52) $460 $195 (77) 
 
Table L.2 CV Survey Mean Annual WTP Values per Household (standard errors in 
parenthesis) by Ideology  
 Turnbull Estimator Parametric Estimates  
 Moderate Liberal 
Conserva
tive 
Moderate Liberal 
Conservat
ive 
Federal program 
– Small scale  
$314  
(80) 
$715  
(136) 
$183  
(51) 
$240 
(92) 
$755 
(103) 
-$375 
(114) 
Federal program 
– Big scale
 
$422  
(102) 
$742  
(116) 
$149  
(59) 
$224 
(91) 
$739 
(102) 
-$390 
(113) 
State program – 
Small scale 
$299  
(82) 
$673  
(146) 
$104  
(36) 
$261 
(117) 
$776 
(125) 
-$354 
(135) 
State program – 
Big scale 
$92 
(15) 
$510  
(105) 
$156 
(76) 
$246 
(115) 
$761 
(122) 
-$369 
(132) 
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Table L.3 Budget Survey Conditional-Logit Parameter Estimates of the Symmetric 
Linear, Asymmetric Linear and Categorical Models, Not controlled for Non-
Attendance to the Cost Attribute 
 
Symmetric 
Linear 
Asymmetric 
Linear 
Categorical 
 Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio 
Early childhood  0.008 19.578     
Decrease 
  -0.015 -17.570   
Increase 
  0.001 1.291   
50% decrease 
    -0.729 -15.992 
25% decrease 
    -0.438 -10.017 
25% increase 
    0.134 3.000 
50% increase 
    0.049 1.058 
Food safety  0.004 10.218     
Decrease 
  -0.011 -12.266   
Increase 
  -0.003 -3.702   
50% decrease 
    -0.525 -11.608 
25% decrease 
    -0.277 -6.369 
25% increase 
    -0.022 -0.484 
50% increase 
    -0.162 -3.488 
Job training  0.006 14.296     
Decrease 
  -0.011 -12.049   
Increase 
  0.001 0.691   
50% decrease 
    -0.482 -10.469 
25% decrease 
    -0.386 -8.623 
25% increase 
    0.109 2.420 
50% increase 
    -0.007 -0.149 
Disaster relief 0.004 9.211     
Decrease 
  -0.008 -8.996   
Increase 
  -0.001 -1.422   
50% decrease 
      
 398 
 
25% decrease 
    -0.360 -7.884 
25% increase 
    -0.194 -4.392 
50% increase 
    0.104 2.288 
Taxes -0.429 -32.730     
Increase   -0.993 -35.587 -0.998 -35.761 
Decrease   0.097 5.238 0.109 5.829 
Version       
Version 2 -0.040 -2.227 -0.037 -1.926 -0.041 -2.146 
Version 3 0.020 1.073 0.023 1.157 0.018 0.886 
Version 4 -0.014 -0.735 -0.011 -0.574 -0.013 -0.668 
       
N of subjects 
1896  1896  1896  
Log Likelihood 
-8393  -7769  -7742  
AIC 
1.27  1.18  1.17  
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Table L.4 Budget Survey Conditional-Logit Parameter Estimates of the Symmetric 
Linear, Asymmetric Linear and Categorical Models, Controlled for Non-Attendance to 
the Cost Attribute 
 
Symmetric 
Linear 
Asymmetric 
Linear 
Categorical 
 Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio 
Early childhood  0.009 21.016     
Decrease 
  -0.018 -18.956   
Increase 
  0.007 7.315   
50% decrease 
    -0.895 -17.860 
25% decrease 
    -0.529 -11.216 
25% increase 
    0.177 3.626 
50% increase 
    0.348 6.627 
Food safety  0.005 10.607     
Decrease 
  -0.011 -11.996   
Increase 
  0.002 2.331   
50% decrease 
    -0.584 -11.825 
25% decrease 
    -0.310 -6.670 
25% increase 
    0.016 0.333 
50% increase 
    0.115 2.194 
Job training  0.007 15.125     
Decrease 
  -0.012 -12.542   
Increase 
  0.006 6.054   
50% decrease 
    -0.598 -11.792 
25% decrease 
    -0.477 -9.918 
25% increase 
    0.094 1.897 
50% increase 
    0.263 4.913 
Disaster relief 0.004 10.299     
Decrease 
  -0.009 -9.116   
Increase 
  0.005 4.567   
50% decrease 
    -0.439 -8.759 
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25% decrease 
    -0.260 -5.474 
25% increase 
    0.128 2.612 
50% increase 
    0.203 3.809 
Taxes -0.792 -40.115     
Higher   -7.297 -30.167 -7.328 -29.961 
Lower   0.199 8.042 0.193 7.732 
Non-attendant to 
cost attribute 
      
Increase   7.130 29.293 7.157 29.070 
Decrease   -0.373 -9.338 -0.360 -8.976 
Version       
Version 2 -0.048 -2.587 -0.053 -2.562 -0.054 -2.594 
Version 3 0.013 0.678 0.014 0.641 0.015 0.674 
Version 4 -0.019 -0.964 -0.026 -1.211 -0.024 -1.114 
       
N of subjects 
1896  1896  1896  
Log Likelihood 
-7877  -6521  -6510  
AIC 
1.19  0.99  0.99  
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Table L.5 Budget Survey Mean Annual WTP per Household from the Conditional-Logit 
Parameter Estimates, Controlled for Non-Attendance to the Cost Attribute 
 Uncontrolled Controlled 
 WTP T Ratio WTP T Ratio 
Symmetric Linear Model 
Early childhood 
$959 18.92 $587 20.96 
Food safety 
$493 10.30 $290 10.72 
Job training 
$704 14.18 $424 15.22 
Disaster relief 
$444 9.32 $283 10.47 
Asymmetric Linear Model 
Early childhood     
50% decrease 
$780 15.75 $126 16.82 
50% increase 
$57 1.30 $50 7.43 
Food safety     
50% decrease 
$537 -11.57 $78 11.29 
50% increase 
-$165 -3.65 $16 2.36 
Job training     
50% decrease 
$538 11.32 $84 11.78 
50% increase 
$31 0.69 $42 6.17 
Disaster relief     
50% decrease 
$399 8.69 $60 8.80 
50% increase 
-$64 -1.42 $32 4.64 
Categorical Model 
Early childhood 
    
50% decrease 
$731 14.58 $122 16.17 
50% increase 
$49 1.06 $48 6.71 
Food safety     
50% decrease 
$526 11.02 $80 11.19 
50% increase 
-$163 -3.45 $16 2.22 
Job training     
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50% decrease 
$483 9.96 $82 11.23 
50% increase 
-$7 -0.15 $36 4.99 
Disaster relief     
50% decrease 
$361 7.67 $60 8.52 
50% increase 
-$69 -1.46 $28 3.86 
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Table L.6 By Ideology: Budget Survey Conditional-Logit Parameter Estimates and 
Mean Annual WTP per Household from the Asymmetric Linear Model, Controlled for 
Non-Attendance to the Cost Attribute 
 
Moderate / Main-
Effects 
Liberal Conservative 
 Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio 
Early childhood        
Decrease 
-0.019 -12.125 -0.029 -15.168 -0.010 -6.021 
Increase 
0.006 3.979 0.013 6.975 0.003 1.655 
Food safety        
Decrease 
-0.009 -6.023 -0.017 -9.169 -0.011 -6.317 
Increase 
0.004 2.322 0.003 1.709 0.000 -0.208 
Job training        
Decrease 
-0.014 -9.017 -0.019 -9.765 -0.006 -3.756 
Increase 
0.007 4.146 0.008 4.391 0.004 2.018 
Disaster relief       
Decrease 
-0.008 -5.366 -0.013 -7.118 -0.007 -3.876 
Increase 
0.006 3.950 0.007 3.579 0.000 0.031 
Taxes       
Increase -7.279 -29.165 -7.223 -28.722 -7.162 -28.626 
Decrease 0.117 3.323 -7.367 -29.021 -7.042 -27.965 
Non-attendant to 
cost attribute 
      
Increase 7.054 28.515     
Decrease -0.313 -7.570     
Version       
Version 2 -0.055 -2.620     
Version 3 0.015 0.669     
Version 4 -0.026 -1.207     
       
N of subjects 
1896      
Log Likelihood 
-6373      
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AIC 
0.97      
 
      
 
Mean 
WTP 
T ratio 
Mean 
WTP 
T ratio 
Mean 
WTP 
T ratio 
Early childhood        
50% Decrease 
$128 11.44 $204 13.77 $71 5.93 
50% Increase 
$43 4.01 $88 6.93 $21 1.67 
Food safety        
50% Decrease 
$63 5.93 $117 8.81 $74 6.17 
50% Increase 
$25 2.34 $21 1.72 -$3 -0.21 
Job training        
50% Decrease 
$96 8.73 $131 9.34 $44 3.72 
50% Increase 
$45 4.18 $58 4.41 $26 2.03 
Disaster relief       
50% Decrease 
$57 5.29 $93 6.94 $46 3.85 
50% Increase 
$43 3.99 $46 3.59 $0 0.03 
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Table L.7 Budget Survey Conditional-Logit Parameter Estimates of the Symmetric 
Nonlinear and Asymmetric Nonlinear Models, Controlled for Non-Attendance to the 
Cost Attribute 
 
Symmetric 
Nonlinear 
Asymmetric 
Nonlinear 
 Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio 
Early childhood  0.010 20.343   
Childhood^2 
-1.43E-04 -9.906   
Decrease 
  -0.024 -7.197 
Increase 
  0.007 1.961 
Decrease^2 
  1.30E-04 1.970 
Increase^2 
  -1.07E-05 -0.153 
Food safety  0.004 9.537   
Food^2 
-1.49E-04 -10.284   
Decrease 
  -0.013 -3.907 
Increase 
  -0.001 -0.356 
Decrease^2 
  2.89E-05 0.439 
Increase^2 
  6.11E-05 0.878 
Job training  0.007 14.181   
Job^2 
-1.14E-04 -7.728   
Decrease 
  -0.026 -7.579 
Increase 
  0.002 0.560 
Decrease^2 
  2.84E-04 4.224 
Increase^2 
  5.57E-05 0.782 
Disaster relief 0.004 9.242   
Disaster^2 
-1.04E-04 -7.071   
Decrease 
  -0.012 -3.552 
Increase 
  0.006 1.716 
Decrease^2 
  6.55E-05 0.982 
Increase^2 
  -5.26E-05 -0.745 
Taxes -1.059 -40.904   
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Taxes^2 -0.266 -26.503   
Increase   -7.036 -27.188 
Decrease   0.482 2.608 
Increase^2   -0.431 -3.340 
Decrease^2   -0.142 -1.572 
Non-attendant to 
cost attribute 
1.073 32.743   
Increase   7.750 24.978 
Decrease   -0.339 -8.341 
Version     
Version 2 -0.040 -1.995 -0.050 -2.393 
Version 3 0.021 1.012 0.019 0.859 
Version 4 -0.009 -0.409 -0.020 -0.919 
     
N of subjects 
1896  1896  
Log Likelihood 
-7154  -6504  
AIC 
1.08  0.99  
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Table L.8 Country Survey Conditional-Logit Parameter Estimates of the Symmetric 
Linear, Asymmetric Linear and Categorical Models, Not controlled for Non-
Attendance to the Cost Attribute 
 
Symmetric 
Linear 
Asymmetric 
Linear 
Categorical 
 Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio 
Childhood poverty 
0.008 15.512     
Decrease 
  -0.018 -16.596   
Increase 
  -0.003 -2.483   
50% decrease 
    -0.922 -16.276 
25% decrease 
    -0.519 -9.574 
25% increase 
    -0.149 -2.507 
50% increase 
    -0.150 -2.620 
Environmental 
quality  
0.007 13.104     
Decrease 
  -0.017 -15.701   
Increase 
  -0.002 -2.229   
50% decrease 
    -0.892 -15.568 
25% decrease 
    -0.355 -6.310 
25% increase 
    -0.070 -1.333 
50% increase 
    -0.072 -1.296 
Health care  0.012 22.063     
Decrease 
  -0.026 -21.094   
Increase 
  0.001 0.919   
50% decrease 
    -1.254 -19.738 
25% decrease 
    -0.566 -10.392 
25% increase 
    0.163 3.110 
50% increase 
    0.042 0.739 
Cost of living -0.050 -21.719     
Increase   -0.089 -19.114 -0.089 -19.056 
Decrease   0.031 9.446 0.031 9.224 
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N of subjects 
997  997  997  
Log Likelihood 
-4274  -3962  -3954  
AIC 
1.23  1.14  1.14  
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Table L.9 Country Survey Conditional-Logit Parameter Estimates of the Symmetric 
Linear, Asymmetric Linear and Categorical Models, Controlled for Non-Attendance to 
the Cost Attribute 
 
Symmetric 
Linear 
Asymmetric 
Linear 
Categorical 
 Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio 
Childhood poverty 
0.009 16.536     
Decrease 
  -0.021 -17.613   
Increase 
  -0.001 -0.605   
50% decrease 
    -1.064 -16.966 
25% decrease 
    -0.572 -9.939 
25% increase 
    -0.077 -1.170 
50% increase 
    -0.035 -0.552 
Environmental 
quality  
0.007 13.288     
Decrease 
  -0.019 -15.668   
Increase 
  0.000 -0.042   
50% decrease 
    -0.947 -15.220 
25% decrease 
    -0.428 -6.988 
25% increase 
    0.009 0.158 
50% increase 
    0.005 0.087 
Health care  0.013 23.179     
Decrease 
  -0.028 -20.879   
Increase 
  0.005 3.901   
50% decrease 
    -1.386 -19.889 
25% decrease 
    -0.615 -10.451 
25% increase 
    0.200 3.565 
50% increase 
    0.245 3.791 
Cost of living -0.105 -26.613     
Increase   -0.433 -21.967 -0.433 -21.816 
Decrease   0.044 9.234 0.043 8.981 
Non-attendant to 
cost attribute 
0.103 21.690     
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Increase   0.436 21.588 0.436 21.427 
Decrease   -0.035 -5.271 -0.034 -5.125 
       
N of subjects 
997  997  997  
Log Likelihood 
-4001  -3392  -3390  
AIC 
1.15  0.98  0.98  
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Table L.10 Country Survey Mean Annual WTP per Household from the Conditional-
Logit Parameter Estimates, Controlled for Non-Attendance to the Cost Attribute 
 Uncontrolled Controlled 
 WTP T Ratio WTP T Ratio 
Symmetric Linear Model 
Childhood poverty 
$8,117 13.70 $4,308 15.59 
Environmental quality 
$6,862 12.12 $3,428 12.78 
Health care 
$12,189 19.50 $6,340 21.53 
Asymmetric Linear Model 
Childhood poverty     
50% decrease 
$10,052 12.59 $2,436 14.60 
50% increase 
-$1,517 -2.45 -$84 -0.60 
Environmental quality     
50% decrease 
$9,728 11.93 $2,171 13.06 
50% increase 
-$1,281 -2.18 -6 -0.04 
Health Care     
50% decrease 
$14,393 14.55 $3,221 15.61 
50% increase 
$555 0.92 $547 3.99 
Categorical Model 
Childhood poverty 
    
50% decrease 
$10,326 12.35 $2,459 14.18 
50% increase 
-$1,682 -2.58 -$81 -0.55 
Environmental quality     
50% decrease 
$9,989 11.90 $2,188 12.81 
50% increase 
-$807 -1.28 $13 0.09 
Health Care     
50% decrease 
$14,050 14.17 $3,202 15.34 
50% increase 
$470 0.74 $566 3.88 
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Table L.11 By Ideology: Country Survey Conditional-Logit Parameter Estimates and 
Mean Annual WTP per Household from the Asymmetric Linear Model, Controlled for 
Non-Attendance to the Cost Attribute 
 
Moderate / Main-
Effects 
Liberal Conservative 
 Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio 
Childhood 
poverty 
      
Decrease 
-0.024 -12.117 -0.025 -11.137 -0.015 -7.263 
Increase 
-0.001 -0.419 0.000 -0.202 0.000 -0.191 
Environmental 
quality  
      
Decrease 
-0.021 -10.920 -0.023 -9.832 -0.013 -6.356 
Increase 
0.000 0.046 0.001 0.270 -0.001 -0.336 
Health care        
Decrease 
-0.029 -13.596 -0.026 -10.383 -0.029 -12.289 
Increase 
0.005 2.580 0.008 3.723 0.001 0.384 
Cost of living       
Increase -0.436 -20.893 -0.442 -20.866 -0.428 -20.259 
Decrease 0.045 6.403 0.041 6.037 0.045 6.658 
Non-attendant to 
cost attribute 
      
Increase 0.439 21.600     
Decrease -0.034 -5.108     
       
N of subjects 
997      
Log Likelihood 
-3375      
AIC 
0.98      
 
      
 
Mean 
WTP 
T ratio 
Mean 
WTP 
T ratio 
Mean 
WTP 
T ratio 
Childhood 
poverty 
      
50% Decrease 
$2,835 9.96 $1,743 6.92 $1,711 6.86 
50% Increase 
-$51 -0.20 -$48 -0.19 -$48 -0.19 
Food safety        
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50% Decrease 
$2,567 8.77 $1,555 6.08 $1,527 6.01 
50% Increase 
$65 0.27 -$79 -0.34 -$77 -0.34 
Environmental 
quality 
      
50% Decrease 
$2,944 9.04 $3,376 10.62 $3,314 10.10 
50% Increase 
$953 3.72 $94 0.39 $93 0.39 
Health care $2,835 9.96 $1,743 6.92 $1,711 6.86 
50% Decrease 
-$51 -0.20 -$48 -0.19 -$48 -0.19 
50% Increase 
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Table L.12 Country Survey Conditional-Logit Parameter Estimates of the Symmetric 
Nonlinear and Asymmetric Nonlinear Models, Controlled for Non-Attendance to the 
Cost Attribute 
 
Symmetric 
Nonlinear 
Asymmetric 
Nonlinear 
 Coef. T Ratio Coef. T Ratio 
Childhood poverty 0.010 16.307   
Poverty^2 
-2.04E-04 -11.377   
Decrease 
  -0.023 -5.622 
Increase 
  -0.004 -0.765 
Decrease^2 
  0.000 0.507 
Increase^2 
  0.000 0.724 
Environmental quality 0.008 14.332   
Environment^2 
-2.11E-04 -11.977   
Decrease 
  -0.016 -3.600 
Increase 
  0.001 0.226 
Decrease^2 
  0.000 -0.686 
Increase^2 
  0.000 -0.296 
Health Care 0.015 24.349   
Health^2 
-2.69E-04 -14.253   
Decrease 
  -0.022 -5.277 
Increase 
  0.011 2.774 
Decrease^2 
  0.000 -1.416 
Increase^2 
  0.000 -1.678 
Cost of living -0.128 -28.468   
Cost^2 -0.001 -9.107   
Increase   -0.416 -20.507 
Decrease   0.074 8.220 
Increase^2   -0.001 -3.115 
Decrease^2   -0.001 -4.079 
Non-attendant to cost 
attribute 
0.126 23.214   
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Increase   0.460 20.773 
Decrease   -0.028 -4.179 
     
N of subjects 
997  997  
Log Likelihood 
-3663  -3378  
AIC 
1.05  0.98  
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APPENDIX M 
ESTIMATES FOR EACH VERSION 
Table M.1 Mixed-Logit Random-Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors for Each 
Version 
 Version CFJ Version CFD Version CJD Version FJD 
 Coef. 
St.  
Error 
Coef. 
St.  
Error 
Coef. 
St.  
Error 
Coef. 
St.  
Error 
Early childhood  
        
decrease -0.029*** 0.003 -0.041*** 0.004 -0.022*** 0.004 NA  
increase 0.009*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.003 0.005 0.003 NA  
Food safety          
decrease -0.016*** 0.003 -0.021*** 0.003 NA  -0.022*** 0.003 
increase -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003 NA  0.007*** 0.002 
Job training          
decrease -0.018*** 0.003 NA  -0.016*** 0.004 -0.029*** 0.004 
increase 0.007** 0.003 NA  0.005 0.003 0.007** 0.003 
Disaster relief          
decrease NA
ұ
  -0.019*** 0.003 -0.015*** 0.003 -0.016*** 0.003 
increase NA  0.011*** 0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.006** 0.003 
Tax         
increase -10.648*** 0.836 -11.000*** 0.914 -10.802*** 0.915 -11.680*** 0.961 
decrease 0.163** 0.075 0.366*** 0.083 0.294*** 0.077 0.467*** 0.093 
Non-attendant 
to cost 
        
increase 10.259*** 0.830 10.712*** 0.913 10.586*** 0.911 11.379*** 0.953 
decrease -0.530*** 0.126 -0.660*** 0.138 -0.688*** 0.132 -0.560*** 0.136 
Cross-Effects         
Poverty inc * 
Food inc 
5.74E-
04*** 
1.4E-
04 
NA  NA  NA  
Job dec * 
Disaster dec 
NA  NA  1.03E-04 
1.4E-
04 
NA  
Job inc * 
Disaster inc 
NA  NA  
5.50E-
04*** 
1.7E-
04 
NA  
         
N of subjects 490  498  461  447  
Log Likelihood -1588  -1594 
 
 -1482 
 
 -1467 
 
 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level, and *** indicates at the 
1% level 
ұ 
NA denotes “not applicable”.  
 417 
 
Table M.2 Mixed-Logit Random-Parameter Estimates and Standard Deviations 
(standard errors are in parenthesis) for the Controlled and Uncontrolled Models 
 Controlled Uncontrolled 
 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
St. Deviation 
(St. Error) 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
St. Deviation 
(St. Error) 
Early childhood      
decrease 
-0.031*** 
(0.002) 
0.043*** 
(0.003) 
-0.028*** 
(0.002) 
0.041*** 
(0.002) 
increase 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.028*** 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.030*** 
(0.002) 
Food safety  
    
decrease 
-0.018*** 
(0.002) 
0.028*** 
(0.003) 
-0.017*** 
(0.002) 
0.026*** 
(0.002) 
increase 
-0.00004 
(0.002) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.002) 
0.021*** 
(0.002) 
Job training  
    
decrease 
-0.021*** 
(0.002) 
0.034*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.033*** 
(0.002) 
increase 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.022*** 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.025*** 
(0.002) 
Disaster relief  
    
decrease 
-0.016*** 
(0.002) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
-0.014*** 
(0.002) 
0.024*** 
(0.002) 
increase 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
0.018*** 
(0.003) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.020*** 
(0.003) 
Tax 
    
increase 
-11.078*** 
(0.469) 
NA
ұ
 
-1.531*** 
(0.051) 
NA
ұ
 
decrease 
0.323*** 
(0.041) 
NA 
0.132*** 
(0.031) 
NA 
Non-attendant to 
cost 
    
increase 
10.749*** 
(0.464) 
NA NA NA 
decrease 
0.592*** 
(0.068) 
NA NA NA 
Interactions 
    
Child_inc * Food_inc 
4.82E-04*** 
(9.05E-05) 
NA 
2.46E-04*** 
(7.66E-05) 
NA 
Job_inc * Disaster_inc 
3.58E-04*** 
(9.05E-05) 
NA 
2.11E-04*** 
(7.63E-05) 
NA 
Scale 
    
Version CFD 
-0.075*** 
(0.028) 
0.025 
(0.097) 
-0.051** 
(0.026) 
0.014 
(0.072) 
Version CJD 
0.024 
(0.031) 
0.131 
(0.105) 
0.033 
(0.027) 
0.046 
(0.107) 
Version FJD 
-0.039 
(0.028) 
0.017 
(0.074) 
-0.021 
(0.026) 
0.019 
(0.050) 
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N of subjects 
1896  1896  
Log Likelihood 
-6166  -7296  
AIC criterion 
0.936  1.107  
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level, and *** indicates at the 
1% level 
ұ 
NA denotes “not applicable”. 
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Table M.3 By Ideology: Mixed-Logit Random-Parameter Estimates and Standard 
Deviations (standard errors are in parenthesis) 
 
Moderates Liberals Conservatives Main-Effects 
 Parameter 
(St. Error) 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
St. Deviation 
(St. Error) 
Early childhood 
Decrease 
-0.031*** 
(0.003) 
-0.049*** 
(0.004) 
-0.016*** 
(0.003) 
0.038*** 
(0.003) 
Increase 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Increase (for 
Subjects with 
Experience) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.030*** 
(0.005) 
0.012**  
(0.005) 
NA
ұ
 
Food safety  
Decrease 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
-0.027*** 
(0.003) 
-0.015*** 
(0.002) 
0.028*** 
(0.003) 
Increase 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.003) 
Job training  
Decrease 
-0.026*** 
(0.002) 
-0.026*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.033*** 
(0.003) 
Increase 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.021*** 
(0.003) 
Disaster relief  
Decrease 
-0.019*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0.024*** 
(0.003) 
Increase 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.018*** 
(0.003) 
Taxes (non-random) 
Increase 
-10.799*** 
(0.446) 
NA 
Decrease 
0.205*** 
(0.047) 
0.003 
(0.061) 
0.569*** 
(0.053) 
NA 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level, and *** indicates at the 
1% level 
ұ 
NA denotes “not applicable”. 
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Table M.3 Ideology: Mixed-Logit Random-Parameter Estimates and Standard 
Deviations (standard errors are in parenthesis), continued 
 
Main-Effects 
 
Parameter 
(St. Error) 
St. Deviation 
(St. Error) 
Interactions 
Child_inc * Food_inc 
4.54E-04*** 
(8.72E-05) 
NA
ұ
 
Job_inc * Disaster_inc 
3.17E-04*** 
(9.28E-05) 
NA 
Scale  
Version CFD 
-0.077*** 
(0.029) 
0.015 
(0.454) 
Version CJD 
0.020 
(0.031) 
0.132 
(0.102) 
Version FJD 
-0.038 
(0.031) 
0.023 
(0.301) 
Non-attendant to the cost attribute 
Increase 
10.467*** 
(0.445) 
NA 
Decrease 
-0.481*** 
(0.063) 
NA 
   
N of observations 1896 
Log Likelihood -6052.083 
AIC criterion 0.921 
Degrees of freedom 42 
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** indicates at the 5% level, and *** indicates at the 
1% level 
ұ 
NA denotes “not applicable”. 
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